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This thesis presents four chapters on monetary and financial stability policies in Uganda. The
objectives address a number of research questions that have emerged following financial sector
reforms and a change in monetary policy framework in Uganda.
The first chapter considers the impact of monetary policy tightening on the sectoral composition
of banks’ loan books in Uganda. It also investigates for evidence of a balance sheet transmission
channel and tests whether some sectors in the Ugandan economy are disproportionately affected
by monetary policy. I document that a balance sheet channel is present, and the real estate and
agricultural sectors of the economy are disproportionately affected by the policy. The results
also indicate that bank capitalisation level is vital in the monetary policy transmission process
as banks with larger capital are in position to have better loan portfolio re-balancing across the
sectors.
In the second chapter I investigate whether sector borrowing channel exists in Uganda. Re-
sults show that bank lending and sector borrowing channels are operational in Uganda in all
currencies. As highlighted by Khwaja and Mian (2008), the existance of sector borrowing
channel in Uganda improves the efficacy of monetary policy. Although we have observed that
a sector borrowing channel is at work in Uganda, the role of the banks is important. We note
regional and non-DSIBs banks’ borrowers can offset the impact of credit supply shocks in both
local and foreign denominated currencies loans. However, local banks’ borrowers are unable to
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offset shocks in local and foreign denominated currencies borrowing. This may indicate that
these sectors resort to borrowing from non-bank sources. In addition, all types of banks are
more responsive to credit supply shocks, if loans are in foreign currencies this could affect the
transmission of monetary policy.
In the third chapter I study the impact of sterilised FX intervention on credit growth in Uganda,
in a banking environment characterised by capital and leverage constraints. I find sterilised
FX interventions dampen credit growth for a period of about six months and after which it
recovers. Evidence of a crowding-out channel is observed however, a exchange rate transmission
channel is insignificant. These results support a case for the use of FX interventions as financial
stability instruments. However, this may need further investigation as a need to balance this
tool with other macro-economic policies.
In final chapter we examine using a network approach, the transmission of idiosyncratic credit
supply shocks to aggregate volatility in a developing economy. In demonstrating the impli-
cations of our theoretical results in an empirical application to Uganda, the empirical results
suggest that idiosyncratic shocks to credit supply account for more than a third of the volatility
observed at the aggregate level. Results show that configuration of the network plays a marginal
part in determining aggregate volatility, whereas the architecture of financial intermediation
has a bigger effect. The Herfindahl index is no longer a sufficient statistic for explaining the
banking sector’s contribution to aggregate volatility.
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Since the early 1990s Uganda has undertaken a number of financial sector reforms that include
enhanced prudential regulation, measures to increase competition, diversification of financial
products, and the encouragement of deposit mobilisation. Additional measures have included
efforts in addressing informational asymmetry by establishing credit reference bureaus, financial
literacy schemes and financial consumer protection guidelines. All these policies were geared
towards correcting consequences of misguided financial policies in the previous period.
In line with the above reforms, in July 2011, the Bank of Uganda adopted an Inflation Targeting
Lite (ITL) from the Monetary Targeting Framework (MTF) under which monetary policy was
previously operated. The central bank moved to a price-based monetary policy regime that
was expected to influence interest rates in the economy. In this new framework, the Bank sets
policy interest rate (Central Bank Rate (CBR)) with aim of influencing the 7-day interbank
rate. From the start, the new monetary policy framework was set in an environment where
inflation was high and the financial sector dominated by the banking sector. This has led to a
number of research questions that I explore in this thesis. In its four chapters, the thesis covers
monetary and financial stability policies research questions.
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In the first chapter I examine the impact of monetary policy tightening on the sectoral com-
position of bank’s loan portfolio following a change in monetary policy framework in Uganda.
The chapter investigates for evidence of a balance sheet transmission channel and considers
whether some sectors of the economy are disproportionately affected by tight monetary policy.
Under the inflation targeting monetary policy framework, credit transmission mechanism is im-
portant, although it not extensively studied. Banks form an integral part of the transmission
system as they are the largest part of the financial system in Uganda and help implement the
central bank’s operation guidelines. I document that a balance sheet channel is operational
and the real estate and agricultural sectors of the economy are disproportionately affected by
the policy.
In the second chapter, I consider whether there is a sector borrowing channel in Uganda. Is the
inability of a borrowing sector(s) to smooth the impact of credit supply shock by borrowing
from alternative funding sources in our case these are other banks in the bank system. This
requires us to simultaneously disentangle bank lending channel from sector borrowing channel.
In this approach we have to separate demand and supply shocks as these are usually affected
by similar factors.
As the Ugandan economy liberalised financial, capital and exchange markets, the local currency
has been subject to both depreciation and appreciation pressures. As a policy the central bank
has carried out foreign currency interventions as in an effort to address excessive exchange
rate volatility, and manage monetary policy stance, as well as foreign reserves accumulation.
However, evidence in support of regular intervention in the foreign market is still limited. This
naturally leads us to the third chapter, where we investigate the impact of foreign exchange
intervention on credit growth in Uganda. I find sterilised FX interventions dampen credit
growth. The crowding-channel is the main transmission mechanism at work and the exchange
rate transmission channel is insignificant.
In the final chapter, we develop a theoretical model embedded with financial frictions and
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empirically consider how idiosyncratic microeconomic shocks from the banking sector are prop-
agated to the real economy. We find the bank Herfindahl index is no longer a sufficient statistic
to account for the banking system’s contribution to aggregate volatility. The configuration of
the production network plays a marginal part in determining aggregate volatility. However;
financial intermediation has an important role in amplifying microeconomic shocks to the real
economy. We finally find due to granularity and propagation mechanism via the intermediation
and production network, bank-level supply shocks have sizeable real implications.
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Chapter 2
Monetary Transmission Mechanism in
Uganda, evidence from banks’ sectoral
lending data
Abstract
The paper considers the impact of monetary policy tightening on the sectoral composition of
banks’ loan books in Uganda using banks’ quarterly sectoral lending data from 2011Q4 to
2016Q4. The central bank adopted a new monetary policy framework and operated a restric-
tive monetary policy during this period. The paper investigates for evidence of a balance sheet
transmission channel and tests whether some sectors in the Ugandan economy are dispropor-
tionately affected by monetary policy. An initial analysis considers whether relationships exists
between the policy rate and various sectoral lending compositions using Vector Auto-regression
(VECM) model. A further analysis is carried out using a generalised method of moment(GMM)
dynamic panel estimator as defined by Blundell and Bond(1998). Results suggest that long and
short run relationships exist between the policy rate and the sectoral lending variables. A bal-
ance sheet channel is present, and the real estate and agricultural sectors of the economy are
disproportionately affected by the policy. The results also indicate that bank capitalisation
level is vital in the monetary policy transmission process as banks with larger capital are in
position to have better loan portfolio re-balancing across the sectors.
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2.1 Introduction
In this paper we explore the impact of monetary policy tightening on the sectoral composition
of banks’ loan books in Uganda and its effect on some banks’ attributes. Efficacy of monetary
policy requires policy instruments used by the central bank to be effective in controlling aggre-
gate demand in the economy. In developing countries like Uganda, it is argued that the link
between the policy instruments and aggregate demand is weak in comparison to what is ob-
served in developed and emerging countries (Mishra and Montiel (2013)). Financial structures
of developing economies make the banking channel a dominant channel of monetary policy
transmission whose effectiveness will largely depend on the structure of the banking system
(Mishra and Montiel (2013)).
This is further compounded by the relationship between monetary policy actions, availability
and cost of credit in developing countries that is said to be weak, due to a lack of competition
in the formal financial sector as changes in banks’ costs of funds tends to feed into banks’
profits rather than the supply of banking credit (Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994)). In Uganda
the financial sector is dominated by the banking sector that accounts for about 80 per cent of
total assets of the financial system. The Ugandan banking system had 25 banks, of which 3
were considered domestic systematically important banks and controlled about 39 per cent of
the total bank assets and 38 per cent of the total banking lending as at the end of June 2016.
This suggests the financial sector is highly concentrated, with a few banks controlling a large
proportion of credit extension, which may hinder the monetary transmission process.
Under the newly implemented monetary policy framework “inflation targeting”, the credit
transmission mechanism is increasingly relevant in Uganda, although it is not extensively stud-
ied. In inflation targeting, monetary policy is implemented through interest rates. Banks are,
therefore, an integral part of the transmission mechanism as they make up the largest part
of the financial system in Uganda and help implement the Central Bank’s guidelines. To the
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best of my knowledge, the only paper that has considered this subject is a paper by Abuka,
Alinda, Minoiu, Peydró and Presbitero (2015), who examine the impact of monetary policy on
loans and real effects in Uganda and show an increase in interest rates reduces supply of bank
credit. Having highlighted some of the features of monetary policy transmission in developing
countries, analysing the impact of monetary policy in Uganda, is considered as monetary pol-
icy is now pivotal in this developing country. From a policy perspective, it has been widely
observed that restrictive monetary policy can be discriminatory in nature. Dedola and Lippi
(2005) used dis-aggregated industrial data of five developed economies and report significant
differences across industries that arise from monetary policy effects. A further implication of
this observation would suggest that caution is required when monetary policy is used.
Empirically works of Bernanke and Blinder (1992a) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1996) posits that monetary policy has a short-run effect on the real economy. The credit
channel theory was advanced as an alternative explanation for the short-run effects of monetary
policy as opposed to the traditional “interest rate view”. It stipulates an increase in short-term
nominal interests leads to an increase in longer-term nominal interest rates hence, affecting
the real interest rates. The credit channel assumes that the real economy is affected through
financial frictions between borrowers and lenders in the financial markets. Literature suggests
two different monetary policy channels operate under the credit channel, namely: the “balance
sheet” channel that predicts the amount of lending offered to borrowers is disrupted when
banks (lenders) get sensitive to the decreasing value of collateral and increased debt service as
a result of contractionary policy. In contrast, the “bank lending” channel operates through the
decrease in bank reserves as contractionary monetary policy takes effect, hence a reduction in
the amount of loanable funds, since central banks directly affect the supply side of financial
markets.
Weakness in Monetary Transmission Mechanisms (MTM) in developing countries have been
attributed to the current empirical methods used as observed by Mishra and Montiel (2013).
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In advanced economies, most empirical work on MTM use Structural Vector Auto-regressive
(SVAR) and Vector Auto-regressive (VAR) models, which assume that all the transmission
channels are operational.
Mishra and Montiel (2013) show most of the empirical work on MTM in developing economies
rely on the same assumptions and lags in policy effects as used in the advanced economies.
Initially, We use an unrestricted Vector Error Correction model(VECM) to establish existence
of relationships between the policy rate and various sector lending variables. Then dynamics
panel data methodology is employed, an approach based on less restrictive assumptions. The
impact of banks’ attributes and policy rate on the sectoral composition of loans data at bank
level is considered. With balance sheet and macroeconomic variables used as controls in the
analysis. The loans data, captures the volume of credit advanced and there is a need to
distinguish between factors that drive supply and demand of loans. The number of loans
applications variable is used to measure demand for loans in the study.
The results indicate long-run and short-run relationships exists between the policy rate and
different sector lending variables. In four out of nine sectors, the results show a tight monetary
policy leads to the reduction of credit advanced by these sectors. We also observe a significant
reduction in credit extension to real estate and agricultural sectors. This results is plausible, as
these sectors report the highest number of non-performing loans (see table A.2 in the appendix).
Banks with large capital make significant diversified loan portfolio allocations. These results
indicate a balance sheet transmission channel is operational in Uganda.
The paper is structured as following. Section 2.2 describes the stylised facts of the Ugandan
economy, Section 2.3, provides a literature review. In Section 2.4, we consider the data problem
and section 2.5 provides a data overview. Section 2.6 outlines the methodology used. Section
2.7 provides the results and Section 2.8 provides the conclusion.
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2.2 The Ugandan economy at a glance
2.2.1 Monetary Policy
In the 1970s and 1980s, Uganda’s monetary policy framework was used to finance government
activities, subsidise some sectors of the economy and for exchange rate management. These
activities led to an increase in inflation in the country. And due to these inflationary pressures
that built in the economy, the Bank of Uganda (BoU) adopted the Reserve Money Program
(RMP) framework in 1993 as a way of controlling the high inflation in the economy. Its objective
was to maintain price stability with reserve money acting as an operational target. However, In
July 2011, the Central Bank adopted the inflation-lite targeting framework; a modified version
of the commonly used inflation targeting framework to meet the challenges of macroeconomic
management generated by the transformation of the economy. In this new policy setting, the
Central Bank sets the Central Bank Rate (CBR) to a desired monetary policy stance for a
given period, usually a month. BoU then conducts Open Market Operations (OMO) to bring
the CBR in line with the 7-day interbank money market rate.
2.2.2 Financial Sector
The financial sector in Uganda has undergone reforms that include enhanced prudential reg-
ulation, measures to increase competition, diversification of financial products and a boost
in deposit mobilisation. The banking sector is well capitalised with average tier one capital
adequacy ratio and total capital adequacy ratio recorded at 19 per cent and 21.7 per cent
respectively by the end of 2016. In terms of retail funding, customer deposits contributed to
about 82 per cent of the total liabilities by the end of June 2016. Although small, the interbank
market and swaps market are the main sources of wholesale funding, this limits operation of
the bank lending channel as market-based funding cannot be used in place of deposits. In Table
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2.1, we observe bank lending across sectors and it shows the building and construction, trade
and commerce sector accounted for the largest share of lending at about 24 per cent and 18 per
cent respectively. The success of these reforms has been mixed; notably the system remains
underdeveloped in contrast to financial systems in advanced and emerging economies.
Jun-13 Jun-14 Jun-15 Jun-16
Manufacturing Share 14.4 13.7 16.1 14.6
Growth rate (YoY) 10.0 8.9 40.6 -5.5
Trade & commerce Share 20.3 20.8 19.5 17.9
Growth rate (YoY) -0.5 16.9 12.8 -4.9
Building & Construction Share 23.3 23.3 23.2 23.6
Growth rate (YoY) 6.2 14.3 19.8 5.2
Personal & household loans Share 13.8 17.4 15.2 15.9
Growth rate (YoY) -5.0 44.3 5.1 8.4
Source: Bank of Uganda.
Table 2.1: Analysis of sectoral lending
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2.3 Literature review
The role monetary policy as a tool of macroeconomic stabilisation largely depends on the way its
instruments, feed through to the real economy. In terms of monetary policy transmission, short-
term interest rates were traditionally seen as the only channel through which monetary policy
was transmitted. However, the effect of monetary policy on banking system and credit markets
has recently been singled out as an additional transmission mechanism commonly known as
the credit channel of monetary policy as observed by Bernanke and Gertler (1995). Due to
financial market imperfections, this transmission channel is further broken up into the bank
lending and balance sheet channels. In reviewing the literature, papers that use dis-aggregated
data according to some balance sheet attributes or sector(s) are first considered.
In response to Modigliani-Miller(MM) logic to banking, that argues that shocks to the liability
side of the balance sheet do not affect the banks’ supply of loans for a given interest, Kashyap
and Stein (1995) used disaggregated banks’ dataset to investigate whether a bank lending
channel was present in the US. The banks are split according to their asset sizes. The authors
report that the banks with the smallest assets experienced difficulty substituting into non-
deposit sources of funding after monetary policy changes hence, presenting evidence of a bank
lending channel in the US. They further suggest that these results were not robust enough to
distinguish between loan supply and loan demand shocks. We also note that the study uses
a short time series which may affect the use of these results. In this paper, banks in Uganda
are largely dependent on deposits as the main source of funding as deposits account for 82 per
cent of their funding according to the Financial Stability Report 2016. Therefore the need to
distinguish between deposit and non-deposit sources of funding is irrelevant.
Using data on US banks’ attributes, Kishan and Opiela (2000) and Kashyap and Stein (2000a),
examine for the presence of a credit channel and a banking lending channel of monetary pol-
icy respectively. The latter finds evidence of a credit and a bank lending channel while the
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former’s results suggest a bank lending channel was in operation in the US following a restric-
tive monetary policy as small banks with illiquid balance sheets responded most to changes in
policy. Kishan and Opiela (2000) note that capital and asset size was core in determining the
effects of monetary policy on loan growth. It was further observed that stabilisation policy and
regulatory policy were linked. The paper argues that in times of a contractionary monetary
policy an inadequately capitalised banking system may suffer a disproportionate reduction in
loan growth and economic growth. This observation may not be applicable for the Ugandan
banking system as all the commercial banks are well-capitalised with tier one capital adequacy
ratio and total capital adequacy ratios at 19 per cent and 21.7 per cent respectively (BoU 2016).
Recent papers that have studied the credit channel of monetary policy transmission, have used
data at loan-applications level; this includes data on the lenders and borrowers. The benefit of
this approach it has enables researchers to differentiate between changes in supply and demand
of loans. However, this methodology requires very rich data sets that are not readily available.
Jiménez and Ongena (2012) investigates whether contractionary monetary policy and poor
economic conditions reduce bank loan supply in the Spanish economy using banks’ balance-sheet
and credit register data. This resolves two identification problems of differentiating between
supply and demand of loans and the separation of monetary policy effects from economic
conditions. They report either higher short-term interest or lower GDP growth reduce loan
growth. And banks with low capital and liquidity felt the impact of higher interest rates or
lower GDP most.Also through the bank lending channel, monetary policy and business cycle
effects are transmitted. In our model of the bank balance sheet channel in Uganda, we intend
to use similar banks’ attributes in the analysis.
Aysun and Hepp (2013) use loan-level data to investigate the significance of balance sheet and
lending channels in monetary policy transmission in the U.S. Evidence of a balance sheet trans-
mission channel is observed following tight monetary policy. The paper highlights a diminished
role for the bank lending channel when banks become less dependent on deposits. However,in
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Uganda banks are dependent on deposits as a source of funding. The methodology employed in
this paper incorporates the borrower leverage and lender liquidity to allow for the separation of
the bank lending and balance sheet transmission channels. We take a similar approach but the
focus is on the balance sheet channel and use of the lender’s data as opposed to using both the
lenders and the borrowers. This is done to compensate for the lack of data on the borrowers.
Most of empirical work on the credit channel has been done in developed economies. In de-
veloping countries, a paper by Abuka et al. (2015) investigates the impact of monetary policy
on loans and real effects in Uganda and finds evidence of an increase in interest rates reduces
supply of bank credit. The paper reports evidence of a weak bank lending channel and a strong
balance sheet channel in Uganda. The methodology used in this paper is closely related to
the works of Jiménez and Ongena (2012) in that it combines banks’ lending data with credit
register data. The paper provides a good starting point for our research, although we depart
in terms of techniques used and the principal question of interest.
Several authors have considered the impact of contractionary monetary policy on sectors of the
economy and these include:
Dale and Haldane (1995), estimate a sectoral SVAR model for the UK and find significant
sectoral differences in the monetary transmission. The approach identifies a distinct money
(interest) and credit channels in the transmission of monetary policy. In using aggregated
data, the paper loses some information, making it difficult to justify the handling of monetary
policy instrument as contemporaneous exogenous variable to all the other variables under study.
The data fails to resolve the identification problem as the paper notes, determining the relative
contributions of money and credit is impossible.
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), consider changes in investment patterns of small and large firms
in the manufacturing sector in the US after monetary policy changes. After a restrictive mone-
tary policy is implemented, the authors report evidence of a broad credit channel as investment
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spending is closely related to the internal funds for small firms. This close link reflects the higher
premium associated with external funds. The rise in premium may indicate a deterioration in
the quality of the borrower’s balance sheet as lenders reduce on credit offered.
In Europe, De Bondt (1998) uses disaggregated bank balance sheet data to investigate the
presence of credit channels during a period of financial liberalisation and deregulation using a
VECM. Credit to the household sector was more responsive to restrictive monetary policy as
compared to firms in the economy. A bank lending channel was observed in Germany, Belgium
and the Netherlands, while a balance sheet channel was reported in Germany and Italy. No
credit channel was observed in the United Kingdom as the minimum reserve requirement was
not strict, coupled with banks’ ability to find non-deposit funding sources thereby rendering the
monetary transmission channel inefficient. Although the paper uses banks’ holding of securities
as a proxy for loans, this treatment still falls short as banks’ securities holdings have an element
of demand and therefore the identification problem is not resolved in the paper.
Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro (2007) use the vector autoregressive analysis to study port-
folio behaviour of bank loans during a monetary policy tightening and report that real estate
and consumer loans fall sharply, while commercial and industrial loans increase when policy
is tightened. When a non-monetary downturn was considered commercial and industrial loans
sharply decrease, while real estate and consumer loans hardly change. The paper supports a
case for caution when tight monetary is used as it may disproportionately affect some sectors
of the economy. The paper fails to distinguish between the supply and demand of loans, the
identification problem.
Kandrac (2012), tests for a balance sheet channel of monetary policy in the US using banks’
data and panel data analysis techniques during tight monetary policy conditions. The paper
notes, banks decreased the proportion of credit extended to “small” borrowers. Smaller banks,
that lend to small businesses felt the impact of monetary policy tightening most. This paper
also finds support for a balance sheet effect on small borrowers rather than on small lenders.
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The author notes that a balance sheet channel operates regardless of whether or not the banking
lending channel exists, as this paper focuses on the balance sheet lending channel. In our paper,
sectors of the Ugandan economy are considered as “small” sectors due to a lack of a similar
classification and the different levels of economic development.
While some of the above papers use the SVAR/VAR methodologies to analyse the data, these
techniques are known to perform poorly in measuring MTM in developing countries as the
choice of an appropriate monetary policy indicator and the identification of the exogenous
monetary policy shocks is difficult, as noted by Mishra and Montiel (2013). Defining an em-
pirically observable indicator for monetary policy stance, usually identifying the intermediate
target is difficult. An incorrect choice of this indicator, may fail to strip out the independent
effects of monetary policy as the correlation between the instrument and aggregate demand
may be affected by other variables. These have been further compounded by the weak and un-
derdeveloped financial markets that exist in these economies. For instance, these economies are
less integrated with international financial markets and are prone to foreign exchange market
interventions rendering the exchange rate channel a less effective transmission channel. The
poorly developed capital markets also affect the effectiveness of the traditional interest rate
and the asset channel. In this paper, the limitations are noted and Kandrac (2012) approach
in investigating the impact of monetary policy on sectors of the Ugandan economy is followed.
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2.4 Data problem
The theory behind the financial accelerator of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) argues
when borrowers face high agency costs in credit markets they should receive a comparatively
lower share of credit offers during an economic downturn. It also suggests that economic
downturns affect the access to credit and real economic activity of high agency cost borrowers.
As real interest rates increase after monetary policy tightening, asset prices decrease, making
collateral used for borrowing by firms less valuable. In such situations financial intermediaries
keen on maintaining healthy balance sheets will reduce on credit advanced to these less credit
worthy firms hence, increasing the external finance premium. The purpose of this paper is
therefore to use banks’ balance sheets to identify potential transmission mechanisms through
to sectors of the Ugandan economy. The data contains information on loans offered by banks
to different sectors of the economy. The research question is addressed by a methodology used
by Kandrac (2012).
The dependent variable is computed as sectoral share of loans advanced by each bank. Al-
though, data on loan demand is not available we use the number of loan applications as a
variable to capture loan demand. As noted by Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) who suggest that
initially small firms will demand for more loans as a response to contractionary monetary policy
as they try to deal with a fall in sales, these findings point to firms facing a credit rationing.
In less developed financial sector we assume that these same observations hold. In addition, it
is reported that firms, especially the small ones, resort to the informal banking system to meet
their loan demand (Byaruhanga 2010) as banks restrict credit to these firms.
In addition, Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) show that in times of a monetary contraction the
linkage between internal funds and investment tightens significantly for small firms 1 while
no change was observed in the large firms. This may point to the difficulty that small firms
1These are the generic firms that operate in Uganda and excludes government bodies and multinational
corporations.
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encounter as the supply of external funds is restricted by banks, when restrictive policy is
used and as such, firms resort to using their internal sources of funding. As we assume that
all firms response to the increase in policy rate by demanding more credit, we would expect
the lending ratios to increase. This implies that any reduction in the sectoral lending ratios,
provides evidence of a balance sheet monetary policy channel. In the analysis, we investigate
whether there is a relationship between the policy rate and sector lending data. And finally
the data is modelled using panel data techniques.
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2.5 Data
The paper uses aggregated and dis-aggregated banks’ sectoral lending data. The aggregated
data is a summation of all the sectoral lending of all banks and is used as a time-series dataset
in the vector auto-regression model. The dis-aggregated bank level data is used in the panel
data analysis and all the data is obtained from the Bank of Uganda. The lending data is
made up of loans in local and foreign currencies. Foreign currency loans are converted to
the local currency using the prevailing exchange rates and aggregated as our lending data.
Each bank’s dis-aggregated data is split into these sectors of the economy: agriculture, mining
and quarrying, manufacturing, trade, transport and communication, community, social and
other services, electricity and water, building, mortgage, construction and real estate, business
services and finally personal loans and households’ loans. The quarterly data on sectoral lending
of commercial banks covers period from 2011Q3 to 2016Q4. This period captures when a
new monetary policy framework became operational and the Central Bank tightened policy to
control the high inflation at the time. The analysis will focus on all the sectors of the economy
that borrowed from the banks. Although heterogeneity exists between banks and sectors, we
cannot distinguish between old and new loans. We also expect bank loans to exhibit persistent
as loans usually involved new and old borrowing through restructuring of the loan payments,
additional new borrowing due to increased credit limits and overdrafts.
The dependent variable is computed as a ratio of the total loans offered by each bank to a
sector hence, the dependent variable captures balance sheet channel rather than the banking
lending channel. Banks lent on average about 24 per cent of their loan portfolio to the building,
mortgage, construction and real sector, with one bank lending up to 72 per cent of their loan
book. Banks also on average lent about 23 per cent to the trade sector with one bank lending
about 71 per cent of its loan book. The least lent sector was the mining and quarrying sector
reporting an average of 1 per cent of banks’ loans (see Table 2.2). The quarterly data on banks’
balance sheet is used to study the credit channel and we consider bank’s attributes that measure
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the liquidity, the assets, capitalisation and profitability. A bank’s liquidity is defined as a ratio
of liquid asset to total assets, while capital is defined as the ratio of total capital to total assets.
Profitability is defined as the ratio of net profit to total assets and finally the log of total assets
presents the assets of that bank. The robustness of our results is tested by splitting the data into
the fourth and second quartiles according to the level of bank capitalisation. As the banking
sector is highly concentrated, with few banks owning the largest proportion of the sector’s total
assets. In this specification, we also introduce a non-performing loans variable, defined as a
ratio of non-performing loans to total bank credit as a control. The central bank’s bank rate
(CBR) is used as a policy rate and used as measure of monetary policy stance. Quarterly GDP
data is used to measure economic activity. Inflation is measured by core inflation, a standard
measure used by the Central Bank.
Mean Std.Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations
Economics sectors
Real Estate 0.24 0.14 0.00 0.72 475
Trade 0.23 0.18 0.00 0.71 475
Transport 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.44 474
Personal loans 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.45 433
Manufacturing 0.13 0.11 0.00 0.62 468
Commercial 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.93 475
Agriculture 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.30 475
Business 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.41 475
Mining 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.10 458
Bank attributes
Capital 22.95 13.68 -17.71 94.66 502
Liquidity 35.45 15.97 11.37 104.32 502
Return on Assets 1.27 3.23 -20.95 8.08 501
Ln Asset 8.54 0.59 6.98 9.66 502
Macroeconomic variables
Core Inflation 7.07 5.37 1.90 22.40 525
Headline Inflation 7.26 6.11 1.90 24.10 525
Leading Indicator 1.53 1.02 0.16 3.59 525
Real Policy rate 7.31 2.66 -0.40 10.20 525
Policy rate 14.38 3.63 11.00 22.00 525
Source: Bank of Uganda.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for bank, sectoral and macro variables.
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2.6 Methodology
2.6.1 Vector error correction model
In motivating this paper, we investigate the relationship between the policy rate and the various
sectors of the economy using the monthly aggregated dataset. All the data is subjected to unit
roots tests2. Results suggest that some non-stationary variables are present, leading us to
implementing a VECM. The VECM model is presented as VAR(p) of a mixture of I(1) and
I(0) variables and ignoring the constants and deterministic trends, the model is initially specified
as follows:
Xt = Φ1Xt−1 + ...+ ΦpXt−p + εt (2.1)
Where Xt is a K-dimensional vector of observable variables, εt is a k-dimensional vector of
reduced-form error terms. Without considering the deterministic terms we can subtract Xt−1
on both sides of equation 1,and write it in form of an error correction representation.
∆Xt = ΠXt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
Φ∗i∆Xt−1 + εt (2.2)
Where Π = −(Ik −Φ1 − ...−Φp) and Φ∗i = −(Φi+1 + ...+ Φp) and ∆Xt is first difference of X
as shown in (2.2). We observe from (2.2), that Xt−1 is the only nonstationary variable. Since
the left-hand side of the equation is I(0), this implies that the term ΠXt−1 should be an I(0). If
the matrix Φ is singular of rank r that means we can have r linearly independent cointegrating
relationships. Suppose the matrix Φ is a K × K matrix of rank r, it can be expressed as a
product of two K × r matrices of full column rank. If we defineα and β as two K × r matrices
of rank r then Π = αβ
′
.







Φ∗i∆Xt−1 + εt (2.3)
The VECM is finally specified in (2.3), the error correction term αβ
′
Xt−1
In the estimation process the data is subjected to unit roots test, after which we determine the
optimal lag length with a number of information criteria. We then investigate for the presence
of a cointegrating rank and with these findings we then run the model. The validity of the
model is tested from normality and auto-correlation. The error correction term, that measures
the speed of adjustment from the equilibrium level, is observed with a negative expected sign
as an indication of correction mechanism. For the short run dynamics, the Wald test is used
to examine whether coefficients of a variable are jointly significant(see Table A.5).
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2.6.2 Dynamic panel model
Although results from the VECM suggest that long run and short run relationships exists
between the policy rate and the different sectoral lending, we are mindful of whether some
of the banks’ characteristics may account for these findings. In the preliminary analysis of
dis-aggregated data is subjected to Fisher’s panel unit roots tests and results show that all
the variables are stationary3. To investigate this further, we employ panel data analysis tech-
niques in the analysis of the problem. Identification of parameters using panel data methods
can be made with less restrictive assumptions on exogeneity of covariates that other methods
like time-series or cross-sectional techniques use. The method also controls for any potential
biases that may result from endogeneity because of the inclusion of lagged dependent variables.
The methodology used in this paper will closely follow Kandrac (2012). The sectoral share
of loans advanced by each bank is computed and used as the dependent variable. The inclu-
sion of bank-specific variables such as assets, capital and liquidity in the model specification
is supported by credit channel literature. For instance, Kashyap and Stein (2000,1995) and
Kishan and Opiela(2000) report that big banks are less responsive to changes in monetary pol-
icy. To account for these differences in the balance sheet channel these bank specific variables
(BSV) are interacted with the policy variable (RCBR*BSV). Gross domestic product(GDP)
and the consumer price index are used to measure the real economy. In addition, a real policy
rate to measure the monetary policy stance is applied in the analysis of the problem. In the
computation of real policy rate, core inflation is used as the measure of inflation. All the vari-
ables are then tested for presence of panel unit roots tests as loan data are known to exhibit
persistent. In estimation, we note that developments in the banking sector have a potential
to impact on monetary policy decisions, creating an endogeneity problem to mitigate this, we
make use of the dynamic General Methods of Moments (GMM) panel methodology. The GMM
methodology is also used to control for any likely correlation between bank-level fixed effects
and their lagged dependent variables and loans are known to be sticky, Bernanke and Blinder
3Details of the Fisher’s panel unit roots test are presented in Table A.4 in the appendix.
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(1992b). The approach involves obtaining first differences of the equation to eliminate unob-
served heterogeneity. In the estimation, we employ the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator
that incorporates an additional assumption to the standard Arellano-Bond estimator by im-
posing further restrictions on the dependent variable process. The Arellano-Bond estimator
exhibits “substantial downward bias when the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is
close to unity, as then the dependent variable follows a near random walk and lagged levels
correlate poorly with lagged differences, thus creating a weak instrument problem.” It is as-
sumed that the first differences of instrument variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects
and this helps to cater for more instruments hence, improve efficiency. This estimator can be
used in situations where the models are weakly exogenous and have predetermined covariates.
The dependent variable is defined as in (2.4), and the dynamic panel model is specified as in
(2.5), below:
Γi,j ,t =
total loans to sectorj at periodt















+ µiBSVi,t−1 +χGDPt + νi + ψj + εi,j ,t (2.5)
For I = 1,. . . ..,N banks, j= 1,. . . ..,K sectors, t is the time, RCBR is the real policy rate. GDP
measures economic activity and BSV is a vector of bank specific variables:capital, liquidity,
assets, profitability. In the equation bank attributes such as LIQ as the liquidity of a specific
bank, CAP as the capital of a specific bank. ROA as return to assets, a measure of profitability
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of a specific bank.
Where νi represents the unobserved bank-level effects, ψj represents the unobserved sector-
level effects and εi,j ,t. The error term is assumed to be independent and identically distributed
X∼N (µ, σ2).
From the estimated results we are particularly interested in the sign of policy rate variable
that can be either βj > 0 or βj < 0 in (2.5), indicating that banks can re-balance their loan
portfolio from some sectors to other sectors. With restrictive monetary policy is operation,
the real policy rate is assumed to increase as firms response by demanding more credit to met
their fall in sales and a need to finance inventories and therefore a negative coefficient of real
policy rate will be consistent with the balance sheet channel theory as noted in the previous
section. A positive coefficient on the other hand, may indicate that the banks are willing to
increase lending to some sectors a case for portfolio balancing and therefore this may not rule
out the presence of a bank lending channel. According to the theory of the credit channel these




In this section I consider the VECM model results, shown in Table A.5 in the appendix. The
results indicate a long-run relationship exists between the policy rate and the various sectors of
the economy. The cointegrating equation, shows 10 per cent of the disequilibrium is corrected
in one month, implying that it will take an average of a year for the policy rate to attain
equilibrium. In the short-run all the sectors have a positive significant relationship with the
policy rate with the exception of community services, where an insignificant value is observed.
However, a joint test of coefficients using the Wald test shows that community, electricity
and transport sectors are insignificant. This implies there is no granger causality between the
policy rate and these sectors. Sectors that received a lower percentage of credit resulted to larger
increases in the policy rate. The VECM model establishes that short and long-run relationships
exist between the different sectoral lending variables and the policy rate. However, this finding
does not address the research question; it provides support for further analysis. Using panel
data analysis techniques to control for macroeconomic conditions and characteristics of lending
banks, the research question is analysed in the next subsection.
2.7.2 Panel data results
In the estimation process, we test for the auto-correlation 4(StataCorp 2015). Also loans are
known to have persistence and the Sargan test5is used to test for the overidentifying restrictions
as instruments are used. Detailed results of other variables and the interactive terms used in
4Identically distributed idiosyncratic errors are serially correlated in first difference, rejecting the null hy-
pothesis of no serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at order one does not imply that the model is
misspecified.
5Under Variance-covariance matrix (VCE) vce(robust) assumption, the asymptotic distribution properties
are unknown and the system GMM, can’t compute the vce(robust) option
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the analysis are presented in the appendix. For presentation purposes, results of policy are
shown here. The policy rate coefficients and associated t-statistics are the main variables of
interest in our analysis. In the baseline model in Table 2.3, I control for loan demand using the
number of applications for loans. In six out of nine sectors, the demand variable coefficients are
significant. However, the magnitude of these coefficients are insignificant in real terms. In the
four out of nine sectors, namely real estate, transport, agriculture and trade sectors, a negative
sign is associated to policy rate variable for each sector. This illustrates that an increase in
the policy rate leads to a reduction in lending to these particular sectors if deemed less credit
worthy. However, the real estate and the agriculture sectors show significant changes in the
policy rate. With a unit increase in the policy rate decreases the proportion of lending to the
real estate sector by 0.065 immediately, from an average share of lending of 0.25.
The share of agriculture sector lending decreases by 0.040 per cent after two quarters from
an average of 7 per cent if the policy rate is increased by 100 basis points. However, all the
increments across the different sectors are marginally significant. These observations may not
necessary rule out the existence of balance sheet as the upward pressure on the lending ratio
following a monetary policy shock might have dominated any changes in banks’ loan portfolios
preferences. As per banks’ attributes, results show some statistically significant values for
liquidity, assets and capital for some sectors. However, these values are likely to have marginal
impact on the lending shares. For these values to affect the given sectors, the Central Bank
will have to increase the policy rate by a bigger margin. The results show the real estate sector
was sensitive to economic activity and on average this sector receives the highest amount of
credit from the banks, with a percentage increase in policy rate leading to 0.004 decrease after
two quarters on the average lending share of 0.24 this result will have a marginal effect on the
lending ratio.
The robustness of our results is tested by considering quarterly banks’ lending data, split
according to the level of capitalisation. The data is split into two quartiles with the fourth
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quartile made up of the largest banks in Uganda and second quartile , banks with an average
level of capitalisation. This is of particular interest as the banking sector in Uganda is highly
concentrated with the largest three banks commanding the largest volume of loans. In addition,
a non-performing loans variable is included in the specification of the model. As noted earlier,
for presentation purposes we only show results of the policy rate as seen in Table 2.4, results
shown are broadly in line with the baseline model. The coefficients of the non-performing loans
are significant with the exception of the trade and community sectors.
In Table 2.5 results from the second quartile are shown, the expected sign is obtained in five
out of the nine sectors with similar magnitudes to the coefficients of the baseline model. The
expected sign attached to the policy rate is negative, indicating the balance sheet channel is
operational. However, for their impact to affect the shares of lending, the Central Bank has to
pursue an aggressive monetary tightening policy. Notably the real estate and agriculture are
insignificant in this model specification. However, these sectors have the highest non-performing
assets, this may suggest that banks with average level of capitalisation avoid lending to these
two sectors. Is a risk transmission channel at work? These results from the second quartile
show that it takes a longer time for monetary policy tightening to feed-through to the sectoral
lending. These findings may reflect the role of bank capital is important in the transmission
mechanism.
Under the tightened monetary policy regime, results show sectoral composition of bank credit
changes. These changes are pronounced when the policy rate coefficient is negative. When the
policy coefficient is positive we find some significant values. However, these changes are not big
in real terms. This finding may indicate that banks are cautious when increasing credit limits
in times of restricted monetary policy. Some bank attributes like liquidity, capital and size
of the bank are statistically significant but these values have marginal effects on the amount
lent and can have a bigger impact if large increases in the policy rate are implemented by the
Central Bank.
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In this chapter, we have focused on the balance sheet transmission as the main transmission
system, but this approach fails to distinguish between the risk taking and balance sheet chan-
nels. The risk taking channel aims at capturing the impact of monetary policy stance on the
perception of risk and its pricing. For instance, during a restrictive monetary policy phase fi-
nancial intermediaries are sensitive to risk and therefore tend to reduce on the amount of credit
advanced to firms, while the balance sheet channel takes into consideration the creditworthi-
ness of the borrowers based on the collateral values and profitability. We have assumed that a
negative coefficient associated to the policy rate is an indicator of a balance sheet channel as
highlighted in the previous section. In order to differentiate these channels, we need data over
a longer time horizon, an appropriate interest rate spread that can be used to capture risk. The
data also limits us in that it only covers a period when the Central Bank changed its monetary
policy framework and embarked on a monetary tightening regime. To identify the risk channel
we may need both periods of tight and loose policy. In addition, we know that interest rates are
quite sticky in developing countries and therefore this may hinder the transmission of monetary




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter looks for evidence of monetary transmission mechanism with special reference
to the balance sheet lending channel in Uganda following the introduction of new monetary
policy framework. We find some evidence of a balance sheet transmission in Uganda, with the
real estate and the agriculture sectors being disproportionately affected by restrictive monetary
policy. These results are consistent with findings of Kandrac (2012). However, this has far
reaching consequences in the Ugandan economy which is largely an agro-based economy and a
reduction in credit to this sector will affect the overall growth in the country. Similarly, the real
estate sector receives the largest proportion of credit advanced by banks and a big reduction in
credit will surely affect growth in the country. This creates a policy dilemma for the Central
Bank as growth enters into their objective function. These results also show that the level of
bank capitalisation is important in determining what is lent by banks to the various sectors
this finding is in line with what was reported by Kishan and Opiela (2000) for the US economy.
As we observe, banks with average level of capitalisation fail to lend to the agricultural and
real estate sectors. However, the common thread with these sectors is that they have the
largest amount of non-performing loans. This raises the question: Are banks responding to the
perceived risk associated with these sectors? If so, this brings another dimension to the debate
and that is: Do we have a risk transmission channel at play? There is a need to distinguish
between the balance sheet and risk taking transmission channels.
In the next chapter, we consider monetary policy efficacy by investigating whether a sector
borrowing channel 6 is operational in Uganda. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Stein (1998)
argue that for monetary policy efficacy, credit market imperfections are required at both
bank and firm levels.
6This term is used in this chapter as opposed to the standard “firm borrowing channel” used in literature as




Does a sector borrowing channel exist
in Uganda?
Abstract
In this chapter I investigate whether a sector borrowing channel exists in Uganda. Based on data
from a credit register during the period between 2012Q1 and 2020Q2. I employed fixed effect
models as described by Alfaro, Garćıa-Santana and Moral-Benito (2019), that allows for the use
of bank and sector fixed effects. Results show that bank lending and sector borrowing channels
are operational in Uganda in all currencies. As highlighted by Khwaja and Mian (2008), the
existence of a sector borrowing channel in Uganda improves the efficacy of monetary policy.
Although I have observed a sector borrowing channel is at the work in Uganda, the role of the
banks is important. I note regional and non-DSIB banks’ borrowers can offset the impact of
credit supply shocks from loans in all currencies. However, local banks’ borrowers are unable
to offset shocks in both local and foreign currencies borrowing. This may indicate these sectors
resort to borrowing from non-bank sources. In addition, all types of banks are more responsive
to credit supply shocks, if loans are in foreign currencies this could affect the transmission




Implementation of monetary policy needs the Central Bank to control aggregate demand in
the economy. In terms of monetary policy efficacy, the theoretical work of Bernanke and
Blinder (1988), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Stein (1998), argue that the transmission of
financial shocks to the economy requires credit market imperfections at both bank and firm
levels. An empirical study by Khwaja and Mian (2008) shows market frictions exist at bank
and firm levels. The study highlights the importance of the “firm borrowing channel” in the
bank lending transmission channel.
In Uganda, empirical work by Abuka, Alinda, Minoiu, Peydro and Presbitero (2019) and Opolot
and Nampewo (2014) shows that a banking lending channel is operational. I differ from these
papers by investigating for market frictions at bank and sector levels hence, whether bank
lending and sector borrowing channels are functional in Uganda. In the estimation of the
sector borrowing channel, I simultaneously disentangle the bank lending channel 1 from the
sector borrowing channel 2. This approach can be limited, if we lack data that links banks
to different sectors over a period of time. I note an identification problem may arise from the
separation of demand and supply shocks, as these shocks could be driven by similar factors. In
this chapter, we estimate the bank lending and sector borrowing channels in Uganda, developing
country characterised by a bank-dominated financial sector. I use dis-aggregated banks’ sector
lending data over a period of time.
Methodologically, I use bank-time-specific credit supply shocks identified by differences in credit
growth between banks lending to the same sector, in the spirit of (Alfaro et al. 2019). This
provides plausible exogenous shocks as sectors may react to a negative bank supply shock
by borrowing from another bank(s) or consider resorting to a non-bank funding source. The
1The inability of banks to protect borrowing sectors from bank-specific liquidity shocks.
2The inability of borrowing sectors to smooth the impact of bank lending channel by borrowing from alter-
native funding sources.
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latter may be limited in Uganda, given that the financial sector is not developed. As in Amiti
and Weinstein (2018a) and Alfaro et al. (2019), my approach is based on a linear model that
specifies the growth rate of loans from an individual bank to an individual sector as a function
of bank-time and sector-time fixed effects.
Loan level data from the credit register compiled by Compuscan a credit reference bureau
operating in Uganda is employed. The data contains loan level information for the banking
sector offered on a quarterly basis across all sectors of the economy and covers the period
between 2012Q1 and 2020Q2. Using the credit register data gives us the benefits of studying
lending relationships between banks and sectors over time.
In validating the estimated bank-supply shocks the sample is split into Domestic Systematically
Important Banks (DSIB) and non-Domestic Systematically Important Banks (non-DSIB). The
data is further split into local, international and regional banks. With the increase of foreign
currency lending in Uganda I explore whether banks and their borrowers behave differently in
their lending and borrowing decisions. No significant differences are observed in the estimated
supply shocks. Since no significant difference is observed in credit advanced by these banks we
should expect no significant difference in the estimated bank-supply shocks and therefore our
results are plausible.
This empirical work complements the above papers with results for Uganda. Evidence is pre-
sented from a different environment, namely a developing economy where financial market are
relatively less developed and subject to substantial financial frictions. I find support for bank
lending and sector borrowing channels. The result suggests a significant sector borrowing chan-
nel was at work in non-DSIB and regional banks based on local and foreign currency loans.
During periods of liquidity shocks, results indicate DSIB and international banks borrowers
respond by borrowing in foreign currency to offset the impact of the shocks. Also, based on
foreign and all currencies lending, we note a non-significant sector borrowing channel for local
banks’ borrowers. This shows local banks’ borrowers are unable to offset the impact of liquidity
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shocks and therefore resort to informal funding sources.
3.1.1 Related literature:
In the first strand of the literature we consider papers that study the bank lending channel as
a transmission mechanism of shocks. Khwaja and Mian (2008) study how supply side bank
liquidity shocks feed through to the economy in Pakistan using firm fixed effects models. They
show a bank lending channel was operational in Pakistan. Observed is large firms are able
to hedge against this shock by borrowing from other banks. This paper introduces the fixed
effects method as a new approach of disentangling credit supply from demand. We follow a
similar approach with fixed effect models used in the analysis. The fixed effect approach is
used to estimate the unobservable covariance between credit shocks and credit demand shocks.
However, this approach needs an instrument(s) that can be used to identify credit supply
shocks. In this paper it was sanctions following a nuclear test by Pakistan. The method limits
the scope of a study to a particular event hence, it can’t be used over a long time horizon.
Abuka et al. (2019) show a bank lending channel is functional in Uganda using credit register
data and regression techniques. The strong banking lending channel had big effects on real
activity. Also noted, banks with lower capital transmitted monetary policy more. In addition,
banks with higher liquidity responded to credit supply more. Although the paper, controls for
credit demand on industry and district basis we differ in that we consider a sector breakdown.
In another country-specific case, Opolot and Nampewo (2014) examine the relevance of bank
lending channel of monetary policy in Uganda and employ a dynamic panel methodology in the
analysis. The results indicate that a bank lending channel was operational in Uganda. They
further show bank characteristics such as liquidity and capitalisation are vital in influencing
the supply of loans. These findings are broadly in line with established literature. See Jiménez,
Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2012) and Kashyap and Stein (2000b).
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Abuka et al. (2019) and Opolot and Nampewo (2014) confirm the presence of a bank lending
channel in Uganda using micro data. However,these papers don’t address the role of supply and
demand shocks. So we take it to the next step by estimating the supply and demand shocks
arising from banks’ lending activity.
Another literature strand has focused on the real effects of banking lending shocks and these
papers consider the problem. Amiti and Weinstein (2018a) investigate the impact of supply-side
financial shocks on firms’ investments using a new methodology of disentangling firm-borrowing
shocks from bank supply shocks. Loan growth rates are expressed as a function of bank-time
fixed effects and firm-time fixed effects. They show these effects were large. Based on a similar
approach Alfaro et al. (2019) investigate the real effects of banking shocks and how they feed
through to the economy based on Spanish data. The study shows credit supply shocks are
sizable to real variables. Our paper closely follows this methodology and focuses on the firm
borrowing channel. This approach resolves all the limitations highlighted in Khwaja and Mian
(2008) and therefore is applicable to our data.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 3.1, we provide an introduction and some related
literature; Section 3.2 explores bank intermediation in Uganda, Section 3.3 ; looks at the data
used in the paper; Section 3.4, considers the empirical analysis and finally Section 3.5 provides
concluding remarks.
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3.2 Bank intermediation in Uganda
3.2.1 Institutional background
Although Uganda’s recent economic history has seen significant financial development, most
indicators of financial development are still low by international standards. Similar to most
low income countries, financial market depth in general, and the size of the banking system in
particular, are smaller – in terms of domestic credit relative to GDP – and less open – in terms
of de jure and de facto measures of financial integration – in Uganda than their counterparts
in developed countries (Abuka et al., 2019; Bremus and Buch, 2015). Table 3.1 provides some
relevant statistics for Uganda from the Bank of Uganda, Financial Stability Department.
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
(1) Private credit by financial sector to GDP(%) 10.38 11.93 11.14 11.56 11.42 11.20 11.23 11.67 11.86
(2) Private credit by banks to GDP(%) 9.98 11.45 10.71 11.08 10.89 10.69 10.69 10.96 11.20
(3) Bank dependence [(2)/(1)] 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94
(4)Total loans to total deposits(%) a 74.96 73.42 70.48 73.14 70.67 64.41 65.18 64.71 61.16
(5)Total loans to total assets(%) 50.70 48.53 47.47 49.37 48.29 44.20 45.49 44.79 43.21
(6) Deposit dependence [(5)/(4)] 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.71
(7) Bank concentration (largest 3 banks, %) 45.19 42.41 40.51 39.05 40.78 42.84 40.79 41.53 42.63
(8) Bank concentration (largest 5 banks, %) 59.73 58.28 56.70 55.42 55.75 61.60 60.48 60.43 61.49
Source: Bank of Uganda, Financial Stability Department.
a All annual figures are computed as quarterly averages, figures in 2020 are an average of two quarters.
Table 3.1: Financial development and banking in Uganda (2012Q1-2020Q2)
Formal financial sector credit to the private sector has increased from 10.4 per cent of GDP in
2012 to 11.9 per cent of GDP in 2020. The overwhelming share of this is actually originated
in the banking system, whose credit volume to the private sector expanded from 10.0 per cent
to 11.2 Per cent of GDP over the same period. The Ugandan economy is thus characterised
by significant bank dependence, with an average of 95 per cent of private sector credit coming
from banks. The banking system itself is strongly dependent on deposit funding. Deposits as
a share of GDP range between 14.6 per cent and 16.9 per cent (Global Financial Development
Database, 2018), and they are by far the most important source of funding for bank assets.
Indeed, deposit dependence, calculated as the fraction of bank deposits relative to assets, was at
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68 per cent in 2012 and at 71 per cent in 2020. By contrast, the availability of wholesale funding
is very limited; with a ratio of interbank borrowing to total deposits in the banking system
at only 2 per cent in 2017 (Bank of Uganda Financial Stability Report, 2017), the interbank
market is weak.
While Uganda still has a substantial informal financial sector, the formal banking sector is
well-established and adequately capitalised,3 though with a relatively small number of banks.
It currently comprises 24 banks (mostly foreign- and privately-owned) and is characterized by
a high degree of concentration. The market share (in terms of total assets) controlled by the
three largest banks accounted for more about 40 per cent, and in 2019 the combined balance
sheet of the five largest banks made up more than 60 per cent of the overall assets held in the
banking system.
3.3 Data
Our subsequent analysis is based on data obtained from the Bank of Uganda, the national
central bank which is also responsible for the supervision of the banking sector in Uganda.
We use sector-level data on credit in the domestic banking system compiled by Compuscan,
a credit reference bureau, for the Bank of Uganda. Compuscan maintains the credit register
under the supervision of the Bank of Uganda. Covering the entire banking system in Uganda,
it provides quarterly data on firm borrowing for the period from 2012Q1 to 2020Q2. Data used
covers the period when the Credit Reference Bureau, produced clean and consistent run of data.
Corporate borrowing is recorded either in local or foreign currencies, and foreign currency loans
are converted to their local currency value using prevailing exchange rates obtained from Bank
of Uganda databases.
3In 2017, the average tier one capital adequacy ratio and total capital adequacy ratio were 21.4 per cent and
23.6 per cent, respectively (Bank of Uganda Financial Stability Report, 2017).
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The availability of data on firm level is restricted on grounds of confidentiality and regulatory
constraints. The credit register data records the parties involved in each loan and thus allows
for the classification of loans according to identifiable bank-sector pairs. We eliminate the
two smallest banks from our data set as their lending is driven by special considerations and
quantitatively insignificant. This leaves us with 23 banks, whose lending activity accounts
for the bulk of private-sector lending in Uganda. Starting from the quarterly loan data, we
consolidate the bank-sector level series into annual loan aggregates, computed as the total
volume of credit provided by a lender (bank) to a particular sector over the quarter or year,
respectively. At quarterly frequency, this produces a data set of 6,881 sectors borrowing in
more than quarter. For the annual data, we end up with 1,535 bank-sector observations with
credit relationships over more than one year.
We are interested in bank credit at a higher, sectoral level of aggregation. The loan series are
broken down at the sector level in accordance with International Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion (ISIC) codes used by the UBoS and the central bank.In detail, the eleven broad sectors are:
Agriculture, Business, Electricity, Manufacturing, Mining, Household, Building, Social,Trade,
Transport and Others. Table 3.2 provides a sectoral breakdown of bank loans in Uganda at
quarterly frequency.
These variables are split into different banks’ classification. In this chapter, banks referred
to as “local”, have their headquarters and most share ownership resident in Uganda. “Re-
gional” banks are cross-border banks controlled and owned from other regional countries on
the African continent and incorporated, registered and licensed in Uganda. International banks
are multinational banks that have headquarters overseas(4.
In Table 3.2, Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, we compute quarter on quarter growth rates for a number
of variables for the period 2012Q1-2020Q2. The period reflects when the credit reference bureau
produced a clean and consistent dataset. Commonly used Financial Stability Indicators (FSIs)
4Details of banks’ classification by origin are provide in Table B.1
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are considered and these are: Capital is used to measure the level of capital the bank holds and
is defined as the ratio of total capital to total assets. Asset is a variable used to measure the
asset quality and is defined as the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans. The profit
variable is used to reflect how profitable banks are and defined as the ratio of bank profit to its
total assets. Liquidity is a variable used to capture how liquid the banks are and its defined
as the ratio of liquid assets to total deposits. Banks’ market risk (market) is captured as forex
exposure to regulatory tier 1 capital.
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Observations Average growth Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Agriculture 668 2.89 93.92 -983.47 788.46
Building a 1571 4.25 81.27 -1377.44 1343.09
Business 634 2.99 48.66 -214.04 229.81
Electricity 277 7.13 183.32 -1239.04 1357.12
Household 197 2.60 18.11 -103.20 99.69
Manufacture 653 3.15 82.30 -1112.58 869.13
Mining 404 0.41 183.53 -1595.35 1225.75
Others 451 -7.81 188.03 -1114.00 1347.38
Social 639 4.69 79.27 -717.85 474.23
Trade 722 3.57 56.84 -728.46 813.15
Transport 666 1.66 70.01 -686.10 732.72
All Sectors 6882 2.67 101.33 -1595.35 1357.12
Source: Bank of Uganda.
a Building includes commercial and residential mortgages.
b Average quarterly credit growth statistics are reported as unweighted mean.
Table 3.2: Loan dynamics in Uganda (2012Q1-2020Q2) for both domestic and for-
eign currency loans.
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Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
DSIBs
Capital a 1460 20.50 12.15 7.81 71.63
Asset b 1460 6.09 3.44 0.00 21.51
Profit c 1460 1.23 2.06 -8.34 6.03
Liquidity d 1460 34.99 15.73 13.32 76.05
Market e 1460 -3.33 9.38 -25.74 17.42
Credit 1460 1.46 134.15 -1595.35 1357.12
Non-DSIBs
Capital 5422 20.58 12.24 8.09 67.00
Asset 5422 6.00 3.48 0.00 23.92
Profit 5422 1.24 2.08 -7.86 7.39
Liquidity 5422 35.29 15.77 4.98 76.05
Market 5422 -3.31 9.21 -25.74 21.96
Credit 5422 3.00 90.50 -1124.15 1132.21
All Banks
Capital 6882 20.56 12.22 7.81 71.63
Asset 6882 6.02 3.47 0.00 23.92
Profit 6882 1.24 2.08 -8.34 7.39
Liquidity 6882 35.22 15.76 4.98 76.05
Market 6882 -3.31 9.24 -25.74 21.96
Credit 6882 2.67 101.33 -1595.35 1357.12
Source: Bank of Uganda.
a Capital is defined as the ratio of total capital to total assets.
b Asset is defined as the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans.
c Profit is defined as Return on Assets.
d Liquidity is defined as the ratio of liquid assets to total deposits.
e Market is defined as forex exposure to regulatory tier 1 capital.
Table 3.3: Credit growth and Financial Stability Indicators of DSIBs and
Non-DSIBs banks (2012Q1-2020Q2) for both domestic and foreign currency
loans.
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Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Local Banks
Capital 957 20.88 12.51 10.45 71.63
Asset 957 6.10 3.49 0.00 21.51
Profit 957 1.30 2.13 -7.86 6.03
Liquidity 957 35.07 15.62 15.75 76.05
Market 957 -3.44 9.18 -25.74 17.42
Credit 957 4.08 49.80 -421.10 585.00
International Banks
Capital 1588 20.45 12.03 9.98 63.01
Asset 1588 6.03 3.44 0.00 16.15
Profit 1588 1.23 2.05 -3.33 6.46
Liquidity 1588 35.16 15.81 13.32 76.05
Market 1588 -3.37 9.36 -25.74 21.96
Credit 1588 3.03 125.52 -1377.44 1357.12
Regional Banks
Capital 4337 20.53 12.22 7.81 63.01
Asset 4337 6.00 3.48 0.00 23.92
Profit 4337 1.23 2.08 -8.34 7.39
Liquidity 4337 35.28 15.78 4.98 76.05
Market 4337 -3.27 9.22 -25.74 20.65
Credit 4337 2.23 99.91 -1595.35 1132.21
All Banks
Capital 6882 20.56 12.22 7.81 71.63
Asset 6882 6.02 3.47 0.00 23.92
Profit 6882 1.24 2.08 -8.34 7.39
Liquidity 6882 35.22 15.76 4.98 76.05
Market 6882 -3.31 9.24 -25.74 21.96
Credit 6882 2.67 101.33 -1595.35 1357.12
Source: Bank of Uganda.
a Average credit growth statistics reported as unweighted mean.
Table 3.4: Credit growth and Financial Stability Indicators by bank origin (2012Q1-
2020Q2) for both domestic and foreign currency loans.
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Exploiting the loan-level data, we are able to paint a detailed picture of banks’ loan exposures
and their change at business cycle frequency. Figure 3.1 presents two snapshots of the data
in terms of the annual averages of outstanding loans by sector for each of the banks in our
sample. Two observations are striking: First, there is substantial heterogeneity in sectoral loan
exposures across banks. For example, in 2015 the share of real estate lending ranged from 0
per cent (bank 1) to 24 per cent (bank 22); similarly, the exposure to the manufacturing sector
varied from 0 per cent (bank 1) to 25 per cent (bank 23). Second, this heterogeneity appears
to be persistent. Although there are noticeable shifts in the composition of individual banks’
loan books over time, there are evident patterns of specialisation. For each bank, the Spearman
rank correlation between its sectoral exposures in 2015 and 2019 is positive and significant, and
the correlation coefficient is given by 0.54. We take this as evidence of relationship lending,
where expertise and relationship capital are built up within bank-sector pairs.
As a consequence, differences across banks in the relative share of loans extended to individual
banks display some persistence. Moreover, in addition to being dependent on bank credit as
a means of external finance, individual firms operating in a given industrial sector are likely
to find themselves locked into their relationship with their existing lenders. There is thus only
a limited substitutability across bank loans originated by different banks, and financial shocks
affecting banks’ lending capacity can be expected to have real effects on their borrowers. In




Figure 3.1: Private-sector bank lending in Uganda: annual average of outstanding loans by
sector
3.4 Empirical findings
A key challenge for empirical work on banking is to isolate changes in loan supply from changes
in loan demand. This leads Khwaja and Mian (2008) to argue that the assessment of how
shocks to the banking system affect the real economy must simultaneously confront two separate
channels: the bank lending channel and the sector borrowing channel. The bank lending channel
rests on banks’ inability to insulate the borrowing sector from bank-specific liquidity shocks,
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while the sector borrowing channel is due to sectors’ inability to address bank lending shocks
by substituting towards alternative sources of financing.
In this section, we examine the bank lending and sector borrowing channels in Uganda, following
ideas in Amiti and Weinstein (2018a) and Alfaro et al. (2019). Our approach exploits linked
bank-sector data so that the unit of observation is given by xib, that is, the volume of loans
from bank b to sector i. Specifically, our identification of supply and demand shocks to the
growth of bank credit exploits the fact that each bank lends to multiple sectors, and each sector
borrows from multiple banks.
Estimating idiosyncratic shocks to bank credit supply.
Amiti and Weinstein (2018a) show that the bank-time and sector-time fixed effects estimated
on the basis of (3.1) are identical to those obtained from a specification that also allows for
bank-sector-time effects Zibt. The key insight is that one can always express the interaction
term as Zibt = ςbt + δit + ζibt, where ζibt is an error term. It is therefore possible to define the
bank and sector shocks such that they are invariant to the inclusion of the interaction term,
and they can be consistently estimated from equation (3.1).
Consider the following decomposition of credit growth between bank b and sector i at time t,
∆ ln(xibt) = ςbt + δit + εibt, (3.1)
where xibt denotes the average of outstanding loans from bank b to sector i over period t;
ςbt is a bank-time fixed effect, and δit is a sector-time fixed effect. Our baseline specification
aggregates the monthly Compuscan data at quarterly frequency, but we also report estimates
for annual data. The fixed effects in (3.1) can be interpreted as supply and demand shocks,
respectively. In particular, ςbt captures idiosyncratic shocks to bank b which are identified
through differences in credit growth across banks lending to the same sector: From observing a
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sector whose credit from bank b displays stronger growth than that from bank b′, we conclude
that bank b was subject to a more favourable supply shock than bank b′. The identification
of the demand shocks δit follows a similar logic. Finally, εibt captures other shocks to the
bank-sector relationship assumed to be orthogonal to the bank and sector effects.
Bank lending channel. We follow Alfaro et al. (2019) in estimating the magnitude of the bank
lending channel. Our approach, implemented at the bank-sector level, amounts to estimating
the following model,
∆ ln(xibt) = β
bς̂bt + ηit + νibt, (3.2)
where ς̂bt is the bank-specific credit supply shock estimated in (3.1) and then normalised to have
zero mean and unit variance. The sector-time fixed effect ηit controls for time-varying demand
shocks, which is feasible due to banks’ credit exposure to multiple sectors. The magnitude of
the bank lending channel is then captured by parameter βb; given the normalisation of ς̂bt, the
estimate can be interpreted in terms of the change in the gross rate of credit growth induced
by a one-standard deviation bank-specific shock to credit supply.
Table 3.5, provides our estimates, contrasting effects at quarterly and annual frequency.
quarterly annual
bank-sector bank-sector




Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the bank level;
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 3.5: Bank lending channel at loan level for both domestic and foreign currency loans
The first column examines the bank lending channel at the bank-sector level at quarterly
frequency and identifies a positive and significant effect. Conditional on sector-time fixed
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effects, increased credit supply from a given bank implies higher credit growth for sector with
a credit relationship to that bank. The magnitude of this effect is substantial: A one standard
deviation credit supply shock gives rise to 0.33 percentage points in credit growth; this is relative
to an average quarterly growth rate of credit of 2.67 percent. On annual basis a one standard
deviation credit supply shock leads to 0.53 percentage points in credit growth; this is relative
to an average annual growth rate of credit of 8.08 percent.
We conclude that the bank lending channel has potentially important effects at all considered
levels of aggregation across time and sectors. Notice, however, in comparison to the estimates at
quarterly frequency, the annual effects are slightly higher. This points to the fact that borrowers
are able to partially offset the effect credit supply shocks over time. Indeed, borrowing firms may
still be able to insulate themselves from idiosyncratic bank credit supply shocks by resorting
to credit from alternative sources, and in particular from other banks.
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Sector borrowing channel. In order to examine the question to what extent a negative
bank lending shock actually translates into a reduction of available credit for borrowers, we
use the idiosyncratic credit supply shocks ς̂bt identified in (3.1) to construct a measure of credit
availability at sector level. Specifically, we again start from the normalised version of ς̂bt and
compute the credit supply shock facing a particular sector as the weighted average of the







Next, we regress sectors’ credit growth on the constructed credit supply measure and the
idiosyncratic demand shocks δ̂it (again normalised to have zero mean and unit variance) from
(3.1),
∆ ln(xit) = β
iς̄it + γδ̂it + uit. (3.4)
Similar to the bank lending channel estimated in (3.2), the magnitude of the sector borrowing
channel is reflected in parameter βi.
Table 3.6, provides our estimates, contrasting effects at quarterly and annual frequency.
quarterly annual
bank-sector bank-sector




Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the bank level;
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 3.6: Sector borrowing channel for both domestic and foreign currency loans
Based on quarterly data, the second column examines the borrowing channel at the bank-
sector level. Our estimate implies that, controlling for credit demand, a one-standard deviation
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shock in the credit supply available to a given sector leads to an increase of the sector’s bank
credit by 1.09 percentage points. Notice, however, that the effect is bigger in magnitude than
the corresponding estimate for the bank lending channel (βi = 1.09 versus βb = 0.33). This
increase indicates that sectors have a higher response to the shock hence, a stronger transmission
mechanism is operational at the sector level.
Revisiting the credit dynamics induced by credit supply shocks at annual frequency, column
two, in Table 3.6, report borrowing channel estimates are statistically significant at the bank-
sector level. This suggests that a stronger transmission takes places over a longer horizon.
Comparing this estimate to its counterpart from Table 3.5, we observe higher values at the
sector level of bank-specific shocks to credit supply. This implies a higher pass-through of
idiosyncratic supply shocks to observed credit growth on both quarterly and annual frequen-
cies. Our estimated effects for the sector borrowing channel are smaller than those obtained
by Alfaro et al. (2019) for Spanish data. One underlying reason is that our identified bank
credit supply shocks ςbt display a very low volatility so that a one-standard deviation shock
corresponds to a smaller absolute change in credit supply. This result suggests that over time
sectors are able to adjust to the effects of a credit supply shocks.
In testing the validity of our credit supply shock estimates, we split the sample into DSIB
and (non-DSIB). These DSIBs banks account for 50.8 percent of the banking sector total
assets as reported by Bank of Uganda, Financial Stability Report, June 2019. We assume these
institutions(DSIBs) are well capitalised and highly profitable and are resilient to shocks. Firstly,
we test for whether the average realised supply shock is different for DSIBs versus non-DSIBs
banks.
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∆ ln(xibt) = β
bς̂bt + ηit + νibt, (3.5)
Where b is bank classification for DSIB or non-DSIB banks. Note:each bank classification is
run separately.
We estimate the (3.5) and the results are shown in Table 3.7. We observe positive and significant
effects across the banks, conditional on sector fixed effects. Both DSIBs and Non-DSIBs banks
recorded a similar growth in credit at bank-sector level during the period of the study. In the
second column of Table 3.7, the coefficient shows a one standard deviation in credit supply
shock to non-DSIBs banks leads to 0.33 percentage point increase in credit growth from these
banks to sectors. These results are similar in magnitude to our estimated credit supply shocks in
the baseline model. DSIBs and non-DSIBs are all well capitalised banks see table 3, we should
expect a smaller response to the shocks. In their papers, Abuka et al. (2019) and Jiménez et
al. (2012), observe that well capitalised banks are less sensitive to monetary policy shocks and
this result is in line with these earlier findings.
Secondly, we consider if the average effect of the sector-specific shocks differs for DSIB versus
non-DSIB banks by estimating (3.6).
∆ ln(xit) = β
iς̄it + γδ̂it + uit. (3.6)
The above equation is run, conditioned on either the bank classification is DSIB or non-DSIB
banks. Note:each bank classification is run separately.
Results of (3.6) are shown in Table 3.8, and show sector-specific shocks affect non-DSIBs banks’
borrowers in a positive and statistically significant way. In terms of size, a one standard
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deviation credit supply shock to non-DSIB banks generates 1.05 percentage points increase
in credit growth from non-DSIB banks to sectors. These borrowers face idiosyncratic supply
shocks to observed credit growth, and therefore can find alternative funding from other banks
following credit supply shock. In column one in table 3.8, shows credit shocks to DSIB banks
borrowers are insignificant implying these borrowers are non-responsive to credit supply shocks.
The inability of sectors banking with DSIB banks to adjust may suggest establishing a new
banking relationships is costly as such is a financial market constraint. Or this result may
speak to the credit quality of these borrowers hence, these lenders can still provide the needed
funding.
DSIB Non-DSIB




Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the bank level;
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 3.7: Banks’ supply shocks on credit for both domestic and foreign currency loans
DSIBs Non-DSIBs




Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the bank level;
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 3.8: Supply shocks for DSIB and non-DSIB banks borrowers for both domestic and
foreign currency loans
Measuring the impact of financial frictions among banks is important in a developing country
as financial constraints are likely to be more pronounced. Debate in policy circles is that
effects of cross-border banking vary a lot across countries and time periods and may largely
depend on the regulatory framework, market structure and financial infrastructure as observed
by Beck (2014). I test whether the origin of a bank plays part in its resilience to shocks, these
institutions are broken down into international, regional and local (domestic) banks. In Table
63
3.9, I observe positive and significant effects across the banks, conditional on sector fixed effects.
In the first column of Table 3.9, the coefficient shows that a one standard deviation in credit
supply shock to local banks leads to 0.33 percentage point increase in credit growth from these
banks to sectors. Similarly, as seen in the second, a one standard deviation in credit supply
shock generates a 0.33 percentage point increase in credit growth from international banks to
the sectors. However, we note that there is no significant differences in the way banks react to
supply shocks across the banks’ classification.
In Table 3.10 column one, no significant sector specific shocks are observed. This shows sectors
banking with local banks are not in position to offset the impact of credit shock by borrowing
from other banks. In Table 3.10 column two, no significant sector specific shocks are observed.
This implies sectors borrowing from these international banks can not offset the supply shocks.
The inability of sectors banking with local or international banks to adjust may suggest estab-
lishing a new banking relationships is costly and such is a financial market constraint. This
result may speak to the credit quality of these borrowers hence, these lenders can still provide
the needed funding. Is this a case of cream-skimming of the best borrowers by international
banks as noted by Pelletier (2018)? In Table 3.10 in the third column we observe sectors bank-
ing with regional banks when subject to credit supply shocks; a one standard shock gives rise
to 1.03 percentage points increase in credit supply. The ability of sectors banking with regional
banks to adjust may suggest establishing a new banking relationships is not costly to these
borrowers.
(1) (2) (3)
Local banks International banks Regional banks
credit supply shock 0.326** 0.334*** 0.331***
(26.71) (92.28) (512.92)
observations 957 1588 4336
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the bank level;
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.




Local banks International banks Regional banks
sector supply shocks 1.337 1.599 1.031***
(1.35) (1.87) (5.95)
observations 828 1375 3716
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the bank level;
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 3.10: Sector-specific supply shocks on both domestic and foreign currency loans by bank
origin.
Mathieu, Pani, Chen and Maino (2019) advance two main drivers of increased cross-border
banking as search for yield and the need to diversify. In this paper, in line with search for
yield goal, they note “banking groups were more reluctant to expand across borders when
exchange rate risk made the associated gains more uncertain”. In Uganda, increased lending in
foreign currencies has been previous observed and according to the Financial Stability report
by Bank of Uganda June 2018, over the last four years the ratio of foreign currency loans to
total loans was about 42.9 per cent. With this in mind we next investigate whether banks and
their borrowers behave differently if loans are advanced in foreign currencies. In Table 3.11, we
observe positive and significant effects across all banks, conditional on sector fixed effects. In
the first column of Table 3.11, the coefficient shows a one standard deviation in credit supply
shock to all banks leads to 0.52 percentage point increase in credit growth from all banks to
sectors. A similar coefficient value is observed for DSIB and non-DSIB banks and this suggests
no significant difference between these banks and therefore these institutions react to the shocks
in the same way. However, for local banks one standard deviation in credit supply shock to
these banks leads to 0.45 percentage point increase in credit growth from local banks to sectors.
This indicates the local banks’ lending in foreign currency is less responsive to liquidity shocks.
All banks DSIB Non-DSIB Local International Regional
Credit supply shock 0.520*** 0.518*** 0.520*** 0.454** 0.522*** 0.520***
Observations 6129 1327 4802 856 1415 3858
Adj. R squared 0.21 0.151 0.222 0.091 0.24 0.214
Source: Bank of Uganda.
Table 3.11: Bank lending channel based on foreign currency lending
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In Table 3.12 column 4, no significant sector specific shocks are observed. This implies sectors
borrowing from these local banks cannot offset the supply shocks. The inability of sectors
banking with local banks to adjust may suggest establishing a new banking relationships is
costly and as such is a financial market constraint. Since we observed that sectors banking
with local banks are unable to offset banking lending shocks in both local and foreign currency,
see Table 3.10 column 1, which may indicate that these firms resort to borrowing outside the
formal banking system. In a comparison of results from Table 3.10 and Table 3.12, we fail to
observe a sector borrowing channel when all currencies are consolidated (see Table 3.10 column
2, for international banks’ borrowers but a significant and positive value is noted in table 3.12
column 5. This shows international banks’ borrowers switch to foreign currency borrowing in
times of shocks and are in position to offset these shocks. Similarly we observe DSIBs banks’
borrowers have no significant sector borrowing channel in all currencies loans (see Table 3.8
column 1), and significant value in Table 3.12 column 2 for foreign currencies loans. This
indicates DSIBs banks’ borrowers switch to foreign currency borrowing in times of shocks and
are in position to offset these shocks.
All banks DSIBs Non-DSIBs Local International Regional
Credit supply shock 0.910** 1.854** 0.879** 0.991 1.327*** 0.764*
Observations 5190 1148 4042 724 1204 3262
Adj. R squared 0.071 0.055 0.077 0.008 0.108 0.072
Source: Bank of Uganda.
Table 3.12: Sector borrowing channel based on foreign currency lending.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigate whether a sector borrowing channel exists in Uganda. Results show
that bank lending and sector borrowing channels are operational in Uganda in all currencies. As
highlighted by Khwaja and Mian (2008), the existence of a sector borrowing channel in Uganda
improves on efficacy of monetary policy. Although we have observed a sector borrowing channel
is at the work in Uganda, the role of the banks is important. We note regional and non-DSIB
banks’ borrowers are sensitive to the impact of credit supply shocks from both local and foreign
currency loans. However, local banks’ borrowers are unable to offset shocks in local and foreign
currency borrowing. This suggests these sectors resort to borrowing from non-bank sources.
In addition, banks are more responsive to credit supply shocks, when loans are in foreign
currencies. This could affect the transmission of monetary policy.
On the other hand, domestic banks’ borrowers cannot offset the impact of the shocks. Is this
a case of cream-skimming of the best customers by foreign and regional banks as observed by
Pelletier (2018)? Or a case where these organisations have superior monitoring and screening
processes? As a policy response, we need to increase competition and efficiency in the banking
sector. In the second chapter, I considered monetary policy efficacy and findings show banks’
foreign currency lending is important in the transmission of shocks. However, with increased
foreign currency lending the Central Bank has to intervene to stem wide volatility in the foreign
exchange market and maintain a monetary policy stance. This leads us to the third chapter,




Sterilised FX Interventions and its
Impact on Domestic credit in Uganda.
Abstract
We study the impact of sterilised FX intervention on credit growth in Uganda, in a banking
environment characterised by capital and leverage constraints. Using Local Linear Projection
(LLP) methodology as proposed by Jorda (2005) to analyse the impact of daily FX intervention
on domestic credit and the transmission channels at work. We find sterilised FX interventions
dampen credit growth for a period of about six months and it recovers thereafter. Evidence
of a crowding-out channel is observed however, a exchange rate transmission channel is in-
significant.These results support a case for the use of FX interventions as a financial stability
instrument. However, this may need further investigation as there is a need to balance this tool
with other macro-economic policies.
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4.1 Introduction
Foreign currency(FX) intervention continues to play an important role in Uganda, with the
Central Bank purchasing United States Dollar (USD) 470.7m in 2017/18 fiscal year1 an equiv-
alent of about 15 per cent of the country’s foreign reserves. Although, evidence in support
of regular intervention in foreign market is still scanty, as observed by Cespedes, Chang and
Velasco (2017). The Bank, uses this measure to manage exchange rate volatility, manage mon-
etary policy stance and for foreign reserves accumulation. The banking sector is at the heart
of these transactions. The financial sector is dominated by banks that contribute an average
of 96 per cent of private sector credit. Understanding the way these financial intermediaries
operate as they extend domestic credit under risk and exchange rate constraints is important
in a developing economy. Also considered, is the transmission mechanisms at work.
The Ugandan government, liberalised markets, the capital account and introduced flexible
exchange rate mechanism as part of the structural adjustment process that was carried by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Also at the height of these reforms,
the Ugandan government became a big beneficiary of official aid. The Ugandan shilling was
subject to appreciation pressures on the back of these developments. As a policy response, the
government sold foreign currency to the Central Bank in exchange for domestic currency. These
actions led to the accumulation of foreign reserves by the central bank. Liberalisation of markets
also led to the increased volatility of the exchange rate and increased the government’s foreign
exchange needs. Driven by the need to build up reserves while managing the increased domestic
currency liquidity, the Central Bank has carried out FX and sterilised FX interventions. The
Central Bank sold government securities to the market to managed Increased liquidity in the
financial system. However, FX interventions can cause distortions to banking sector operations
in developing countries that are characterised by a lack of deep financial markets. Reserve
build-up activities can have opportunity cost in terms of interest differential between return on
1Bank of Uganda annual report 2017/18.
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reserves and interest cost of external debt, as observed by Rodrik (2006).
The role of exchange rate in central banks’ policy and macro models has tended to be down-
played; it is argued that exchange rate only becomes a problem when it affects inflation and
output. Supported by the notion, sterilised foreign exchange interventions, which do not affect
money supply have little impact on the exchange rate. The traditional thinking of international
bodies like the IMF is to counsel that in times of large capital inflows countries should use pru-
dent fiscal policy and exchange rate flexibility as policy responses. Diverting from this advice,
emerging economies have used multidimensional tools, namely: macro-prudential policies, capi-
tal controls and FX intervention as a way to mitigate the effects of large capital inflows. Ghosh,
Ostry and Qureshi (2017) report that central banks in many emerging market economies have
used FX interventions as policy instruments in periods of rapid domestic credit growth as a
result of increased capital inflows.
Theoretical studies on the impact of FX interventions on exchange rates, have suggested its ef-
fects are transmitted through signalling and portfolio balance channels. Through the signalling
channel, FX interventions affect the exchange rate by providing information on the central
bank’s monetary policy stance. However, it is argued the signalling channel transmits infor-
mation and therefore it is not an independent policy instrument as observed by Adler, Lisack
and Mano (2015). The portfolio balance theory as advocated by the likes of Kumhof (2010)
and Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) report, FX interventions affect exchange rates as domestic
and foreign assets are considered imperfect substitutes. The relative supply of domestic assets
increases, increasing the risk premium and creating depreciation pressures on the exchange
rates.
Earlier empirical studies on the effects of FX intervention on the exchange rate are centred on
developed economies. Studies find little evidence to support the use of FX interventions on
exchange rate management. However, when major central banks jointly used FX interventions,
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the tool was effective as reported by Sarno and Taylor (2001). In emerging markets, studies
show FX interventions impact on the level and volatility of the exchange rate as observed by
Menkhoff (2013).
Hofmann, song Shin and Villamizar-Villegas (2019) report that sterilised foreign currency (FX)
intervention also works through two separate channels:
1. The risk-taking channel of the exchange rate which leans against bank lending capacity
due to effects of currency appreciation. Hofmann, Shim and Shin (2017) argue that with a
currency mismatch, an appreciation of the shilling improves the balance sheet position of
a USD borrower as their liabilities decreases relative to assets. An improved balance sheet
position of a borrower encourages the banks to extend credit to the borrower. On the
other hand, if the shilling depreciates against the USD it tends to tighten the financial
conditions in the economy. Less creditworthy borrowers are credit constrained on the
back of weakened balance sheets. Under this channel, credit risk premium is determined
by the spot exchange rate and therefore it becomes a risk measure. Bruno and Shin
(2015) also suggests banks that face risk constraints are affected by currency appreciation
as tail-risk associated with loans is reduced, leading to increased credit supply. These
authors consider this a risk-taking channel of the exchange rate.
2. Central banks often offset FX interventions by selling securities to banks, a way of reduc-
ing the increased liquidity created by the initial transactions. Increased holdings of OMO
instruments or government securities by banks, reduces private sector lending hence, the
“crowding out” channel. Through this channel, large public sector borrowing from the
banking system takes place, reducing private sector credit. Although, it can be profitable
for the lending banks, it hinders financial sector deepening as more resources are allo-
cated to the public sector rather than the private sector that is often seen as an efficient
resource user. Cespedes et al. (2017) observes that under a sterilised intervention, when a
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government uses tradable foreign reserves to purchase nontradables it is equivalent to the
government lending the tradable, and its effects feeds through to financial constraints.
Cook and Yetman (2012) report findings from Asian emerging markets that show an in-
crease in reserves accumulation leads to a significantly lower credit growth and attributed
it to crowding-out effects.
The net impact of sterilisation FX intervention by the Central Bank can be quantified by
the exchange rate and OMO transmission mechanisms. Our paper aims at investigating the
impact of foreign exchange intervention on credit growth in Uganda and the transmission
mechanisms through which this happens. At the heart of this paper is how banks advance
credit in an environment where risk constraints interact with macro-financial indicators like the
exchange rate. Diamond, Hu and Rajan (2018) report a link between exchange rates and credit
developments and note FX intervention can moderate credit booms, creating a macroprudential
tool.
The following hypotheses are empirically tested:
• The effects of sterilised FX intervention on credit growth. We expect increased purchases
of foreign assets by banks is likely to reduce on domestic credit supply through the risk
taking channel of currency appreciation, which drives investor risk taking and supply of
credit. Hofmann et al. (2017) observe a depreciate of local currency is associated with
tightening of financial conditions. As the financial health of borrowers deteriorates, banks
extend credit to fewer creditworthy borrowers and therefore credit supply tightens.
• The effects of sterilised FX intervention on the exchange rate. We should expect that FX
purchases will depreciate the domestic currency. In line with the portfolio balance theory,
that suggests when domestic and foreign exchange rates are traded, the relative supply
of domestic exchange rates increases hence, the expected depreciation pressures on the
local currency.
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• The impact of Central Bank’s open market operations on domestic lending. We expect
given banks’ balance sheet constraints such as leverage and capital requirements, an
increase in supply of OMO instruments by the Central Bank, as part of the FX sterilisation
process will decrease on domestic credit supply. As banks exchange domestic currency
for government securities, they lend more to the public sector as opposed to the private
sector hence, the reduction in private sector credit.
In this chapter, we use a high-frequency(daily) FX intervention, OMO datasets from the Central
Bank and a comprehensive credit register of banks’ lending to the real economy. The high
frequency and panel structure of the credit register is the empirical identification strategy
employed as endogeneity issues that may a raise between FX decisions and exchange rates,
(Adler et al. (2015)). With high frequency data the contemporaneous relationship between
exchange rate and intervention decisions can be broken as intervention is done at a lower
frequency in comparison to exchange rate movements. Additionally, this approach may mitigate
effects of reverse causality that may existence between FX intervention decisions and market
outcomes like the exchange rate as observed by Dominguez, Fatum and Vacek (2013) . However,
since we intend to control for banks’ balance sheet quantities and the available data is monthly,
we assume that there is no contemporaneous relationship between banks’ lending and FX
decisions and rather banks look at the whole lending portfolio.
We find sterilised FX purchases negatively affect credit growth in Uganda. However, the decline
is not persistent. The crowding-out channel is the main transmission mechanism through which
effects of sterilised FX interventions feed through to domestic credit. The empirical exercise
fails to find evidence of an exchange rate transmission mechanism operating in Uganda following
a sterilised FX intervention shock. Our paper adds to the literature that links FX intervention
and exchange rates in a banking sector facing capital and risk constraints in a developing
country. FX intervention has a dampening effect on domestic credit hence, one can use this
macro-prudential policy for financial stability purposes during periods of credit booms.
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The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we derive and explain the underlying
theoretical model and its implication on domestic credit. In Section 4.3, data used in this
paper is described. Section 4.4, the empirical methodology and results are explored. In the
final Section 4.5, conclusions of the paper are presented.
4.2 Theoretical model
In a non technical explanation of Hofmann et al. (2019) model, banks lend to business (firms)
or government. The private sector is lent in either domestic or foreign currencies2. Banks
are capital and risk constrained. These banks lend to business for project investment that
is subject to risks. Firms pay back the borrowed funds and this depends on the project’s
outcome. These outcomes are random and subject to risks. These risks can be diversified
(idiosyncratic) or non-diversified (systematic). The borrower only pays back the loan if the
value of project outcome is greater than the sum of loan repayment and valuation effects
of exchange rate movements. The business health of firms improves as the local currency
appreciates, as cash-flows of these businesses are in local currency (Ugandan shillings). With
a currency appreciation, the likelihood of loan defaults decreases. Banks respond by lending
more to the private sector as risk constraints preventing lending are less binding. The banks
have to decide what proportion of their limited capital is allocated to loans and government
bonds. The amount banks lend to the private sector is determined by a parameter and that
factor is an increasing function of the exchange rate. Government borrowing depends on some
leverage factor. If exchange rate appreciates (depreciates) more capital is allocated to loans
(bonds). As more capital is allocated to bonds, private sector lending is decreased hence, the
crowding out effect.
2According to Financial Stability report by Bank of Uganda June 2018, over the last four years the ratio of
foreign currency loans to total loans is about 42.9 per cent.
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The detailed model is based on a theory advanced by Bruno and Shin (2015) that links the
banking sector and borrowers. The model assumes borrowers are risk-neutral and invest in
projects. Each project uses one unit of labour and borrows one unit of fixed capital from
banks. The loans are denoted in Ugandan shilling at time 0. The borrower is assumed to have
an existing debt of one dollar that is subject to valuation effects of currency movements. The
investment matures at time 1, giving raise to a project outcome. Loan repayment is due at
time 1, when the project matures and the value of the loan is 1+r where r is the loan interest.
The dollar value of the shilling at period 0 is denoted by Ψ , with a higher value implying a
stronger shilling. The project outcome (realisation) V1 is a random variable and follows the









We define Zi as a standard normal and s is a constant. A bank’s loan book is exposed to credit






Where X and Yi are mutually independent standard normals and represent systematic and
idiosyncratic risk factors facing borrower i respectively. The parameter ρ assigns a weight to
the risk factor X and is bounded between zero and one. The borrower defaults when the value
of project outcome V1 is less than the sum of loan repayment given by 1+r and valuation effects
of exchange rate movements 1
Ψ
. A bank can diversify away the idiosyncratic risk Yi associated
with each borrower and the systematic X risk cannot be diversified in project outcomes. Based
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on the risk-taking channel of the exchange rate, the implication of currency mismatch that may
arise from a dollar currency borrower assumes that the balance sheet of the debtor improves,
following a shilling appreciation against the dollar. The individual borrower default risk reduces
leading to a reduction in bank’s loan portfolio tail risk. As a result a bank facing a Value-at-Risk
(VAR) constraint, responds by providing higher credit on a back of a smaller tail risk.
4.2.1 Bank capital allocation
Each bank has a loan and bond division, with its total capital split between these divisions and
all the capital is in shillings. Total capital Cb for each bank is split between the two divisions.
Capital allocated to the bond division is represented by KBb , while loan division K
L
b takes up






Lending by the loan unit is constrained by VaR rule that states the probability of loan losses
should not exceed the capital allocated to the unit by some constant probability α > 0. The
model suggests as the shilling appreciates, individual borrower’s(idiosyncratic) risk reduces.
With this, bank’s loan portfolio tail risk reduces and a VaR constrained bank, increases its
lending to the private sector.
From the balance sheet identity: Assets = liabilities plus Equity. If total lending Wb by bank
b are assets(loans) for the bank, KLb is equity allocated to the loan division and Lb is the total
non-equity funding amount and its associated funding rate is given by f. Then the balance
identity can be expressed as follows:
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Wb = Lb +K
L
b (4.3)
However, we know that the debt ratio which is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets and follows a standard normal as shown in lemma 1 and 2 in Hofmann et al. (2019). The
standard normal Ω is defined by the probability of default and is a function of the exchange
rate. The weight ρ assigned to the common factor of X and the VaR rule constraint. It can




From the above equation Lb can expressed as:
(1 + r)Wb
(1 + f)
Ω = Lb (4.5)




Ω = Wb (4.6)

















Then total lending Wb by bank b can be defined as in (4.10), where λ is an increasing function




With the above equation when the shilling appreciates the loan division of bank increases its
leverage for a given level of capital. As the shilling appreciates, the loan portfolio’s tail risk
exposure decreases inducing banks to increase on their lending as the VAR constraint is eased.
The model assumes a bank’s bond holdings is determined by constant leverage factor µ of the







In aggregate terms i.e summing across all banks b, total loan supply by the banking sector is
given by:
W = λ(Ψ)KL (4.12)






Therefore in aggregate C = KL +KB and this implies KL = C −KB. (4.12) can be rewritten
as:
W = λ(Ψ)(C −KB) (4.14)
From (4.13) we can deduce that the amount of capital allocated to bonds by banking sector is




= KB. If all the outstanding stock of bonds in shillings denoted by
S is held by the banking sector. The Central Bank’s sterilisation exercise is achieved when this
market clearing condition B = S holds. Using this expression in (4.14) we obtain the following
expression:
W = λ(Ψ)(C − S/µ) (4.15)
Since λ(Ψ) is an increasing function of Ψ it implies a shilling appreciation leads to an increase
in lending to the private sector borrowers. In (4.15) we further observe that sterilised FX
interventions that weaken(depreciate) the shilling will lower the amount of private sector loans
supplied by banks. From (4.15), it further shows If the stock of outstanding bonds S increases,
lending to the private sector falls hence, the “crowding out” effect on loans, assuming everything
else is held constant. If banks hold more bonds, more capital is allocated to bond portfolio
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leading to a reduction in capital available to the loan portfolio. All this points to the trade-
off between the two asset classes, additionally this shows through the sterilisation leg of FX
intervention, private sector credit is negatively affected. If the outstanding stock of bonds
increases and the shilling depreciates against the dollar at the same time, then the crowding-
effects on private sector credit is amplified as leverage of the loan division decreases further.
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4.3 Data
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics of daily loan data obtained from Compuscan, a credit
reference bureau. It covers the period from January 2012 to December 2018, with a total of
15.2 million loan observations. Data used covers the period when the credit reference bureau
produced a clean and consistent run of data. Loans are grouped according to these 12 sec-
tors: agricultural, mining, manufacturing, trade, transport, electricity, building, community,
business, government, personal and other sectors. From Table 4.1, we observe on average 25.4
million Uganda shillings was lent across all sectors; the lowest sector loan was 1 million shillings
and the highest loan offered was 49.2 billion shillings across all the sector divisions. The gov-
ernment sector recorded the highest average borrowing of 163 million shillings and its highest
sector borrowing stood at 1.5 billion shillings. The sector also borrowed the least number of
loans of 197 transactions during the period of consideration. The highest number of 6.3 million
transactions was received from the personal sector that incorporates personal, household and
mortgage loans. The sector borrowed on average 15.3 million shillings and the highest lending
of 31.3 billion was given to this sector. The agricultural sector the biggest employer 3 in the
country received the second highest number of loan transactions, recording an average of 17.9
million shillings with the highest amount allocated to the sector at 32.5 billion shillings.
3According to Uganda National Household Survey produced by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics the Agri-
culture sector contributed to 64.6 percent of labour participation.
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Observations Minimum Mean Median 75th Percentile Maximum
Agriculture 1532483 1.01 17.9 4.2 10.0 32500
Mining 132923 1.01 14.0 4.0 6.6 20000
Manufacture 1373315 1.00 16.6 5.0 7.0 35000
Trade 706955 1.00 39.4 5.0 12.0 41100
Transport 86156 1.02 72.7 4.5 15.0 41100
Electricity 9902 1.05 76.8 2.0 5.3 16900
Building 708739 1.00 38.5 5.8 10.0 40000
Community 426222 1.00 20.3 4.0 7.0 7420
Business 1467850 1.00 41.8 5.1 9.1 49200
Government 197 1.50 163 50 162 1500
personal 6253614 1.00 15.3 6.1 9.7 31300
other 2538997 1.00 42.3 6.3 17.0 48000
Total 15200000 1.00 25.4 5.6 10.0 49200
Source: Compuscan and author’s computations.
Table 4.1: Daily sectoral distribution of loan(millions) from the credit registry
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In the analysis, monthly banks’ balance sheet data of total assets, total liabilities and total
capital are used. In addition, monthly macro financial variables such as inflation and net
portfolio inflows are incorporated in the analysis. Data on daily VIX index is obtained from
FRED database and used as a proxy for global market uncertainty. Additionally, data on daily
lending activities by banks is sourced from Compuscan. Information on daily purchases and
sales of foreign assets (currencies) is obtained from the Central Bank. Also data on Open
Market Operations and foreign exchange rates are obtained from the central bank.
The Bank of Uganda uses FX intervention for its monetary policy operations, aimed at attaining
low inflation under an inflation targeting frame and operates a flexible exchange rate regime
and open capital account that presents challenges. The central bank uses the tool to manage
excessive market volatility of the exchange rate and for liquidity management in the economy.
These objectives are achieved by either selling or buying foreign assets (currency) as needed.
FX interventions are used for building up the country’s international reserves.4
In Table 4.2, on monthly average the Central Bank bought 3.92 million dollars for reserve
accumulation with the highest monthly average purchased, reported at 10.53 million dollars
of foreign reserves. Targeted interventions are used to address specific lumpy payments by
corporations. The Central Bank sold on monthly average of 8.05 million dollars, with the
largest monthly sale reported at 15.43 million dollars. In the reserves build-up process both
pre-announced (non-discretionary) and discretionary approaches have been employed. FX in-
terventions are used with discretionary intervention used to manage the exchange rate volatility
and targeted intervention.
4The country’s reserves should be in position to meet a three month import cover as stipulated by the IMF.
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Interventions Mean Median St.Deviation Minimum Maximum
Targeted purchase(sale) 84 -8.05 -7.48 5.08 -15.43 11.28
Intervention purchase(sale) 27 -13.62 -17.50 19.35 -50.00 20.00
Reserve build-up 81 3.92 3.91 1.89 0.00 10.53
Net Fx Intervention 84 1.95 2.23 2.64 -7.96 8.01
Source: Bank of Uganda.
a All variables are measured in USD(millions).
Table 4.2: Monthly Interventions distributed by FX intervention method
We define net FX intervention as the sum of purchases of net of sales of foreign currency used for
intervention, targeted interventions and reserve build-up purposes as the Central Bank often
buys and sells foreign currencies on a given day. When the Central Bank purchases foreign
currency it can exchange domestic currency for the foreign currency, resulting in an increase
in domestic currency. To offset the increase in domestic currency the bank sells government
securities and open market operations instruments (deposit auction and repurchase agreements)
that decreases money supply in the economy. Data shows on a daily average, the Central Bank
bought USD 3.23 million, with the highest purchase recorded as USD 53.70 million5 while on
monthly average, the Central Bank purchased 67.30 million dollars, with the highest purchase
recorded at 187.20 million dollars. For instance we note, in January and March 2015, the
Central Bank sold over 150 million dollars in these respective months as shown in figure 4.1.
During this period, the shilling had depreciated by 14.4 per cent year on year (YoY) basis
against the USD and by 9.3 per cent (YoY) on trade weighted basis in the respective months.
The depreciation was due to a global strengthening of the USD, large current account deficit and
high demand by the corporate sector6. On balance the largest component of FX interventions
has been aimed at international reserves build up.
5Monthly average data on FX interventions are computed from daily intervention figures.
6Sourced from the Bank of Uganda’s monetary policy reports for February 2015 and April 2015.
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Figure 4.1: FX Intervention in Uganda(2012-2018) showing the different categories used.
In sterilisation of FX intervention, the Central Bank uses repurchase agreement (repos), re-
verse repos and deposit auction instruments for liquidity management and these form part of
the OMO instruments. The liquidity management framework is based on a short-term liquidity
forecasting exercise and short-term market intelligence as reported by Bacalu, Qureshi and Van-
depeute (2015). It involves adjusting short-term (day-to-day) money supply to meet demand
while meeting the Bank’s operational money market rate (7-day inter-bank rate). The Bank’s
OMO injections averaged on daily(monthly) basis, on average the Central Bank issued UGX
257(307) billion worth of repos and reverse repos, with a maximum of UGX 1020(933) billion
and the lowest daily repos issued at UGX 6.50(32.0) billion. In terms of auctioned deposits
an average daily(monthly) of UGX 48.10(48.0) billion was auctioned, with the highest daily
amount reported at UGX 688.0(502.0) billion (see Table 4.3 and Table 4.4).
The exchange rate(USD-UGX) peaked at 3890 shillings per dollar, averaging at 3096.5 shillings
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per dollar. The 7-day policy rate averaged 13.04 percent and the highest noted at 31.13 per-
cent.The overnight policy rate averaged at 10.5 percent on a daily basis and the highest noted
at 29.9 percent.
Minimum Mean Median 95th Percentile Maximum
Exchange rate(USD-UGX) 2311.70 3096.45 3285.00 3754.00 3890.00
Exchange rate(UGX-USD) 0.00025 0.00033 0.00030 0.00040 0.00043
Log of exchange(UGX-USD) -8.27 -8.02 -8.10 -7.81 -7.75
Change in log of exchange rate(UGX-USD) -0.04163 -0.00022 0.00 0.005581 0.061076
Policy rate(%) 0.09 11.04 10.05 19.93 30.42
Log of VIX index 0.00 1.17 1.15 1.35 1.61
Repos reverse repos(UGX(B) 6.50 257.00 194.00 688.00 1020.00
Auction deposit(UGX(B)) 0.00 48.10 33.00 162.00 688.00
Open market operations(UGX(B)) 6.50 306.00 243.00 796.00 1260.00
FX sterilisation(USD(M)) 0.00 3.23 2.00 11.20 53.70
Overnight policy rate(%) 0.00 10.46 9.55 19.33 29.86
7-day policy rate(%) 0.00 13.04 11.70 21.37 31.13
Source: Bank of Uganda.
Table 4.3: Daily statistics of macro and financial Indicators.
Minimum Mean 50th Percentile Maximum
Repos (UGX) (B) 32.00 259.00 236.00 687.00
Auction Deposits (UGX) (B) 0.00 48.00 33.00 502.00
Open Market Operations (UGX) (B) 32.00 307.00 270.00 933.00
Overnight policy rate(%) 4.88 10.41 9.32 26.47
Seven day policy rate(%) 6.31 13.01 11.59 28.71
Credit growth -0.99 2.43 0.00 199.00
Banks’ assets (UGX) (B) 0.07 1.11 0.69 5.54
Banks’ capital (UGX) (B) 0.01 0.18 0.11 0.90
Banks’ liabilities (UGX) (B) 0.05 0.94 0.59 4.63
CBOE Volatility Index 10.13 15.23 14.30 24.95
Policy rate(%) 9.00 12.79 11.50 23.00
FX operations USD(M)7 -175.06 40.31 46.87 176.26
Exchange (UGX-USD) 0.00026 0.00033 0.00031 0.00043
Consumer price level 0.85 5.47 4.76 21.39
Net portfolio inflows (USD) (M) -823.40 -339.19 -351.32 151.60
FX Intervention USD(M) 0.00 67.30 65.13 187.20
change in policy rate -2.00 -0.15 0.00 1.50
Deviation from Inflation target -4.15 0.47 -0.24 16.39
Log of volatility Index 2.32 2.70 2.66 3.22
Change in exchange rate (UGX-USD) -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.06
Source: Bank of Uganda.
Table 4.4: Monthly statistics of macro and financial Indicators.
7FX operations includes both the sale and purchase of forex, with a negative sign indicating a sale. FX
intervention only captures purchase of forex through intervention, reserves build-up and target interventions.
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4.4 Empirical specification
In the empirical analysis we investigate the impact of sterilised FX intervention on new credit
issued by banks. In the next phase, we explore through which channels FX intervention affects
new credit growth. We consider the impact of FX interventions on the exchange rate of the
shilling against the USD. Finally we consider whether the “crowding out” channel operates, as
the model suggests FX interventions impact on domestic credit through OMO.
The estimation approach is based on panel local linear projection (LLP) as pioneered by Jorda
(2005). Under the LLP, the autoregressive coefficients can be estimated directly at each h-step-
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Jorda (2005) shows that after estimating the K ×K autogressive coefficients Ah1 , h = 1, ..., H
this is equivalent to estimating impulse response functions without re-writing the equations
in the form of the Wold representation theorem. Errors obtained from the above exercise are
vector moving average (VMA) processes of order h. The author highlights a need to estimate a
variance-covariance matrix using a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator
(HAC) as defined by Newey and West (1987). As a result of the direct estimation used in the
LLP method the author reports that the approach is more robust to model misspecification in
comparison to VAR iterated procedures that are functions of the horizon.
Using (4.16), Jorda (2005) reports that consistent and asymptotically normal estimates for Ahj
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for j = 1,....,k can be obtained. The advantages of this method are estimates can be obtained
using the least squares and can be used for inference without asymptotic approximations. I also
helps to compute impulse without specification and estimation of the underlying multivariate
dynamic system. We augment (4.16) with exogenous terms by including control variables hence,
the baseline model can be defined as in the equation below:
Yi,t+h = αh,i +λhyi,t−1 +βhFXIt−1 + ΓhQi,t−1 +ΩhEt−1 + εi,t+h , (4.17)
Where Yi,t+h is the cumulative flow of new firms’ loans by bank i, the model will include a
lagged dependent variable yi,t−1 as specified above. The inclusion of this variable is aimed
at capturing any persistence in the dependent variable. The matrix Qi captures attributes
of banks that provide credit to the private sector defined as the total assets, total capital and
total liabilities. E also defines macro-financial variables. These variables include log-level of the
VIX index, the change in bilateral exchange rate of the Ugandan shilling against the US dollar,
the change in the policy rate, deviation of inflation from the Bank’s target and net portfolio
inflows and finally FXIt−1 capturing the net sterilised FX Intervention variable. Some of the
variables included in the control variables describe the FX intervention function. It is from the
estimates of βh for the given time horizon that cumulative (IRF) of new credit subjected to FX
intervention shock are produced.
Cumulative (IRF) from local linear projections regressions in 5 per cent confidence bands with
robust standards errors clustered at on both cross-section and period. In Figure 4.2, we observe
following a FX intervention shock, credit growth decreases in the first six months and recovers
after the sixth month, becoming positive after the ninth month. These movements suggest
credit growth is negative for a period of nine months, becoming positive after this period
following a FX intervention shock. This shows a FX intervention shock has a negative impact
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Note:The figure presents the cumulative Impulse Response Function(IRF) of an FX intervention shock of a first
difference magnitude shock.The x-axis presents the months. The y-axis represents a change in credit.
Figure 4.2: Impact of FX intervention shock on credit growth in Uganda.
on credit growth.This decrease in credit growth is not persistent as one would expect.However,
it still supports our first hypothesis. We naturally question through which channel(s) is credit
affected. Literature suggests through the exchange rate, net portfolio inflows and crowding-out
channels, FX interventions can impact on domestic credit growth.
4.4.1 Exchange rate channel
In this section, we examine the role of the exchange rate in the transmission of FX intervention
shock on credit. In testing of the risk-taking channel of the exchange rate we explore the
impact of net FX purchases8 on the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate(NEER) and the bilateral
exchange rate of the Ugandan shilling against the US dollar. The NEER is used as it measures
the competitiveness of the local currency. Additionally, the Central Bank uses the USD for it
FX interventions, capital inflows and outflows are typically in USD and we therefore employ the
8The difference between FX purchases and net FX purchases is that net fx purchases is net of sales on a
given day of intervention.
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UGX-USD exchange in the analysis. In order to avoid problems of endogeneity/simultaneity
that may arise, daily figures of the exchange rate and NEER are used. We assume the exchange
rate/NEER change can be explained by the FX interventions and its reaction function. The
baseline model in (4.17) is rewritten as follows:
Xi,t+h = αh,i +λhxi,t−1 +βhFXIt−1 + ΩhEt−1 + εi,t+h (4.18)
Where Xi,t+h is the cumulative sum of xi the log change in the NEER/shilling US dollar
exchange rate, a lagged dependent variable xi,t−1 is included and FXIt that captures net FX
intervention. Additionally, change in the policy rate and VIX index are included as control
variables represented by E.
Note: Figures presents the cumulative IRF of an FX intervention shock of one unit.On the x-axis presents the
number of trading days. The y-axis represents a percentage change in UGX-USD/NEER.
Figure 4.4: The cumulative response of
NEER to Net FX interventions
In Figure 4.3 we consider the bilateral exchange of the shilling to US dollar to FX intervention
and the results show that the impact of net FX intervention shock on the exchange rate of the
shilling against the dollar is insignificant over the 100 trading days.This finding is in line with
previous studies such as Montoro (2013) who reports that sterilised FX interventions has little
impact on near-term nominal exchange rate expectations. In Figure 4.4 daily impulse response
of FX intervention shock on the NEER, is used to test for robustness of the previous result.
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In this empirical exercise, the regressions are run on a daily frequency for horizons up to 100
days, the impact on the NEER due to one unit shock to net FX intervention suggests that on
average the shilling appreciates against the basket of currencies. This is largely driven by these
currencies: US dollar, euro, Kenyan shilling, Indian rupees and United Arab Emirates Dirham.
The weights attached to these currencies account for over 57 per cent of the total weights.
This observation diverges from the previous finding on the UGX-USD exchange rate and a
possible explanation is some of the currencies in the basket of currencies depreciated against
the shilling and therefore on aggregate the shilling appreciated. However, FX interventions and
capital movements are usually done in USD and we conclude FX intervention shocks on the
UGX-USD exchange rate are insignificant. The result differs from a finding by Hofmann et al.
(2019) who report a significant exchange rate channel in Peru. Although the model stipulates
that the exchange rate is an important transmission channel, with the expectation that an
appreciation of local currency should lead to increased lending, an insignificant transmission
is observed in this paper. A possible explanation for this finding could be, what is the effect
of increased dollarisation in Uganda as noted earlier, see footnote 4. This also indicates other
operational channel(s) exist through which effects of FX interventions feed through to credit
growth.
4.4.2 Crowding channel
In this section we test for “crowding-out” channel. The baseline model is adjusted by replacing
the sterilised FX intervention variable with Open market Operations. This comes into play
when banks’ balance sheets are capital or leverage constrained, consequently, leading to lending
restrictions. As the Central Bank supplies government securities through sterilisation leg of FX
intervention, banks become capital constrained as more capital is allocated to the purchase
of government securities. This further leads to a reduction in capital available for private
sector lending hence, a decrease in private sector credit. In Figure 4.5, the response of new
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credit to a shock to open market operations suggests a significant and persistent decrease in
credit growth over the period of observation. As noted in the model, an increase in OMO
should decrease the growth of private sector credit. These impulse responses are in line with
the stated hypothesis. In Figure 4.6 we experiment with repos, an open market operation
instrument. We observed after a repos shock credit growth decreases significantly, however, the
decline is more pronounced with OMO instruments. Repos is one of the main components of
OMO instruments and have largely followed the same path as OMO. These results indicate that
the crowding effect is operational in Uganda. Additionally, credit growth is Uganda is largely
affected by the crowding out channel of monetary policy as seen in this empirical exercise.
Note: The figure presents the cumulative Impulse Response Function(IRF) of an FX intervention shock of 1
unit shock.On the x-axis presents the months. The y-axis represents a change in credit.
Figure 4.6: Monthly response of new credit
growth to OMO/repos shock
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we consider the impact of sterilisation FX intervention on credit growth in
Uganda and the transmission mechanisms at work. Using linear local projection methodology
as proposed by Jorda (2005) results show that FX intervention reduces credit growth in Uganda
this is in line with a previous study by (Hofmann et al. 2019) who examine the impact of
sterilised FX interventions in Peru. However, the decline in credit is not persistent as it lasts
for a period of six months only.
We observe that sterilised FX intervention insignificantly affects the UGX-USD exchange rate.
This finding goes against a previous paper by Hofmann et al. (2019) in Peru and our stated
hypothesis. The hypothesis, states FX purchases are expected to depreciate the local currency.
Although the model stipulates the exchange rate as one of the main transmission mechanisms,
the empirical exercise fails to identify significant effects of sterilised FX shocks.
The impact of FX shocks on open market operations shows credit growth declines in a significant
and persistent way suggesting a “crowding-out” channel is operational. The result shows, the
crowding-out channel is the main mechanism through which sterilised FX intervention feed
through to domestic credit. We therefore conclude that in Uganda the crowding-out channel is
the main transmission mechanism of sterilised FX intervention as hypothesised.
FX interventions dampen credit growth and the instrument could be used in times of credit
booms, as a way to moderate excess credit growth in the economy and as a consequence used a
financial stability instrument. An area that needs further research could be what is the optimal
policy mix that enables FX interventions to achieve financial stability and monetary policy
objectives.
In the previous chapters, we find restrictive monetary policy, credit supply shocks and sterilised
FX interventions negatively affect credit growth in Uganda. In the following chapter, we take a
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macroeconomic perspective and ask how these idiosyncratic credit supply shocks feed through
to aggregate volatility in the country.
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Chapter 5
Credit supply shocks and aggregate
volatility: A network approach
Abstract
In this paper we examine using a network approach, the transmission of idiosyncratic credit
supply shocks to aggregate volatility in a developing economy. Our analytical framework is
based on Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012). The model is extended to
capture financial frictions and the role of intermediation via bank-lending. The economy com-
prises of households, banks and firms operating in an input-output system. In demonstrating
the implications of our theoretical results in an empirical application to Uganda, an economy
defined by high bank dependence and concentration in the banking industry. The empirical
results suggest that idiosyncratic shocks to credit supply account for more than a third of the
volatility observed at the aggregate level. Results from the counterfactual experiments show
that configuration of the network plays a marginal part in determining aggregate volatility,
whereas the architecture of financial intermediation has a bigger effect. In banking system
environments characterised by financial frictions, the Herfindahl index is no longer a sufficient
statistic for explaining the banking sector’s contribution to aggregate volatility. From a policy
perspective this paper opens up a debate on how financial intermediation should be organised
with respect to its implications for aggregate volatility.
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5.1 Introduction
There is by now extensive evidence on the relationship between financial conditions and macroe-
conomic outcomes, both in settings where the financial sector works to amplify real shocks and
where shocks originate in the financial sector itself. However, the details of the underlying
propagation mechanisms and their dependence on the anatomy of production and financial in-
termediation are still not fully understood. In this paper, we formally examine these issues from
a network perspective with a particular focus on the transmission mechanism from idiosyncratic
credit supply shocks to aggregate volatility.
Our analytical framework follows Acemoglu et al. (2012) and considers a static version of the
multi-sector model in Long and Plosser (1983). We extend this environment to encompass
financial frictions and a role for intermediation via bank lending. The economy is populated
by households, banks and firms operating in an input-output system. Production displays
decreasing returns to scale and is subject to a financial constraint, which requires firms to
finance their wage bill in advance via bank loans. Banking services are differentiated so that
loans from different banks are aggregated with a finite elasticity of substitution. Individual
banks finance these loans by issuing deposits to households, whereby their funding costs are
subject to shocks that are passed through into loan rates. Idiosyncratic shocks to banks’ lending
capacity therefore have real implications because they affect the price and volume of credit
available to firms. The shocks are then further propagated through the economy’s production
network and ultimately affect aggregate output.
The model is intentionally kept simple in order to retain analytical tractability with results in
closed-form. At its heart are two networks: the production network represented by the econ-
omy’s input-output matrix W, and the financial intermediation network Φ summarising the
financial links between banks and the industrial sectors. An important property of the interme-
diation network is that, generically, banks have links to multiple sectors so that idiosyncratic
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credit supply shocks become a direct source of comovement. Starting from this setup, we show
that firms’ production decisions are distorted under a binding financial constraint. Since the
working capital constraint applies only to the wage bill, firms are induced to substitute their
factor employment away from labour and towards intermediate inputs. And in consequence of
this factor demand distortion, their combined expenditure share for labour and intermediate
inputs falls short of what is dictated by decreasing returns alone. That is, both the intermediate
input share and firms’ profitability are increased relative to their technologically determined
levels.
Building on this result, we go on to derive expressions for the equilibrium level of (the log
of) aggregate output and its volatility. Aggregate output is characterised as a function of two
objects: the distortion vector Θ, which collects the bank-level shocks weighted by their relevance
for the financial intermediation network, and the distortion influence vector d, which traces their
propagation through the input-output network and ultimately maps them into final output. The
volatility of aggregate output inherits these determinants, but it can equivalently be rewritten
in terms of (i) a Herfindahl term proportional to the sum of squared bank market shares, and
(ii) an additional outdegree correction term accounting for the sectoral interdependence beyond
what is captured via bank market shares.
The outdegree correction term becomes relevant whenever financial frictions distort firms’ input
decisions. The important implication for such environments therefore is that the bank Herfind-
ahl index is no longer a sufficient statistic for the banking system’s contribution to aggregate
volatility. This opens the door for normative questions about the desirable organisation of
financial intermediation with respect to its implications for aggregate volatility. In a series of
simple examples, we show under which conditions these considerations have bite and how they
twist the usual recommendation of simply minimising the bank Herfindahl index.
We conclude by demonstrating the implications of our theoretical results in an empirical ap-
plication to the case of Uganda, an economy characterised by high bank dependence and con-
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centration in the banking industry. In a first step, we exploit credit registry data to provide
an empirical estimate of the magnitude of bank-level credit supply shocks and their conse-
quences for credit dynamics at the bank and sector level. The pattern of our empirical results
supports the conclusion that idiosyncratic shocks to credit supply have real consequences for
bank-dependent industrial sectors. In light of this evidence, we calibrate our theoretical model
to capture the empirical features of the intermediation and production networks observed in
Uganda. We then subject the calibrated economy to a number of counterfactual experiments
focused on (i) the decomposition of the sources of aggregate volatility and (ii) the degree of am-
plification in the mapping from idiosyncratic shocks to aggregate outcomes. The key findings
from this exercise are as follows.
The configuration of the production network W plays only a marginal role in the determination
of aggregate volatility, whereas the architecture Φ of financial intermediation has important
effects. These effects are often visible in the bank Herfindahl index. But the bank Herfindahl
index is not necessarily an appropriate indicator for aggregate volatility, in line with our the-
oretical results. Closely related to this observation is the question about the role of financial
frictions for the degree of amplification of idiosyncratic shocks. Our theoretical model points at
an increased intermediate input share and increased profit leakage as the principal consequences
of financial frictions. A larger intermediate input share increases the network multiplier for the
input-output system substantially – by a factor of 2.25 in our calibrated economy. Increased
profit leakage, however, works in the opposite direction, illustrating the quantitative relevance
of the outdegree correction term. The degree of amplification after accounting for both effects is
thus diminished to a factor of about 1.38. Neverthless, when we square the estimated volatility
of the credit supply shocks estimated from the credit registry data with the volatility of GDP
in Uganda, we find that these idiosyncratic shocks alone can account for more than one third
of the volatility recorded at the aggregate level. Owing to their granularity and to the propaga-
tion mechanism via the intermediation and production network, we thus find bank-level credit
supply shocks to have sizeable real implications.
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Related literature
Our work is related to three strands of literature. The first strand links network structure
in production economies to the real economy. In the second we empirically illustrate how
financial shocks feed to the economy and finally we focus on how bank size is important in the
propagating systemic risks in the sector.
In the first strand, we examine the importance of network structure in production economies
in the transmission of idiosyncratic shocks to the real economy through intersectoral linkages
as a factor in the contagion:
Acemoglu et al. (2012) argue that in presence of intersectoral input-output linkages, idiosyn-
cratic shocks at a microeconomic level can feed into aggregate fluctuations. The authors suggest
that the structure of the network of the linkages affects the rate at which aggregate volatility
decreases. The paper also manages to rank relationship between different sectors as suppliers
to their direct and indirect customers using network analysis techniques. In a related paper
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2017) and based on a multi-sector general equilibrium
model show the interplay of idiosyncratic microeconomic shocks and input-output linkages con-
tribute tail co-movement as large recessions cause significant declines in GDP and industrial
activity.
Bigio and La’O (2020) introduce financial frictions in a static multisector framework in which
production is undertaken in an input-output network and observe sectoral distortions feed-
ing through to the aggregate level through the total productivity and labour wedge channels.
They show during the 2008-09 financial crisis the US input-output structure increased financial
distortions by a factor of two.
These papers highlight the importance of the network structure in a developed country setting.
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We deviate from these papers by considering a developing country environment characterised
by financial frictions.
Although, the above papers take a theoretical approach using network analysis to explain the
contagion to the real economy, we note empirically the following papers consider an environment
where credit supply shocks originate from the financial sector. Chava and Purnanandam (2011)
explore the effect of Russian banking crisis as an exogenous shock on U.S banking system. They
observe firms that primarily used bank capital suffered larger valuation losses translating into
lower capital expenditure and lower profitability. Chodorow-Reich (2013) also examines the
impact of bank lending frictions on employment outcome during 2008-9 financial crisis using
fixed effects models. The paper finds that banking relationships are important and therefore
there is a cost in switching to other lenders. The author establishes firms that had a banking
relationship with less healthy lenders had a lower probability of obtaining a loan after the
Lehman bankruptcy, paid higher interest rates and reduced employment. Kroszner, Laeven
and Klingebiel (2007), investigates the impact of banking crises on industries dependent on
bank credit and report sectors that rely on bank credit experience a greater reduction in value
added during a bank crisis. These papers illustrate how shocks to the banking sector can feed
through to the real economy. We differ from these papers by considering the impact of banking
sector shock during normal times.
Following Gabaix (2011), a number of papers have examined the role of bank-specific shocks
for the real economy, another strand considers the importance of bank size in propagating
systemic risks in the sector. Buch and Neugebauer (2011) analyse whether shocks to loan
growth at large bank impacts on real GDP growth using a measure of idiosyncratic shocks
developed by Gabaix (2011). The authors find changes in lending have short-run effects on
GDP. In a related paper, Bremus, Buch, Russ and Schnitzer (2018) examine both theoretically
and empirically whether the presence of big banks affects macroeconomic outcomes. They
show that big banks have a positive and significant relationship with macroeconomic outcomes
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such as GDP. Although, we do not explicitly consider the size of banks in our analysis, we are
aware that the banking industry in Uganda is characterised as fore-mentioned and therefore
the presence of few large banks could propagate the shocks. In this paper we consider how
important are network structure in production economies in the transmission of idiosyncratic
shocks to the real economy through intersectoral linkages. Our own empirical work complements
the above papers with results for Uganda, 2012-2020. We therefore present evidence from a
different environment, namely a developing economy where financial market are relatively less
developed and subject to substantial financial frictions.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents our theoretical model,
whose properties are then analysed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 contains the empirical application
to the case of Uganda along with our counterfactual experiments. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 The model
We consider a static general equilibrium model of input-output trade within a network of
industrial sectors subject to financial frictions. In line with some recent papers in the literature,
we assume that bank loans are differentiated products.1
5.2.1 Economic environment
Each good in the economy is produced by one of n competitive sectors and can be used either
for consumption or as an intermediate input for production in other sectors. Labour is the only
primary factor and assumed in exogenous supply, normalised to unity, L = 1. The production
1There is a range of possible interpretations for this differentiation, most of them evolving around the services
provided by banks in the process of lending. We should elaborate on this point.
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technology for intermediate good firms in sector i is given by
qi = (ui)
η , (5.1)
where ui is an input composite, and η ∈ (0, 1) denotes the degree of decreasing returns to scale.2
Let qij denote the intermediate inputs from sector j used in sector i to produce its output good
qi. The input composite ui aggregates these intermediate inputs together with labour `i hired











j=1 ωij = 1 so that the input aggregation displays constant returns. Intermediate good
firms are competitive and take prices as given. A limited enforcement constraint forces them to
finance their wage bill upfront with bank loans whose gross-of-interest volume cannot exceed a
fraction ξ of their sales revenue. Notice, however, that this working capital constraint relates
only to firms’ wage payments, but not to their expenditure on intermediate inputs. The implicit
assumption therefore is that trade credit to support the flow of intermediate inputs between
sectors is available without frictions, while wage payments must be facilitated via bank credit.3
Sectoral output qi can be used either for consumption ci or as an intermediate input for pro-
duction in other sectors,




As in Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Jones (2013), the sectoral consumption goods ci are aggregated
into a single final good through a log-linear function (which can either represent the technology
2Decreasing returns naturally arise as a consequence of factors of production like capital that are (in the
short-run) fixed or immobile across sectors.
3Bigio and La’O (2020) consider a related setting with exogenous working capital constraints where they
allow only for bank credit but not for trade credit. Altinoglu (2020) and Luo (2020) consider economies with
trade credit subject to endogenous financial constraints.
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for final good production or household preferences over the aggregate consumption bundle C),




where βi denotes the expenditure share falling on sector i and
∑n
i=1 βi = 1.
5.2.2 Banks
There are m banks providing differentiated loans to the intermediate good firms. This dif-
ferentiation is associated with limited credit market competition whose ultimate source we
leave unmodeled here. The theoretical literature typically links banks’ market power to asym-
metric information problems, long-term customer relationships, switching costs or spatial and
regulatory considerations of bank reach.4 Against this background, we take the limited sub-
stitutability across loans originated by different banks as a primitive of our model. Banks are
owned by households and fund their working capital loans by issuing demand deposits, which
are passed on by the firms to compensate workers for their labor supply. Deposits are remu-
nerated at an exogenous gross interest rate R, which is common to all banks, consistent with
perfect competition on the deposit market.
On top of the common cost of deposits, the funding cost facing an individual bank b is subject
to an idiosyncratic shock zb ∈ (0, 1) relating to the operating cost of the bank’s lending activity.
The resulting variable cost of lending is thus bank-specific and passed on to the borrowing firms,





4Most microeconomic studies of financial intermediation consider market power as a distinctive feature of
the banking industry (Freixas and Rochet, 1997), and it is empirically well-documented (Claessens and Laeven,
2004; Degryse and Ongena, 2008). Recent papers introducing heterogenous banks with differentiated loans and
markups due to market power include Gerali, Neri, Sessa and Signoretti (2010), Mandelman (2010), Andres
and Arce (2012), Bremus et al. (2018) and Corbae and D’Erasmo (2019).
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Hence, for a given deposit rate R, the gross lending rate rb varies inversely with the idiosyncratic
cost shock zb. Let xib denote the volume of loans from bank b to sector i, and let Db denote the










xib = zbDb, (5.7)
which can be interpreted as a balance sheet constraint restricting the bank’s volume of funds
xb available for lending to firms. The pass-through of funding costs to borrowers in the form of
increased lending rates is possible due to imperfect competition on the loan market. In a closely
related paper, Bremus et al. (2018) provide a micro-foundation for this mechanism within a
model with imperfect competition among heterogeneous banks charging endogenous markups
in the face of a search friction. Specifically, we assume that bank loans are relationship-specific
and thus differentiated products with a finite elasticity of substitution across loans originating








b=1 φib = 1. Accordingly, the effective loan volume available to intermediate good
firms operating in sector i is given by the weighted geometric mean of loans xib obtained from
individual banks, where the weights φib capture the importance of bank b in financing sector
i. Finally, let D =
∑m




Intermediate good firms are competitive and take prices and the technology specified in (5.1)
and (5.2) as given. In addition, they face a financial constraint, which forces them to finance
their wage bill w`i (but not their expenditure on intermediate inputs) upfront with bank loans
whose gross-of-interest volume cannot exceed a fraction ξ ∈ (0, 1) of their sales revenue. That
is,




rixi ≤ ξpiqi, (5.10)










Notice again that this presumes a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of bank loans as in (5.8). The
















subject to (5.9) and (5.10). We assume ξ < ηα so that financial constraint (5.10) is binding.
Lemma 1 Suppose ξ < ηα. Given the wage rate w, the vector of sectoral prices p = [p1, ..., pn]
′
and the vector of interest rates r = [r1, ..., rm]
′, the factor and loan demand of the representative,
financially constrained firm in sector i satisfy
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= χ < η < ζ = 1−ξ




pjqij = [χα + ζ(1− α)] piqi < ηpiqi. (5.13)
The compound parameter χ < η captures the effective tightness of the financial constraint,
which we interpret as an indicator of financial development. Taking this parameter as given,
equation (??) indicates that that sector i’s demand for loans from bank b varies inversely with
the lending rate rb. At the same time, the expression retains the limited substitutability across
loans originated by differentiated banks.
More generally, the results summarised in Lemma 1 indicate that a binding financial constraint
distorts firm decisions in three dimensions. The distortions are best understood relative to the
unconstrained benchmark where, given decreasing returns to scale, a firm’s total expenditure
amounts to a fraction η < 1 of its revenue. First, since the working capital constraint applies
only to the wage bill, the immediate effect is that firms have to economise on their gross-
of-interest expenditure on wages. The associated expenditure share now amounts only to
ξ = χα < ηα of firm revenue. Second, since firm revenue can be increased by expanding the
use of intermediate inputs which are not subject to the financial constraint, firms seek to relax
their financial constraint by increasing the overall expenditure share on intermediate inputs to
ζ(1 − α) > η(1 − α). There is thus a technologically inefficient substitution of inputs away
from labor and towards intermediate inputs. Third, the cumulative effect of these demand
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distortions for labour and intermediates is that firms have to limit their expenditure below
what is dictated by decreasing returns alone, χα+ ζ(1− α) < η. The financial constraint thus
leads firms operate at an inefficient scale. It is straightforward to show that this distortion is
increasing in the labour share.
Lemma 2 Suppose ξ < ηα. Then the shortfall of total expenditure relative to the volume
implied by decreasing returns to scale is increasing in α. Formally,
d
dα
[χα + ζ(1− α)] < 0.
5.2.4 Equilibrium
Recall from (5.3) and (5.4) that sectoral output can be used either for consumption or as
an intermediate input for production in other sectors, and that final output coincides with
aggregate consumption,








With P denoting the aggregate price level, expenditure for final consumption goods from sector
i is then given by
pici = βiPC, (5.14)










which is normalized to one, P = 1. A competitive equilibrium for the given economy is defined
as follows.
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium of the economy with m banks and n intermediate good
sectors consists of prices w, R, p = [p1, ..., pn]
′, r = [r1, ..., rm]
′ and quantities ` = [`1, ..., `n]
′,
D, c = [c1, ..., cn]
′, q = [q1, ..., qn]
′, x = [x1, ..., xn]
′ with qi = [qi1, ..., qin]
′ and xi = [xi1, ..., xim]
′
for all sectors i = 1, ..., n such that:
(i) the consumption allocation c is consistent with (5.4);
(ii) interest rates r satisfy (5.5);
(iii) the intermediate good firm allocation `i, qij and xib solves problem (5.12);
(iv) markets clear, that is,
n∑
i=1
`i = L = 1, w
n∑
i=1

























Figure 5.1: A combination of the Input-Output(W) and Intermediation(Φ) Matrices
In the above Figure 5.1 we provide a graphical illustration of the linkages between the input-
output(W) matrix 5 and the intermediation(Φ) matrix. In Fig 5.1 the direction of the arrows
show the relationship between banks and sectors of the economy. The thickness of these arrows
5For detailed sector classification please see appendix Table C.1.1
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shows the strength of these relationships. Arrows that originates from a given bank to given
sector implies the bank in question lends to that sector. Likewise if the arrow originates from a
given sector to another sector this shows the sector in question provides inputs to that sector.
The figure also illustrates cases where sector provide inputs to itself sector. To begin, it is
convenient to define a number of important primitives. Let the n × m matrix Φ collect the
coefficients for the given bank-sector relations,
Φ ≡





φn1 . . . φnm

with typical element φib, capturing the importance of bank b in financing sector i. Similarly,
let W denote the n× n input-output matrix,
W ≡





ωn1 . . . ωnn

collecting the intermediate input shares ωij across sectors. Based on the intersectoral depen-
dence embodied in W, we obtain the influence vector,6 defined as
v = α [I− ζ(1− α)W′]−1 β. (5.16)
Intuitively, element vi of the influence vector captures the importance of sector i for aggregate
outcomes, taking into account the effects of propagation through the network of input-output
linkages across sectors (Acemoglu et al., 2012). Consequently, the influence vector is charac-
terised in terms of ζ, which captures sectors’ (endogenous) dependence on intermediate inputs
(cf. Lemma 1).
6See Appendix C.1.3 for a derivation of the influence vector and its relation to the sectoral sales vector.
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In an economy where firms operate under constant returns to scale and are not subject to
financial frictions (η = 1 and ξ ≥ ηα), the influence vector can be interpreted in terms of the
share of labor (the only primary input into production) assigned to the sectors: Each sector
purchases intermediate inputs and hires labor, which is then transformed into intermediate
output and – by way of the intersectoral input-output linkages – ultimately into final output.
Thus, the influence vector provides a measure of sectors’ importance in the mapping from
labour inputs to final output, with
∑n
i=1 vi = 1. That is, the influence vector coincides with
the sectoral sales vector, and the vi correspond to the Domar weights.
In the economy at hand, however, firms operate under decreasing returns to scale (η < 1)
and are financially constrained (ξ < ηα). Under decreasing returns, firms make profits, which
are paid to households in the form of dividends rather than recycled within the input-output
network for purchases of intermediate inputs. There is thus ‘profit leakage’ (Bigio and La’O,
2016). Under financial frictions, the allocation is further modified because the scale of firms’
production as measured by the share of expenditure relative to sales is reduced below what
is dictated by decreasing returns alone (cf. Lemma 1), so that the share of profits increases
further. On the other hand, in an effort to relax their financial constraint, firms increase the
share of their expenditure on intermediate inputs relative to sales to ζ(1 − α) > η(1 − α).








which is generally different from one. Notice that α
1−ζ(1−α) > 1 holds if ζ > 1, which is true
provided the extent of financial frictions as captured by the shortfall of ξ below ηα is sufficiently
strong relative to the extent of decreasing returns to scale η < 1. Formally, ζ = 1−ξ





. By contrast, under moderate financial frictions, we have ζ < 1 and hence α
1−ζ(1−α) <
1. Accordingly, depending on their relative strength, decreasing returns and financial frictions
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can work to amplify (attenuate) the importance of individual sectors for aggregate outcomes
because they increase (limit) the use of intermediate inputs relative to sales and hence augment
(contain) the propagation of changes at the sector level through the input-output network. We
summarise our findings, which resonate results in Bigio and La’O (2016), in the following
Proposition.





Under constant returns to scale (η = 1) and absent financial frictions (ξ ≥ ηα), ζ = 1 and the












For all scenarios in Proposition 1, the influence vector remains crucial in the expressions for
firms’ equilibrium demand for intermediate inputs and loans. They are given by











where zb is the idiosyncratic cost shock for bank b and D =
∑n
i=1w`i = w by clearing on
the market for working capital loans. But despite this importance, the influence vector is not
in itself a sufficient statistic for the characterisation of aggregate outcomes in the presence
of financial frictions. Instead, this requires consideration of the distortion influence vector,7
defined as
d = α [I− η(1− α)W′]−1 β. (5.17)
Comparison of the definition of the distortion influence vector in (5.17) with that of the influence
vector in (5.16) reveals an almost identical structure – up to the difference between ζ and η.
Thus, different from the influence vector, the distortion influence vector is defined not with
reference to the importance of intermediate input flows, but instead in terms of the returns-to-
scale parameter η. At a deeper level, however, it turns out that the mapping between v and




M = [I− ζ(1− α)W] [I− η(1− α)W]−1 . (5.18)
Notice in particular that it is generally not possible to write M as a linear matrix function of
the input-output matrix W. Accordingly, the mapping M is generally different from a simple
rescaling of v into d. Instead, it depends explicitly on the input-output matrix W; that is, the
sectoral interdependence embodied in the input-output network matters.8
7See Appendix C.1.5 for a derivation of the distortion influence vector.
8A trivial exception is the case when W = I so that each sector operates in isolation without any interme-
diate inputs flows between sectors. Then, M degenerates to a scaling factor, M = 1−ζ(1−α)1−η(1−α) I. However, this
simplification of M to a scaling factor is impossible in the presence of sectoral interdependence via intermediate
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Intuitively, the characterisation of aggregate outcomes recurs on the distortion influence vector
with its key parameter η (rather than ζ) because, unlike productivity shocks, the distortions
zb do not affect firms’ production frontier. Firms’ (efficient) production scale is therefore de-
termined by the returns-to-scale parameter η, and this is what ultimately matters for the
aggregate consequences of distortions in financing the intersectoral production network. On
the other hand, the flow of intermediate inputs within the input-output network is still gov-
erned by the expenditure share parameter ζ, which is endogenous to the tightness of financial
constraints (cf. Lemma 1) but does otherwise not interact with the idiosyncratic bank shocks
zb. In consequence, the influence vector v has an effect on the level of final output, whereas the
aggregate impact of financial distortions zb can be traced via the distortion influence vector d.
The following Proposition details this further.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, the natural logarithm of final output is given by










where Γ collects terms constant in zb, and where φib and zb denote elements of the intermediation




i=1 vi, the equilibrium
allocation is generically inefficient.
In compact notation, the expression from Proposition 2 can be written as
lnY = Γ + ηd′Θ,
where the constant term Γ is determined via the influence vector v,9 and where the distortion
inputs.






b=1 φ1b ln (φ1bzb)
...∑m
b=1 φnb ln (φnbzb)

collects the bank-level shocks zb weighted by their relevance for the financial intermediation
network Φ. Accordingly, the organisation of financial intermediation, as captured by Φ, has a
direct level effect on final output,10 and the quantitative relevance of this effect for aggregate






1−ζ(1−α) , the equilibrium allocation is inefficient, which has two sources.
First, the inefficiency reflects the misallocation arising due to the input substitution described
in Lemma 1, which distorts the aggregation of inputs in (5.2). Second, the idiosyncratic credit
supply shocks zb generally affect the intermediate goods sectors in an asymmetric fashion, which
is governed by the particular cross-sectional pattern of shocks {zb} and their the propagation
via the network of bank-sector relations Φ. Since the production technology (5.1) displays
decreasing returns to scale, the resulting dispersion in the scale of sectoral production activity
is inefficient. The distortion vector Θ captures these distortions, and the distortion influence
vector d traces their propagation through the input-output network and ultimately maps them
into final output. Specifically, element di of the distortion influence vector captures the im-
portance of sector i for the transmission of credit supply shocks into the production network.
Notice, however, that in the considered environment with exogenous labor supply, inefficiency
cannot materialise in terms of the supply of primary inputs, but exclusively in terms of reduced
10Even absent shocks (that is, when zb = 1 for all banks b), the level effect arises due to the finite-elasticity
aggregation of loans in (5.8), whereby the fact that this is presumed to happen with an unitary elasticity is not
important in itself. To understand the mechanics, notice from the expression for Θ that the contribution of
sector i to lnY depends on
∑m





. The structure of this Cobb-
Douglas aggregator results from firms’ optimal demand for loans, given the weights φib. In a situation where
(risk-neutral) firms could instead choose these weights, they would opt for complete concentration, that is, for
obtaining the entirety of their loans from one single bank. This rationale for concentration is driven by the
benefit from rationalising on the need to aggregate different loans subject to a finite elasticity of substitution.
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aggregate productivity.11
Moving on from the level of final output, we now turn to analyse the aggregate volatility
generated by idiosyncratic bank-level shocks. This requires consideration of two key objects.
First, the vector of bank outdegrees ob, whose entry for bank b accumulates its funding shares





Second, the vector of bank market shares sb, defined as the ratio of the loans Db issued by bank
b over the aggregate volume of loans extended by the whole banking system, D =
∑m
b=1 Db.












Bank market shares are an important – but generally not the only – factor explaining aggregate
volatility, as detailed in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose all banks have the same distribution of shocks, σb = σ, and the shocks
zb are independent across banks. In equilibrium, the variance of the natural logarithm of final
output is then given by




























denotes the market share of bank b, and where δi ≡ di− vi can be approximated,
11In the terminology of Bigio and La’O (2020), there is a loss of total factor productivity (misallocation), but
no labour wedge (distortion of primary input supply).
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to the first-order, as




Similar to Proposition 2, the first line in the expression for var[lnY ] in Proposition 3 makes
clear that the key determinants of aggregate volatility are the distortion vector Θ and the
distortion influence vector d. The second line in this expression instead establishes that the
mapping from idiosyncratic bank-level volatility to aggregate volatility generally depends on
two terms: (i) a Herfindahl term proportional to the sum of squared bank market shares, and
(ii) an outdegree correction term, which interacts the vector of bank outdegrees ob with the
vector of sectoral differences δi ≡ di − vi and thus accounts for the sectoral interdependence
beyond what is captured directly via the influence vector. From equation (5.20), we can infer
that the Herfindahl term, that is, the sum of squared bank market shares, can be computed
based on the influence vector v. But to the extent that v differs from the distortion influence
vector d, the Herfindahl term alone fails to account for the correct mapping from idiosyncratic
to aggregate volatility, which also requires consideration of the correction term. Indeed, as
seen from the definition δi ≡ di − vi, the outdegree correction term emerges exactly due to the
divergence of the distortion influence vector d from the influence vector v. To better understand
the substance of the Proposition, it is useful to consider a number of special cases.
First, suppose the production technology (5.1) displays constant returns to scale (η = 1) and
financial frictions are irrelevant (ξ ≥ ηα). In this friction-less economy, there is no need for
firms to distort their input mix between capital and intermediate goods so that ζ = η = 1 and
δ = 0. The variance expression from Proposition 3 thus degenerates to




Accordingly, aggregate volatility is equal to the product of idiosyncratic volatility and the
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Herfindahl index of bank market shares (cf. Gabaix, 2011). From the expression for sb in (5.20) it
is clear that the bank market share embodies the structure of the input-output network W (via
the sectoral influences vi) and the intermediation network Φ (via the bank-sector coefficients
φib). However, given the Herfindahl index, the details of neither W nor Φ matter for aggregate
volatility (cf. Bigio and La’O, 2020). In other words, even though the intermediation matrix Φ
determines the way financial shocks hit the economy and the input-output network W plays
an important role in their propagation, the structure of bank market shares sb as captured by
the Herfindahl index is a sufficient statistic for tracing the relevance of bank-specific shocks
for aggregate volatility. That is, W and Φ play no role beyond pinning down the bank size
distribution. This is a reflection of Hulten’s theorem (Hulten, 1978) which states in a production
context that, in efficient economies, the impact of an idiosyncratic shock at the micro level is
equal to the relevant unit’s sales share of GDP.12
Next, continue to assume that financial frictions play no role (ξ > ηα), but allow for decreasing
returns to scale (η < 1). As before, there is no input substitution, implying ζ = η < 1.
Aggregate volatility can then again be characterised in terms of the Herfindahl index of bank
market shares, now with an additional scaling term which arises because firms’ expenditure
share on intermediate inputs generally amounts to η(1− α) < (1− α). It is now given by
























< 1, aggregate volatility is now dampened. This is because of profit
leakage: firms’ sales revenues are now in part diverted from the propagation within the input-
output system and rebated to households in the form of profits. In consequence, the role of
the input-output network as a source of amplification is reduced. However, conditional on a
given Herfindahl index of bank market shares, the network architecture embodied in W and Φ
continues to have no influence on aggregate volatility.
12Key to the derivation of Hulten’s theorem are equilibrium efficiency and the envelope theorem. It may thus
not hold in inefficient economies like the one considered here when η < 1 and ξ > ηα.
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This result is finally broken when financial frictions are sufficiently strong to make them rele-
vant for firms’ input decisions (ξ > ηα). By Lemma 1, firms will then inefficiently substitute
inputs away from labor and towards intermediate goods. With firms’ expenditure share on




. As seen before, this cofactor exceeds (falls short of) one when financial frictions
are sufficiently strong (moderate) relative to the extent of decreasing returns to scale; accord-
ingly, the fundamental role of bank market shares sb for aggregate fluctuations is amplified
(dampened). Importantly, however, the effects of sectoral interdependence via spending on
intermediate inputs as captured by parameter ζ are different from the extent of profit leakage
governed by η. Indeed, Lemma 1 established η < ζ, and as a consequence, the Herfindahl term
overstates the contribution of idiosyncratic shocks to aggregate volatility.13 This leads to the
emergence of the additional outdegree correction term.
The nature of the outdegree correction term becomes clear from the approximation of δi in
Proposition 3. As η < ζ, the correction term is generally negative. The magnitude of this
adjustment depends on
∑n
j=1 vjωji, that is, on the importance of individual sectors i as suppliers
to the other sectors j, scaled by these sectors’ influence vj. Hence, sectors that are important
as suppliers of intermediate inputs get assigned a lower weight in the determination of the
volatility of aggregate output. Similarly, the weight adjustment is also relevant for banks
whose contribution to aggregate volatility is no longer captured by their market shares sb and
the corresponding simple Herfindahl index. Instead, as seen from the outdegree correction term∑n
i=1 δiφib, banks which lend to more important sectors get assigned a lower weight; that is,
bank size is punished less if it is the result of lending to important sectors. The underlying
notion of sectoral importance is again captured via the difference vector δ, which incorporates
the full structure of the input-output matrix W.
13In detail, the Herfindahl term accounts for the increased intermediate input share ζ(1− α) under financial
frictions, which leads to an increased network multiplier. But it fails to account for the increased extent of
profit leakage as measured by the reduced overall expenditure share χα+ ζ(1− α) (cf. Lemma 1).
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In addition to the input-output matrix W, the outdegree correction term
∑n
i=1 δiφib also recurs
on the intermediation matrix Φ. Intuitively, the term
∑n
i=1 δiφib accounts for the part of
bank b’s contribution to aggregate volatility that has been incorrectly captured by its market
share sb; evidently, this contribution is determined by the relevant bank-sector links φib. In
consequence, also the intermediation matrix Φ plays a key role in shaping aggregate volatility.
One interesting aspect here is that, through Φ, idiosyncratic bank shocks zb induce a correlation
structure for the effective financial distortions the production network is subject to. This is
readily seen from the distortion vector Θ, where an idiosyncratic shock zb to bank b shows up as
a distortion for all sectors i which have an existing lending relationship φib > 0 with that bank.
Thus, credit supply shocks are naturally correlated across sectors. The financial intermediation
network Φ is therefore a second source of co-movement in addition to the input-output linkages
embodied in W.
5.3.1 An example
How should financial intermediation be organised in order to minimize aggregate volatility?
That is, for a given input-output network, what are banks’ optimal (volatility minimising)
shares φib in financing individual sectors, and what are the implications for the the distribution
of bank market shares sb? To gain insights towards answering these questions, consider a
stylised economy with n = 2 sectors and m = 2 banks. We set η = 0.85, α = 0.71 and ξ = 0.20;
these parameter values conform with our baseline calibration obtained in Section 5.4.2 below
and imply a binding borrowing constraint as ξ < ηα. We also assume that the idiosyncratic
cost shocks zb have a uniform volatility σ
2
b = σ
2 across banks. Since the effects of the shocks
zb are scaled by the volume Db of banks’ lending, this implies that larger banks expose the
production network to potentially larger shocks. Recall also that, whenever sectors have a joint
exposure to individual banks, their financial shocks are correlated.
Looking at a number of different specifications, the four panels of Figure 1 plot (i) the vectors v
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and d for the two sectors, (ii) the minimum volatility configuration of financial intermediation,
and (iii) the associated bank market shares. For given GDP shares β and a given input-
output structure W, the minimum volatility configuration of financial intermediation is given
by the collection {φib} that minimises the expression for aggregate volatility in Proposition 3;
in the context of the 2×2 economy at hand, it can be described in terms of the two coefficients
(φ11, φ22), which allows for a convenient graphical representation.
14 The associated bank market
shares can then be inferred from equation (5.20).
Indeed, the respective determination of the minimum volatility configuration of financial inter-
mediation and the vector of bank market shares highlights a general property. As seen from
(5.20), bank market shares are calculated based on the influence vector v, which mirrors sec-
tors’ importance in terms of intermediate input flows. What matters for aggregate volatility,
however, is not the influence vector v but the distortion influence vector d, which additionally
captures the extent of inefficiency (that is, the wedge between the actual and the efficient scale
of production) originating at the sector level. Specifically, the approximation of δi in Proposi-
tion 3 makes clear that the difference vector δ traces the role of individual sectors as a source
of distortions generated within the whole input-output network. In consequence, minimising
the Herfindahl index of bank market shares will minimise the variance of final output whenever
the distortion influence vector coincides with the influence vector, d = v. But when the two
vectors differ, the minimum volatility configuration of financial intermediation will generally
not entail or require the minimisation of the Herfindahl index. Figure 1 illustrates this for the
simple 2× 2 economy described above.
14Appendix C.1.7 provides the underlying analytical results for the characterisation of the minimum volatility
collection {φib}.
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(a) β′ = [0.5, 0.5], W = [0.5, 0.5; 0.5, 0.5]
(b) β′ = [0.9, 0.1], W = [0.5, 0.5; 0.5, 0.5]
(c) β′ = [0.5, 0.5], W = [1, 0; 0.5, 0.5]
(d) β′ = [0.5, 0.5], W = [1, 0; 0.9, 0.1]
Figure 5.2: Minimum volatility configuration of financial intermediation. Vertical lines indicate
the domain for φ11 compatible with minimum volatility.
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Panel (a) of Figure 1 considers the symmetric economy where both sectors have identical GDP
shares and are equally important as suppliers of intermediate inputs. The top middle chart
shows that the minimum volatility configuration of financial intermediation is then given by all
combinations of (φ11, φ22) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that φ22 = φ11. Common to all these combinations is
that they imply equal bank market shares s1 = s2 = 0.5 (see top right chart) and therefore also
minimize the bank Herfindahl index. This happens in spite of a binding borrowing constraint
(ζ > η). The reason lies in the complete symmetry of the specification in panel (a). Although
d 6= v, the individual entries in the two vectors are actually identical across sectors (see top
left chart) so that the difference has no further implications.
Panel (b) introduces asymmetry via the vector β′ = [0.9, 0.1] of GDP shares but maintains
a balanced input-output matrix W. The middle chart again plots the minimum volatility
relationship between φ11 and φ22; the admissible domain for φ11 compatible with minimum
volatility is now given by φ11 ∈ [0.3750, 0.6250]. The minimum volatility relationship (red line)
implies that as φ11 increases, φ22 rises with a slope larger than one.
15 That is, when bank 1
expands its lending share to the larger sector 1, bank 2 must expand its lending share to the
smaller sector 2 more than proportionately. This happens for two reasons: First, to prevent
the amount of credit intermediated by the two banks from diverging too strongly; and second,
to compensate for the correlation of financial shocks across sectors, which is governed by the
profile of bank outdegrees, ob =
∑n
i=1 φib. The second motive actually implies that minimum
volatility rebalancing (red line) is more pronounced than what would be required to retain
equal bank market shares (blue line), to the extent that the principal financier of sector 1
ends up with a lower outdegree. To understand the underlying logic, recall the expression for
aggregate volatility in Proposition 3 and observe from the left chart in panel (b) that, in the
present example, the difference vector is constant across sectors, δ1 = δ2 = δ < 0. The volatility
15Formally, the minimum volatility relationship is given by φ22 =
d1
d2



















Accordingly, as δ < 0, the minimum volatility configuration assigns a low market share sb to
banks with a small outdegree ob. As seen from the right chart, the consequence is that the
bank with the larger funding share φ1b for the important sector 1 should have a smaller overall
lending volume Db and hence a market share sb < 0.5.
Panel (c) breaks symmetry in the other dimension by considering an input-output matrix W
with a supply chain structure where sector 2 relies on intermediate inputs from both sectors
while sector 1 produces without external intermediate inputs. That is, asymmetry is now gener-
ated not via sectoral GDP shares but via the input-output network; the left chart demonstrates
that the difference vector then becomes unbalanced, δ1 < δ2 < 0. The minimum volatility rela-
tionship between φ11 and φ22 (red line) again displays a slope larger than one, but in contrast
to the previous example it is now flatter than the equal market shares relationship (blue line).
This is because the minimum volatility configuration assigns a larger market share sb > 0.5
to the principal financier of the high-influence sector 1, here bank 1. The minimum volatility
configuration thus displays tolerance towards the size of banks that are important for funding
important, high-influence sectors.
Finally, panel (d) considers a variation of the example considered in panel (c), which further
amplifies the asymmetry in intermediate input flows. In line with its increased dominance as
a supplier of intermediate goods, an increased funding contribution to sector 1 is now assessed
with an extra amount of tolerance for market share expansion. Compared to panel (c), the
admissible interval for φ11 compatible with minimum volatility is centered more tightly around
0.5, but the range of the distribution of tolerated market shares is now wider.
In sum, the preceding set of examples illustrates that, in an (asymmetric) inefficient economy,
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the minimum volatility configuration of financial intermediation is compatible with a non-
degenerate distribution of bank market shares. The expression for bank market shares in
(5.20) illustrates that banks lending to high-influence sectors tend to be large. Looking at the
minimum volatility configuration, whether asymmetry amplifies or mitigates this natural effect
depends on the particular source of heterogeneity across sectors: An increased funding share for
high-β sectors implies that the bank’s market share should shrink (see panel (b)). By contrast,
an increased funding share for sectors that play a dominant role as input suppliers implies that
the bank’s market share should expand (see panels (c) and (d)).
5.4 Empirical illustration
In this Section, we provide an empirical illustration of the implications of the theory developed
so far. The application is to the Ugandan economy. In view of the importance of financial
frictions and the institutional environment for financial intermediation, we see Uganda as par-
ticularly suitable for this purpose. As detailed in Appendix C.2.1, the formal economy in
Uganda displays a pronounced bank dependence with few alternative means of finance avail-
able to firms; on average, 96 per cent of private credit comes from banks. The banking sector
itself relies strongly on funding via deposits and the interbank market is weak; these features
are consistent with the formalisation of credit supply shocks developed in our theory. Finally,
with a 3-bank (5-bank) concentration ratio in 2017 of more than 40 per cent (60 per cent),
the Ugandan banking industry – comprised of 25 banks – is characterised by a high degree of
concentration.
The expression for aggregate volatility established in Proposition 3 is used to link the theoretical
and empirical parts of this chapter. This proposition 3 is rewritten into three terms, the
first term provides the Herfindahl index of bank market shares, the second term captures the
interaction between the Herfindahl index and the extra distortion term and the last(outdegree
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correction) term represents the aggregate contribution of shocks in the banking system. In the
application of this proposition we first address the question whether the relationship between
financial intermediation and macroeconomic outcomes is due to concentration in the banking
industry or concentration on the economy’s production side. We show through the prism of the
decomposition result, aggregate volatility is driven by the Herfindahl term and the outdegree
correction term. And finally proposition 3 is used to quantify the empirical contribution of
idiosyncratic credit supply shocks to the volatility of GDP in Uganda.
We proceed in three steps. First, Section 5.4.1 provides an empirical estimate of the magnitude
of bank-level credit supply shocks and their consequences for credit dynamics at the bank and
sector level. Second, Section 5.4.2 describes the structure of the intermediation and production
networks in detail and calibrates the model to the environment observed in Uganda. Third,
Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 employ the calibrated economy to undertake a number of counterfactual
experiments focused on (i) the decomposition of the sources of aggregate volatility and (ii) the
degree of amplification in the mapping from idiosyncratic shocks to aggregate outcomes.
5.4.1 Credit supply shocks
Data. Our empirical assessment of credit supply shocks in the Ugandan banking sector builds
on data obtained from the Bank of Uganda (BoU), the national central bank which is also
responsible for the supervision of the banking sector in Uganda. We use loan-level data on
credit in the domestic banking system compiled by Compuscan, a credit reference bureau, for
the Bank of Uganda. Compuscan maintains the credit register under the supervision of the
Bank of Uganda. Covering the entire banking system in Uganda, it provides monthly data on
firm borrowing for the period from January 2012 to June 2020. Data used covers the period
when the credit reference bureau produced a clean, consistent and most recent run of data.
The credit register data records the parties involved in each loan and thus allows for the
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classification of loans according to identifiable bank-firm pairs. We eliminate the two smallest
banks from our data set as their lending is driven by special considerations and quantitatively
insignificant, accounting for a negligible share of overall bank credit. This leaves us with 23
banks, whose lending activity accounts for the bulk of private-sector lending in Uganda.
While the data is in principle available at the firm-level, compliance with the BoU’s confiden-
tiality standards forces us to aggregate data at the level of industrial sectors – the level of
aggregation also relevant to our theoretical model. Hence, the primary data at the bank-firm
level are collapsed into loan series at the sector-level according to the International Standard
Industrial Classification (ISIC) codes used by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics and the cen-
tral bank. In detail, the ten broad sectors are: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; Business;
Building; Electricity and Water; Manufacturing; Mining and Quarrying; Social; Trade; Trans-
port; Others.16 We then consolidate the monthly bank-sector level series into quarterly and
annual loan aggregates, computed as the total volume of credit provided by a lender (bank) to
a particular sector over the quarter or year, respectively. At quarterly frequency, this produces
a data set of 6881 bank-sector observations, where the lending relationship lasts more than
one quarter. For the annual data, we end up with 1535 bank-sector observations with credit
relationships over more than one year.
Methodology and results. A key challenge for empirical work on banking is to isolate
changes in loan supply from changes in loan demand. This leads Khwaja and Mian (2008) to
argue that the assessment of how shocks to the banking system affect the real economy must
simultaneously confront two separate channels: the bank lending channel and the firm borrowing
channel. The bank lending channel rests on bank’s inability to insulate borrowing firms from
bank-specific liquidity shocks, while the firm borrowing channel is due to firms’ inability to
compensate bank lending shocks by substituting towards alternative sources of financing.
16Table 2 below provides the mapping of ISIC codes into these broad sectors as well as their GDP shares.
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We examine the bank lending and firm borrowing channels in Uganda, following ideas in Amiti
and Weinstein (2018b) and Alfaro, Garćıa-Santana and Moral-Benito (2020). In line with our
theoretical model, our approach exploits linked bank-sector data so that the unit of observation
is given by xib, that is, the volume of loans from bank b to sector i. Specifically, our identification
of supply and demand shocks to the growth of bank credit exploits the fact that each bank
lends to multiple sectors, and each sector borrows from multiple banks.
To start, consider the following decomposition of credit growth between bank b and sector i at
time t,
∆ ln(xibt) = ςbt + δit + εibt, (5.21)
where xibt denotes the average of outstanding loans from bank b to firm i over period t; ςbt is
a bank-time fixed effect, and δit is a firm-time fixed effect. The fixed effects in (5.21) can be
interpreted as supply and demand shocks, respectively. In particular, ςbt captures idiosyncratic
shocks to bank b which are identified through differences in credit growth across banks lending
to the same sector: From observing a sector whose credit from bank b displays stronger growth
than that from bank b′, we conclude that bank b was subject to a more favourable supply shock
than bank b′. The identification of the demand shocks δit follows a similar logic. Finally, εibt
captures other shocks to the bank-firm relationship assumed to be orthogonal to the bank and
firm effects.17
We find no evidence indicating a systematic effect of bank size on volatility (see Appendix C.2.2
for a scatter plot). A linear regression of bank volatility on size results in a slope estimate of
-0.01 estimated without significance (p = 0.28). Our subsequent analysis will thus assume a
uniform volatility at the level of the cross-sectional average, σb = σ = 0.3313.
17Amiti and Weinstein (2018b) show that the bank-time and sector-time fixed effects estimated on the basis
of (5.21) are identical to those obtained from a specification that also allows for bank-sector-time effects Zibt.
The key insight is that one can always express the interaction term as Zibt = ςbt + δit + ζibt, where ζibt is an
error term. It is therefore possible to define the bank and sector shocks such that they are invariant to the
inclusion of the interaction term, and they can be consistently estimated from equation (5.21).
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In order to quantify the magnitude of the bank lending channel, we estimate the following
model,
∆ ln(xibt) = β
bς̂bt + ηit + νibt, (5.22)
where ς̂bt is the bank-specific credit supply shock estimated in (5.21) and then normalised to have
zero mean and unit variance. The sector-time fixed effect ηit controls for time-varying demand
shocks, which is feasible due to banks’ credit exposure to multiple sectors. The magnitude of
the bank lending channel is then captured by parameter βb; given the normalisation of ς̂bt, the
estimate can be interpreted in terms of the change in the gross rate of credit growth induced
by a one-standard deviation bank-specific shock to credit supply.
Table 1 reports our results. The first column examines the bank lending channel at the bank-
quarterly credit growth annual credit growth




Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the bank level;
t statistics in parentheses; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Table 5.1: Bank lending channel
sector level at quarterly frequency and identifies a positive and significant effect. Conditional on
sector-time fixed effects, increased credit supply from a given bank implies higher credit growth
for sectors with a credit relationship to that bank. The magnitude of this effect is substantial: A
one standard deviation increase in credit supply leads to an increase in the growth rate of bank-
sector credit by 0.33 percentage points; this is relative to an average growth rate of credit of 2.67
per cent. The second column repeats the exercise at annual frequency.18 Bank credit supply
shocks are again associated with positive effects on credit growth. For sectors with an existing
18Working with annual data implies having more sector observations per bank, allowing for a better estimation
of bank credit supply shocks. On the other hand, though, with quarterly data sector-time effects can vary within
a year, which facilitates a better control for demand shocks.
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credit relationship to a particular bank, bank-specific credit supply shocks are estimated to
result in an increase in credit growth by 0.53 percentage points relative to an average growth
rate of 8.08 per cent. We conclude that credit supply shocks have statistically and economically
important effects on bank-sector credit growth. When comparing the estimates at quarterly
and annual frequency, notice that, even though the shocks have a smaller absolute effect for
the quarterly data, their magnitude relative to the underlying average growth rates is actually
larger. This points to the fact that borrowers are able to partially offset the effect credit supply
shocks over time. Indeed, borrowing firms or sectors may still be able to insulate themselves
from idiosyncratic bank credit supply shocks by resorting to credit from alternative sources,
and in particular from other banks.
In a second step, we seek to examine to what extent a negative bank lending shock actually
translates into a reduction of available credit for borrowers. To that end, we use the idiosyncratic
credit supply shocks ς̂bt identified in (5.21) to construct a measure of credit availability at the
sector level. Specifically, we again start from the normalised version of ς̂bt and compute the
credit supply shock facing a particular sector as the weighted average of the idiosyncratic supply







Next, we regress sectors’ credit growth on the constructed credit supply measure and the
idiosyncratic demand shocks δ̂it (again normalised to have zero mean and unit variance) from
(5.21),
∆ ln(xit) = β
iς̄it + γδ̂it + uit. (5.24)
Similar to the bank lending channel estimated in (5.22), the magnitude of the sector borrowing
channel is reflected in parameter βi.
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Table 2 provides our estimates, contrasting effects at quarterly and annual frequency. The first
quarterly credit growth annual credit growth




Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the bank level;
t statistics in parentheses; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Table 5.2: Sector borrowing channel
column examines the sector borrowing channel based on quarterly data. Our estimate implies
that, controlling for credit demand, a one-standard deviation shock in the overall credit supply
available to a given sector leads to an increase in the growth of the sector’s bank credit by 1.09
percentage points. Revisiting the credit dynamics induced by credit supply shocks at annual
frequency, the second column reports an even larger borrowing channel estimate of 1.58 per-
centage points. Hence, consistent with our theoretical model, there is a quantitatively relevant
pass-through of idiosyncratic credit supply shocks to observed credit growth at the sector level.
Interestingly, the estimated effects are even larger in magnitude than their counterparts from
Table 1 (βi > βb).
5.4.2 Production and intermediation networks
Building on the empirical estimates, we now examine the consequences of idiosyncratic credit
supply shocks within our model economy when it is calibrated to network data from Uganda.
The key primitives of our model economy are the input-output matrix W and the intermediation
matrix Φ. Data for the construction of W come from the Eora Global Supply Chain Database
(Lenzen, Moran, Kanemoto and Geschke, 2013) which provides the input-output table across
26 industrial sectors in Uganda for the year 2015.19 Consistency with the loan information
described in Section 5.4.1 requires that we aggregate the 26 original sectors into 10 broad
19The Eora Global Supply Chain Database is available at https://worldmrio.com/.
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sectors as detailed in Table 2 below along with sectors’ ISIC codes and GDP shares β.
Sector ISIC GDP share β
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing A 0.2639
Mining and Quarrying B 0.0098
Manufacturing C 0.1768
Electricity and Water D + E 0.0384
Building F + L 0.1216
Trade G + I 0.1331
Transport H + J 0.0525
Business K + M + N 0.0793
Social P + Q + R 0.0857
Others S + T 0.0389
GDP shares from Uganda Bureau of Statistics and authors computations.
Table 5.3: Industrial sectors
We obtain the coefficients ωij by dividing the empirically observed input flow from industry
j to industry i by the sum of all input flows to industry i. The intermediation matrix Φ is
constructed in the same fashion based on data obtained from Compuscan (see Section 5.4.1);
as for W, we again exploit data for the year 2015. Specifically, the coefficients φib are derived
by dividing the empirically observed volume of loans originated by bank b to industry i by the
overall volume of loans to industry i. Figure 2 below presents heatmaps for the input-output
matrix W and the intermediation matrix Φ, respectively. The input flows summarised in panel
(a) show relatively strong entries along the main diagonal, indicating that the mix of industrial
sectors’ intermediate inputs assigns an important role for inputs originating within the same
sector. Moreover, three sectors stand out as important suppliers of inputs: Manufacturing,
Transport and Business. Similarly, the loan flows mapped in panel (b) reveal the dominance
of individual banks (e.g., bank 10 and bank 22) in financing the production in many industrial
sectors; these are banks with a high bank outdegree, ob =
∑n
i=1 φib. Moreover, there is sub-
stantial heterogeneity in sectoral loan exposures across banks.20 In sum, both matrices W and
Φ are characterised by a fair amount of asymmetry.
20Examining repeated snapshots of the data, we find this heterogeneity to be persistent, consistent with the
idea of specialisation in bank lending. We take this as evidence of relationship lending where expertise and
relationship capital are built up within bank-sector pairs. There is thus only limited substitutability across
bank loans originated by different banks, and shocks affecting a bank’s lending capacity can be expected to
have real effects on their borrowers.
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(a) Input-output flows (2015) (b) Loan flows (2015)
Figure 5.3: Heatmaps for input-output matrix W and intermediation matrix Φ.
To complete the parameterisation of the model, the degree of decreasing returns to scale η,
the Cobb-Douglas share for the labor input α and the tightness of the borrowing constraint ξ
must be calibrated. While ξ can be pinned down from information in the input-output table,
the parameters η and α cannot be determined directly. This reflects the fundamental prob-
lem of separately identifying differences in distortions from differences in technology (cf. Jones,
2013). We therefore proceed as follows. The input-output table provides information not only
on intermediate input flows but also on the compensation of primary factors, including the
compensation of employees. For each sector i, we can thus break down overall expenditure into
the aggregate intermediate input component across all industries
∑n
j=1 pjqij and the compen-
sation of primary factors, which, among other things, includes the wage bill w`i as a separate
item. Calculating the respective expenditure shares and averaging across sectors, we thus ob-
tain statistics for the intermediate expenditure share and the wage bill relative to sales revenue;
they are given by ζ(1− α) = 0.31 and ξ = 0.20.21
21Jones (2013) argues that the intermediate goods share of gross output is about 0.5 across a large number
of countries (see his Table 3). Compared to that, our measure of ζ(1 − α) = 0.31 under the 10-sector dis
133
We set the returns-to-scale parameter at η = 0.85 as in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008); con-
ditional on this value for η and a guess for α, we can compute ζ = 1−ξ
1−ηαη and thus obtain
an implied value for the intermediate good share ζ(1 − α); iterating on the guess for α to hit
the target ζ(1 − α) = 0.31 then delivers α = 0.89 and ζ = 2.78. In view of the fundamental
identification problem surrounding η and α, we also explore the robustness of our results under
different values for η.22 Table 3 below summarises the outcomes of our calibration exercise
when η ranges in the interval [0.7, 1).
ζ(1− α) = 0.31 η = 0.7 η = 0.8 η = 0.85 η = 0.9 η = 0.99
α 0.7289 0.8418 0.8884 0.9297 0.9936
ζ 1.1433 1.9600 2.7767 4.4100 48.5100
χα+ ζ(1− α) 0.5100 0.5100 0.5100 0.5100 0.5100
α
1−ζ(1−α) 1.0563 1.2201 1.2875 1.3474 1.4400
ζ(1− α) = 0.50 η = 0.7 η = 0.8 η = 0.85 η = 0.9 η = 0.99
α 0.2857 0.5833 0.7059 0.8148 0.9832
ζ 0.7000 1.2000 1.7000 2.7000 29.7000
χα+ ζ(1− α) 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000
α
1−ζ(1−α) 0.5714 1.1667 1.4118 1.6296 1.9663
Table 5.4: Baseline calibration and sensitivity to η
The top panel considers the 10-sector disaggregation where ζ(1 − α) = 0.31. As seen, the
effects are monotonic in the degree of decreasing returns: The higher η, the higher α and ζ.
By contrast, there is no effect on the ratio of total expenditure relative to sales revenue, which
is always given by χα + ζ(1− α) = 0.51. In addition, the fraction 1− η can be interpreted as
the share of sales revenue accrued to fixed factors like physical capital and land. Consistent
with the importance of financial constraints, which inefficiently restrain the scale of business
operation, firms are thus fairly profitable. In consequence, profit leakage plays a quantitatively




1−ζ(1−α) rises from about 1.05 when η = 0.7
(high profit leakage) to about 1.44 when η = 0.99 (low profit leakage). Nevertheless, the
multiplier throughout exceeds one because the input substitution effect from labour towards
intermediate goods dominates the effect of decreasing returns.
aggregation is lower. Reverting to the original, finer 26-sector dis aggregation results in an intermediate goods
share of 0.50.
22Bigio and La’O (2020) take a similar approach.
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Although the intermediation matrix Φ is based on a dis-aggregation into n = 10 broad industrial
sectors, the EORA data on the input-output network W are available at a finer resolution
with n = 26 sectors. The bottom panel of Table 3 therefore considers the finer 26-sector
dis aggregation, which results in a higher intermediate goods share of ζ(1 − α) = 0.50; the
working capital parameter remains basically unchanged at ξ = 0.20. Qualitatively, the results
are similar to the previous specification, but they display greater sensitivity to η. Overall, the
implied parameterisation appears more plausible with an overall expenditure share for labour
and intermediate inputs of 0.70 and a Cobb-Douglas parameter of α = 0.71 when η = 0.85.
Moreover, in view of the lower labor share α, it is also more conservative with respect to the
implied scale distortion of firms’ production (cf. Lemma 2). The multiplier α
1−ζ(1−α) now ranges
from about 0.57 when η = 0.7 to about 1.97 when η = 0.99.23 Since the dis-aggregation into
n = 26 industrial sectors arguably delivers a more accurate picture of the role of intersectoral
input-output linkages, we will work with this as our baseline calibration.
Figure 3 examines the properties of key objects summarising the sectoral and banking composi-
tion of the calibrated economy. Beginning with the production network, panel (a) displays the
influence vector v and the distortion influence vector d. The underlying heterogeneity in sec-
tors’ size and their role for the input-output flows is visible for both vectors, which highlight the
network importance of the Agriculture, Manufacturing and Business sectors. At the same time,
however, there are non-trivial differences between the two vectors, reflecting the divergence be-
tween sectors’ fundamental role for the flow of intermediate inputs and their importance for
the transmission of credit supply shocks within the production network.
Turning to financial intermediation, panel (b) shows the composition of the banking industry
as measured by individual banks’ market shares sb. The top 5 banks command a cumulative





23When η = 0.7, the borrowing constraint is just binding (ξ < ηα ≈ 0.2). There is almost no input substitution
(η < ζ ≈ 0.7), and the profit leakage induced by decreasing returns implies that the multiplier is smaller than
one.
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Panel (c), in turn, plots the profile bank outdegrees ob =
∑n
i=1 φib, which generally resembles
that of the bank market shares, although there are some differences as the bank outdegree does
not take account of the overall loan volume going to individual borrowing sectors.
This is addressed in panel (d), which depicts two weighted bank outdegree vectors, where the
weights are given by v and d, respectively. When weighted with the sectoral influence vector,
the weighted outdegree vector
∑n
i=1 viφib actually corresponds to the vector of market shares up
to a scaling term.24 When weighing with the distortion influence vector instead, the alternative
weighted outdegree vector
∑n
i=1 diφib gives a slightly different picture. As seen in Proposition
3, it is the latter vector that determines the economy’s level of aggregate volatility, and its
divergence from the former vector gives rise to the outdegree correction term characterised
there.
24See (C.1.10) in Appendix C.1.4.
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(a) Influence and distortion influence vectors (b) Bank market shares
(c) Bank outdegrees (d) Weighted bank outdegrees
Figure 5.4: Intermediation statistics.
5.4.3 Decomposition
An important question concerning the relationship between financial intermediation and macroe-
conomic outcomes is whether concentration in the banking industry matters in itself or whether
it is merely a reflection of concentration on the economy’s production side. For example, Bre-
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mus et al. (2018, p. 32) observe that the effects of granularity in banking identified in their
empirical work ‘might, in fact, be merely manifesting granular effects from the manufacturing
sector. If large banks and large firms are linked financially, then our effects might pick up large
firm effects in general.’ Here, we address this question through the lens of the decomposi-
tion result in Proposition 3, which traces aggregate volatility back to two determinants, the
Herfindahl term and the outdegree correction term.
As the definition of sb in (5.20) makes clear, bank market shares arise exclusively from lending
to firms, whereby large banks emerge as the consequence of lending to important (high vi)
sectors. The resulting volatility effects are captured via the Herfindahl term in Proposition
3. By contrast, the outdegree correction term term arises as a consequence of the divergence
between sectors’ influence vi and distortion influence di coupled with banks’ lending exposure
to these sectors. As seen in Proposition 3, this term becomes relevant independent from bank
concentration.
Exploiting the binomial structure of these two terms, another way to write the expression for
aggregate volatility established in Proposition 3 is



























gives the contribution of the familiar Herfindahl index of bank market shares already discussed






, represents the sum of squared bank outdegree correc-
tions and captures the aggregate contribution of shocks in the banking system, insofar as they
lead to distortions that matter independently from what is already accounted for via bank size.
This extra distortion term arises because, under financial frictions, firms operate at a lower
scale as measured by their total expenditure share. Given the curvature in (5.1), this implies
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that fluctuations in factor use translate into larger fluctuations in output and hence in higher






i=1 δiφib, represents the interaction be-
tween the Herfindahl term and the extra distortion term. Notice that this term is non-positive
as δi ≤ 0. This reflects the fact that the Herfindahl term incorporates the increased interme-
diate input share ζ(1 − α) only but not the increased extent of profit leakage induced by the
lower total expenditure share.
Table 4 details the decomposition of aggregate volatility for the two calibrations considered in
Table 3, breaking it down into the three constituent terms described above (rows one to three
of the respective panels). The sum of these terms, that is, the aggregate volatility factor given
by the expression in parenthesis in (5.25), is presented in the fourth row (‘overall’); finally, the
fifth row (‘volatility’) denotes the aggregate volatility factor multiplied by η2.
ζ(1− α) = 0.31 η = 0.7 η = 0.8 η = 0.85 η = 0.9 η = 0.99
concentration 0.1004 0.1339 0.1491 0.1633 0.1866
interaction -0.0299 -0.0565 -0.0712 -0.0865 -0.1146
extra distortion 0.0024 0.0063 0.0090 0.0121 0.0186
overall 0.0728 0.0837 0.0869 0.0890 0.0906
volatility 0.0357 0.0536 0.0628 0.0721 0.0888
ζ(1− α) = 0.50 η = 0.7 η = 0.8 η = 0.85 η = 0.9 η = 0.99
concentration 0.0296 0.1232 0.1804 0.2404 0.3500
interaction -0.0000 -0.0625 -0.1221 -0.1952 -0.3494
extra distortion 0.0000 0.0082 0.0213 0.0409 0.0899
overall 0.0296 0.0689 0.0797 0.0861 0.0905
volatility 0.0145 0.0441 0.0576 0.0697 0.0887
‘Overall’ denotes the aggregate volatility factor given by the expres-
sion in parenthesis in (5.25). ‘Volatility’ denotes the aggregate volati-
lity factor multiplied by η2.
Table 5.5: Decomposition of aggregate volatility factor
Moving across the columns for the different values for the returns-to-scale parameter η, since the
bank market shares sb are given from the data, the relative behaviour of the concentration term
follows that of the multiplier α
1−ζ(1−α) , which is monotonically increasing in η (cf. Table 3). The
same is true for the extra distortion term, which is generally smaller in magnitude but becomes
more important when the intermediate goods share ζ(1 − α) is higher. This latter feature is
evident from the definition of the difference vector in Proposition 3: The distortions induced via
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the input substitution mechanism described in Lemma 1 become more relevant under a higher
intermediate goods share. While the concentration and extra distortion terms contribute to
higher aggregate volatility, their interaction is sizeable and works in the opposite direction.
Reflecting the importance of profit leakage, both the resulting aggregate volatility factor and
aggregate volatility itself are increasing in η. As the production technology approaches its CRS
limit of η = 1 (no profit leakage), we observe the highest aggregate volatility of almost 9 per
cent.
Behind these aggregate outcomes lies a profile of bank-level shocks that are transmitted first
via the intermediation network Φ and then via the input-output network W. In order to
understand the details of this transmission, Figure 3 looks at the bank-level contributions to
aggregate volatility under the baseline calibration with ζ(1− α) = 0.50.
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(a) Empirical data (b) No β heterogeneity
(c) No W heterogeneity (d) No Φ heterogeneity
Figure 5.5: Contribution to aggregate volatility: bank-level decomposition.
As seen in panel (a), the economy with the empirically observed asymmetry in β, W and Φ
has substantial heterogeneity in (i) the contribution of individual banks to aggregate volatility,
and (ii) the bank-level decomposition of this contribution into its respective components. On
the one hand, this heterogeneity mirrows the differences across banks already identified in the
intermediation heatmap of Figure 2 above; and on the other hand, it provides a dis-aggregate
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perspective at the volatility decomposition in Table 4. The other panels of Figure 3 examine
the consequences for the bank-level contribution to aggregate volatility when individual sources
of asymmetry are removed. Eliminating heterogeneity from the input-output network, either
via β (panel (b)) or W (panel (c)), keeps this general pattern intact but leads to some changes
in both the decomposition across and within banks. By contrast, eliminating the asymmetry
in the intermediation network via the matrix Φ (panel (d)) mechanically implies that the
decomposition becomes identical across banks.
What are the implications for aggregate volatility? Table 5 addresses this question on the basis
of the above counterfactuals.
ζ(1− α) = 0.50 baseline no β no W no β & no W no Φ full symm.
concentration 0.1804 0.1737 0.1755 0.1778 0.0797 0.0797
interaction -0.1221 -0.1176 -0.1165 -0.1185 -0.0531 -0.0531
extra distortion 0.0213 0.0209 0.0198 0.0198 0.0089 0.0089
overall 0.0797 0.0771 0.0787 0.0790 0.0354 0.0354
volatility 0.0576 0.0557 0.0569 0.0571 0.0256 0.0256
Herfindahl 0.0905 0.0871 0.0881 0.0892 0.0400 0.0400
‘Overall’ denotes the aggregate volatility factor given by the expres-
sion in parenthesis in (5.25). ‘Volatility’ denotes the aggregate volati-
lity factor multiplied by η2.
Table 5.6: Aggregate volatility under changing heterogeneity pattern
Compared to the baseline economy, removing asymmetry from the input-output network via
sectoral GDP shares β (column two), the configuration of intermediate input flows as captured
by W (column three) or both (column four) has only marginal effects on aggregate volatility
and its decomposition. The pattern of the relevant figures reveals that, at a general level,
asymmetry in the input-output network actually has mixed effects on aggregate volatility.
The underlying reason is that, empirically, heterogeneity in β and W do not work hand in
hand in that large sectors are not necessarily important as suppliers of intermediate inputs for
other sectors.25 By contrast, eliminating asymmetry in financial intermediation by imposing a
uniform intermediation matrix Φ implies a degenerate bank size distribution and thus minimises
25For example, Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing accounts for more than a quarter of GDP, but it has only
a limited role as supplier of intermediate inputs to other sectors (cf. Figure 2).
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the bank Herfindahl index at 25 × 0.042 = 0.04. This leads to a substantial reduction in
aggregate volatility from 0.0576 to 0.0256.26 Finally, as seen from comparing columns five and
six, establishing full symmetry by eliminating all sources of heterogeneity across banks (Φ) and
sectors (β and W) has no detectable (to four digits) further effects. The key take away from
Table 5 therefore is that, both conditional on the empirically observed intermediation matrix
Φ and on the uniform counterfactual, the input-output network as captured by β and W plays
only a marginal role in the determination of aggregate volatility and its decomposition. Instead,
what matters for aggregate volatility is the architecture Φ of financial intermediation.
To get more detailed insights into the role of financial intermediation as a determinant of ag-
gregate volatility, Table 6 examines the implications of a number of counterfactual experiments
based on variations in borrowing and lending arrangements.27
ζ(1− α) = 0.50 low high specialisation specialisation
baseline concentration concentration diversification m = 25 m = 10
concentration 0.1804 0.1161 0.3076 0.1778 0.1185 0.3080
interaction -0.1221 -0.0776 -0.2110 -0.1185 -0.0922 -0.2275
extra distortion 0.0213 0.0132 0.0384 0.0198 0.0207 0.0492
overall 0.0797 0.0516 0.1350 0.0790 0.0470 0.1298
volatility 0.0576 0.0373 0.0975 0.0571 0.0339 0.0937
Herfindahl 0.0905 0.0582 0.1543 0.0892 0.0594 0.1546
‘Overall’ denotes the aggregate volatility factor given by the expres-
sion in parenthesis in (5.25). ‘Volatility’ denotes the aggregate volati-
lity factor multiplied by η2.
Table 5.7: Aggregate volatility under changing intermediation
To begin, we consider variations in the concentration of sectors’ borrowing away from the em-
pirically given intermediation matrix Φ. To that end, column two (low concentration) reduces
sectors’ dependence on individual banks by taking the square root of the existing funding
shares φib and then re-scaling them so that
∑
b φib = 1. Similarly, by taking the square of the
26Interestingly, despite this drop in aggregate volatility, the breakdown into its constituent factors remains
remarkably stable, with concentration, interaction and extra distortion contributing about 225 per cent, -150
per cent and 25 per cent of the overall, respectively. Notice also that, although the Herfindahl index of bank
concentration remains an appropriate indicator for aggregate volatility in relative terms, there is a noticeable
level effect as seen from comparison of the entries under ‘overall’ and ‘Herfindahl’, respectively.
27Figure B.1 in Appendix C.2.3 provides the associated bank-level decomposition of aggregate volatility.
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φib instead, column three (high concentration) evaluates the consequences of increased sector
dependence on important lenders. As seen, increased concentration of borrowing at the sec-
tor level implies a less diversified funding pool with increased exposure to idiosyncratic bank
shocks, which ultimately results in increased aggregate volatility.
Second, we examine the consequences of diversification of banks’ lending activity. Specifically,
for each bank b, we redistribute the φib by spreading them out equally across sectors so that their
sum
∑
i φib remains unchanged. Notice from (5.20) that, as long as there is heterogeneity in the
sectoral influence vector v, this experiment does generally not keep bank size sb unchanged.
Here it is of little consequence, though, as the bank Herfindahl index barely changes when
moving from the baseline in column one to the diversified lending economy in column four. In
line with this observation, we find that, compared to the baseline, diversified lending has almost
no effect on aggregate volatility. This reflects the following trade-off: On the one hand, sectors’
exposure to bank-level shocks becomes completely balanced, which the previous experiment
has demonstrated to reduce aggregate volatility. But on the other hand, idiosyncratic shocks
are now by construction spread across the whole network so that idiosyncratic shocks in effect
become aggregate shocks, which undermines the benefits of diversification.
Third, the scenario of specialisation in bank lending has individual banks concentrate their entire
lending on only one sector. With n = 10 sectors andm = 25 banks, our first experiment (column
five) here assumes that two banks each concentrate their lending on one sector, and the five
sectors with the highest GDP shares βi obtain funding from three banks.This counterfactual is
at the opposite end of the above diversification experiment and hence results in lower aggregate
volatility. Notice in particular that the specialisation scenario eliminates the correlation of credit
supply shocks across sectors so that the the intermediation network is no longer a source of
co-movement. In a second experiment (column six), we set the number of banks to m = n = 10
so that lending relationships between banks and sectors are one-to-one. In environments with
idiosyncratic risk, an increase in the number of entities subject to such shocks is normally
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associated with a decay in aggregate volatility (cf. Gabaix, 2011). The reduction in the number
of banks considered here substantially limits this diversification mechanism, resulting in an
increase in aggregate volatility.
Finally, comparison across the various configurations of borrowing concentration and lending
specialisation (columns two and three versus columns five and six) shows similar bank Herfind-
ahl indices and levels of aggregate volatility. Importantly, however, and contrary to our previous
findings from Table 5, the relative ranking of the Herfindahl indices levels is not aligned with
that of the volatility levels. Although the numerical differences are moderate, this illustrates
that in the distorted economy at hand the bank Herfindahl index is not necessarily an appropri-
ate indicator for aggregate volatility: there is no proportionality between the bank Herfindahl
index and the predicted level of aggregate volatility.28
5.4.4 Amplification?
The volatility expression in Proposition 3 makes clear that, whenever the the influence vector
and the distortion influence vector diverge so that δ 6= 0, aggregate volatility must be lower
than predicted from the Herfindahl term alone. Consistent with that, Tables 5 and 6 indicate
that, irrespective of the configuration of the intermediation and production networks, the bank
Herfindahl index actually always exceeds the overall volatility factor.
It is thus useful to revisit the discussion following Proposition 3 from a quantitative perspec-
tive. There, we identified profit leakage as one key factor contributing to the dampening
of aggregate volatility. Looking at our baseline parameterisation with decreasing returns to
scale, but assuming financial frictions play no role, the expression for aggregate volatility









. When η = 0.85, the cofactor in this expression
28Instead, the correct and economically relevant index for market concentration is given by the modified
Herfindahl index computed based on the bank outdegrees weighted by the distortion influence vector, that is,







= 0.64. Relative to this technologically determined benchmark, the










The driving force behind this amplification is the factor substitution discussed in Lemma 1,
which induces a rise in the intermediate input share from η(1− α) = 0.25 to ζ(1− α) = 0.50,
but also a fall in the total expenditure share from η = 0.85 to χα + ζ(1 − α) = 0.70. The
amplification effect discussed above accounts only for the former effect via an increased network
multiplier. The latter effect of financial frictions is accounted for via the additional outdegree
correction term in Proposition 3. In line with (5.25), this term can be decomposed into an




, and another term, 2 α
1−ζ(1−α)sb
∑n
i=1 δiφib, reflecting the
interaction with the Herfindahl term. As seen in Tables 5 and 6, the extra distortion term is
positive but only of moderate size; by contrast, the interaction term, which multiplies bank
size with the relevant outdegree correction, is negative and sizeable. Taken together, these
additional effects partially compensate the original amplification. For the baseline economy,
dividing the ‘overall’ volatility factor by the technologically determined co-factor multiplied by
the bank Herfindahl index results in an amplification factor of 0.0797
0.64×0.0905 = 1.3754. Hence, there
is still substantial amplification relative to the benchmark without financial frictions. But the
amplification is significantly smaller than the one predicted on the adjustment of intermediate
input shares alone.
We conclude our discussion with an assessment of the empirical contribution of idiosyncratic
credit supply shocks to the volatility of GDP in Uganda. Between January 2012 and June
2020, the quarterly volatility of log GDP was 1.72 per cent. Over the same time horizon, the
volatility of the bank-level credit supply shocks identified in Section 5.4.1 was σ2 = 0.1098
(cf. Appendix C.2.2). Relating these figures through our model (baseline calibration), we thus
infer that the predicted level of aggregate volatility is 0.63 per cent (0.1098× 0.0576 = 0.0063).
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That is, idiosyncratic credit supply shocks account for more than one third (0.0063
0.0172
= 0.3668)
of the empirically observed volatility. When the returns-to-scale parameter changes from its
baseline value of η = 0.85 to η = 0.7 (low returns to scale) or η = 0.99 (CRS limit), the
contribution changes to 9.2 per cent or 56.5 per cent, respectively. Hence, even though bank
finance has a relatively small volume relative to GDP (low ξ), the financial sector can be an
important source of aggregate volatility, particularly in environments with a limited extent of
profit leakage. Notice also that similar calculations, which incorrectly rely on the Herfindahl
term only, would significantly overstate this role.29 Moreover, the experiments underlying
Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate that the structure of financial intermediation summarised in the
intermediation matrix Φ has potentially significant implications on macroeconomic outcomes
that are not necessarily captured via concentration measures alone.
5.5 Conclusion
The relationship between financial conditions and macroeconomic variables has been exten-
sively studied in the developed economies. We present evidence from a different environment,
namely a developing economy, where financial market are relatively less developed and sub-
ject to substantial financial frictions. In this paper we explore using network approach the
transmission of idiosyncratic credit supply shocks to aggregate volatility in a developing econ-
omy. In demonstrating the implications of our theoretical results in an empirical application
to Uganda, an economy defined by high bank dependence and concentration in the banking
industry, the empirical results suggest that idiosyncratic shocks to credit supply have real con-
sequences for bank-dependent sectors. Results from the counterfactual experiments show that
configuration of the network plays a marginal part in determining aggregate volatility, whereas
the architecture of financial intermediation has a bigger effect. In a banking system environ-
29For example, in the baseline economy the Herfindahl term would trace a share of 83.0 per cent of aggregate
volatility (0.1098×0.85
2×0.1804
0.0172 = 0.8300) back to credit supply shocks.
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ment characterised by financial frictions, the Herfindahl index is no longer a sufficient statistic
for explaining the banking sector’s contribution to aggregate volatility. In addition, our theo-
retical model highlights an increased intermediate input share and increased profit leakage as
the principal consequences of financial frictions. From a policy perspective this paper opens up
a debate on how financial intermediation should be organised with respect to its implications
for aggregate volatility. Results goes against the usual argument that we need to minimise





The first two chapters speak to monetary policy efficacy, highlighting presence of balance sheet
and sector borrowing transmission channels. In the first chapter, I document a balance sheet
channel is operational and the real estate and agricultural sectors of the economy are dispro-
portionately affected by tight monetary policy.
In the second chapter, I observed a sector borrowing channel is functional in Uganda, however,
the role of the banks is important. I show regional and non-DSIB banks’ borrowers can offset the
impact of credit supply shocks from loans in all currencies. Local banks’ borrowers are unable
to offset shocks in both local and foreign currencies borrowing. Banks are more responsive
to credit supply shocks, when loans are in foreign currencies this may affect monetary policy
transmission.
In the third chapter, I investigate the impact of foreign exchange intervention on credit growth
in Uganda. I find sterilised FX interventions dampen credit growth. The “crowding-out chan-
nel” is the main transmission mechanism at work, and the exchange rate transmission channel
149
is insignificant. In the final chapter, we find the bank Herfindahl index is no longer a sufficient
statistic to account for the banking system’s contribution to aggregate volatility. The config-
uration of the production network plays a marginal part in determining aggregate volatility.
However; financial intermediation has an important role in amplifying microeconomic shocks
to the real economy. We finally find due to granularity and propagation mechanism via the
intermediation and production network, bank-level supply shocks have sizeable real implications
Although, a number of monetary policy transmission mechanisms are at work in Uganda as
observed, these mechanisms come at a price. The Ugandan economy is largely an agro-based
economy, a reduction in credit to agriculture sector will affect the overall growth in the country.
Also the real estate sector has the largest proportion of credit advanced to the private sector
and a big reduction in credit will further dent growth in the country. This creates a policy
dilemma for the Central Bank as growth enters into its objective function. When the banking
system is subject to supply shocks local banks’ borrowers are unable to adjust to these shocks.
This suggests the banking system is not competitive and therefore calls for policies to enhance
the competitiveness of the sector.
In terms of policy recommendations, when monetary, financial and foreign exchange interven-
tion policies are implemented there is a need to coordinate policy across the various policy
options. The Central Bank also needs to tighten policy gradually while allows for its impact
to feed-through slowly. The Central Bank may need to adapt to a dual mandate of controlling
inflation and economic growth as it is the case in the United States of America. As foreign
currency lending increases, it is likely to reduce the effectiveness of monetary and financial
stability policies. Therefore, foreign currency lending should be controlled. The banking sector
needs increased competition and mobilisation of funding sources.
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Appendix A
Monetary Transmission Mechanism in
Uganda, evidence from Banks’ sectoral
lending data
Information on economic sectors is Uganda, is compiled by Uganda Bureau of Statistics(UBOS).The
Uganda Business inquiry(UBI)1 2 is a comprehensive economic survey conducted every 5-10
years with the latest data collected in fiscal year 2009/2010. Data collected is used to compile
indicators such as value added, gross fixed capital, gross output and intermediate consump-
tion. The economic sectors are classification according to the International Standard Industrial
classification.
1Over 2 million businesses are covered of which 96 per cent are considered informal and contributing to 31
per cent of the total value added this includes all non-tax paying households
2Data on personal and household sector is considered as part of the informal sector.
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A.1 Agriculture sector
The Agriculture sector contributed to 24 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 4
per cent of value added(VA) in the fiscal year 2009/2010 as shown in table 103. The highest
component of the sector’s value added was profit that contributed to 37 per cent of the total
value added, while the lowest component was bad debt at 0.1 per cent of the total value added.
Labour productivity per worker of the agriculture sector was 800 thousand shillings, which was
well below the 12 million shillings total productivity per person for all sectors. The agriculture
sector reported a liquidity ratio of 0.5 which is less than the 1.2 bench mark used in the survey.
This implies that the sector struggles to meet its short-term obligations. The sector’s ability to
meet its long-term debts was reported at 0.7 per cent meaning that the sector could cover at
least 70 per cent of its debts. The agricultural sector reported a profitability of 16 percentage
which was above the 9 per cent target observed in the survey. At 30 per cent, the sector employs
the highest share of people working in the formal sector. These observations suggest that the
sector has low productivity, low output and sector is not so depended on credit facilitates.
A.2 Manufacturing
The manufacturing sector contributed a share of 8 per cent of total GDP in 2009/10 as reported
in the UBOS statistical Abstract 2011. The sector’s value-added ratio was estimated at 0.9,
implying value addition contributed to 90 per cent of its total output. The manufacturing sector
reported a liquidity ratio of 2.2 which is above the benchmark and therefore this suggests that
the sector could meet its short-term obligations. The debt ratio as defined as the ratio of
total debt to total assets stood at 0.4 which is low implying the corporate capital structures
of this sector was geared towards to more equity financing as opposed to debt. The sector’s
3VA:GO is the ratio of value added to gross output and IC:GO is the ratio of intermediate consumption to
gross output
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profitability was 8.7 per cent just below the overall total profitability of 9 per cent reported in
the survey. Labour productivity was 19.1 million per employed worker over the 12 million total
productivity per worker reported by all businesses. The sector also employs about 22 per cent
of people employed in the formal sector.
A.3 Mining and quarrying
The mining and quarrying sector contributed 0.3 per cent to GDP in the fiscal year 2009/2010.
The sector registered a ratio of value added to output ratio of 0.51, with net profit as the main
driver of value added. The sector commands the largest share of total non-current assets.It also
employs less than 1 percent of people employed in the formal sector.Information of performance
indicators for this sector were not available however, we can deduce that output from the sector
is low and less capital intensive.
A.4 Building, mortgage, construction and real estate
Construction sub-sector reported a current ratio of 1.6 which is broadly in between the accept-
able rage of 1.5 and 3 for a business to be considered healthy. Overall profitability was reported
at 11 per cent for the sub sector. The sub-sector is dependent on debt as the debt ratio was
recorded at 63 per cent. Labour productivity was recorded at 12.8 million per employed per
son which was slightly above the total productivity 12-million-shilling per worker for all sectors.
The real estate sub-sector also reported value added to gross output ratio of 56.0 per cent and
the highest component of value added was the cost of staff. Although, it employs less than 1
per cent of people in the formal sector,it contributes to about 9.3 of the gross output. The
sector has also enjoyed high growth rates in recent past, however, of late growth has slowed




The production, generation of electricity contributed to 1.2 per cent of GDP in current prices
4 while purification and distribution of water was estimated at 3.3 per cent of GDP at current
prices in the fiscal year 2009/2010. The ratio of value added to gross output declined from 77
recorded in 2000/2001 to 66 per cent suggesting that the cost of production increased. The
labour productivity ratio of the sector was 17.7 million as compared to 12 million for all sectors.
Financing of the utilities sector by debt was recorded at 37 per cent as defined by the debt
ratio.
A.6 Trade
The trade sector contributed to about 12 per cent of the total GDP in the fiscal year 2009/2010
5 according UBOS Statistical Abstract 2011. It also reported the highest value added, with
net profit as the highest contributor to value added figure. The ratio of value added to gross
output approximated at 68 per cent in 2009/10 compared to 63 per cent reported in 2000/2001.
Labour productivity for the sector was 10 million per person employed compared to the total
productivity of all sectors of 12 million per employed person. The ability of the trade sector
to cover its short-term obligation was recorded at 1.9 as measured by the liquidity ratio im-
plying the sector was in position to meet its short-term liabilities. In terms of long-term debt
obligations, the debt ratio for the sector was recorded at 0.3, this low figure suggests that the
sector is not largely financed by debt. The trade sector registered a 10 per cent profitability,
4Gross domestic product at prices of the current reporting period
5Recent GDP data is split into three broad categories Agriculture, Industry and services and therefore not
applicable
163
with vehicle sales and retail trade sub-sectors reporting the highest profitability of about 15
per cent each as noted by the UBI survey. The sector employs 21 per cent of people in the
formal sector.
A.7 Community, social and other services
This sector includes several sub-sectors namely: accommodation and food services, arts, en-
tertainments and recreation, education, human health and social work and finally other ser-
vices. Accommodation and food services recorded a value added to gross output ratio of 0.7 in
2009/2010 implying the sector had a high efficiency levels in input utilisation, also net profit
was the biggest contributor to value added measure. We note that this sub-sector is dependent
on equity and reserves for its funding, with loans contributing about 17 per cent of its funding.
The education subsector, had a liquidity ratio of 6.5 per cent, a profitability of 16 per cent and
with a debt ratio of 0.1, implying the sub-sector could meet its long-term obligations with ease.
As a sub-component of this sector the health sector reported a value added to gross output ratio
of 64 per cent in fiscal year 2009/2010. The sub-sector had a liquidity ratio of 2.4 implying the
sub-sector could meet its short-term obligations. The sector recorded a debt ratio of 0.2 and
labour productivity of 13 million compare to the total productivity of 12 million per person
employed across all sectors. The community,social and other services sector also employs 18
per cent of people working in the formal sector.
A.8 Transport and communication
The transport and communication sector contributed to 6.4 per cent to GDP in the fiscal
year 2009/2010. The ratio of value added to gross output was recorded at 18 per cent, with
the cost of staff contributing 39 per cent of the value added as the highest component. The
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information and communication sub-sector’s value to gross output ratio was 48 per cent and
the its profitability was minus 9 percent. The sub-sector had a liquidity ratio of 0.6 that meant
the sub-sector was failing to meet its short-term obligations. The sub-sector had a debt-ratio
of 0.6 implying 60 percent of the its total assets was debt and labour productivity of 41 million
per person.
A.9 Business services
The finance and insurance sub-sector contributed to about 3 per cent of GDP in fiscal year
2009/2011 according to UBOS Statistical Abstract 2011. The sub-sector had a value added to
gross output ratio of 37 per cent in 2009/2010 compared to 77 per cent in 2000/2001.It employs
about 6 per cent of people working in the formal sector. With the ratio of value added to gross
output estimated at about 48 per cent.
In terms of sectors of the economy, it is argued that the big borrowers will continue borrowing
while the small firms face credit rationing when monetary policy is tightened. In a developing
country like Uganda, contractionary monetary policy may significantly affect some important
sectors of the economy, a case may be the agricultural sector that is characterised by lower
collateralised net value, low survival rates, low and volatility output as noted earlier, and
yet the sector also employs the largest proportion of the population. A Bank of Uganda
financial stability report (June 2016) reports that non-performing loans (NPL) of the building,
construction and real estate sector increased by 11.6 per cent in June 2016 from 6.7 per cent
in December 2015 as measured in the local currency.The agriculture sector’s NPL increased by
11.8 per cent in June 2016 from 6.7 per cent observed in December 2015. Trade and commerce
sector’s NPL increased by UGX 10.8 per cent from 7.1 per cent in December 2015, this can be
seen in Table A.2 6. As the asset quality of the banking sector deteriorates it is expected for
6UGX represents the Ugandan shilling and FX represents foreign currencies
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banks to reduce lending to these sectors as they are perceived to be less credit worthy hence
the balance sheet transmission channel. It may also restrict investment so much so that it may
induce a recession as the cost of capital increases disadvantaging some sectors of the economy.
This paper will investigate for evidence of whether some sectors in the Ugandan economy are
disproportionately affected by monetary policy.
Employment share Gross Output Value Added VA:GO IC:GO
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 30.4 1721485 1131430 65.7 34.3
Mining and Quarrying 0.4 280209 140572 50.2 49.8
Manufacturing 21.8 7094311 5206243 73.4 26.6
Utilities 0.0 572931 379395 66.2 33.8
Construction and real estate 0.6 3978372 3333689 83.8 16.2
Trade 20.8 9529806 6444548 67.6 32.4
Transport and communication 2.5 6869878 2365491 34.4 65.6
Community and other services 17.9 5451659 3609379 66.2 33.8
Business services 5.7 7497916 3579753 47.7 52.3
Total 100 42996566 26190498 60.9 39.1
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics, UBI-2009/2010.
Table A.1: Industry sector showing employment shares, gross output and value added
Jun-15 Dec-15 Jun-16
Agriculture UGX 4.6 6.7 11.8
FX 7.5 23.7 21.9
Manufacturing UGX 7.8 0.8 6.0
FX 2.7 0.2 0.6
Trade and commerce UGX 2.6 7.1 10.8
FX 5.2 1.4 7.0
Building, construction and real estate UGX 2.6 6.7 11.6
FX 5.2 5.6 10.7
Personal and household loans UGX 4.0 4.5 3.8
FX 5.7 4.8 1.9
Industry ratio UGX 3.8 5.0 8.3
FX 4.2 5.6 8.3
Source: Bank of Uganda.
Table A.2: Sectoral Non-performing loans ratios by cur-
rency(percentage)
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Levels(Constant,trend) Constant only First diff (Constant, trend) Constant Conclusion
GDP -3.35[0.07](7) -2.04[0.27](4) -4.93[0.00](1) -4.95[0.00](1) Non-stationary
Policy rate -3.96 [0.01] (10) -4.15 [0.00] (10) -3.71[0.03] (1) -3.58[0.01] (1) Stationary
Liquidity -4.27 [0.00] (4) -2.82[0.06] (0) -11.54[0.00] (0) -11.22[0.00] (0) Stationary
Capital -2.56[0.30] (0) -1.89[0.34] (0) -9.87[0.00] (0) -9.86[0.00] (0) Non-stationary
Asset -3.40[0.06](0) -1.85[0.36] (2) -9.30[0.00] (1) -9.10[0.00] (0) Stationary
Agriculture -3.40[0.06](0) -1.17[0.94](0) -7.17[0.00](0) -7.12[0.00](0) Stationary
Trade -2.86[0.56](0) -3.50[0.05](0) -8.88[0.00](0) -8.86[0.00](0) Stationary
Household -2.74[0.22](0) -2.07[0.26](0) -9.45[0.00](0) -9.43[0.00](0) Non-stationary
Transport -1.94[0.62](0) -1.93[0.32](0) -10.19[0.00](0) -10.19[0.00](0) Non-stationary
Manfacturing -2.74[0.22](0) -2.38[0.15](0) -8.70[0.00](0) -8.52[0.00](0) Non-stationary
Real Estate -2.94[0.16](0) -1.16[0.69](1) -5.95[0.00](0) -10.64[0.00](0) Non-stationary
Community -4.72[0.00](0) -4.52[0.00](0) -12.36[0.00](0) -12.45[0.00](0) Stationary
Business -4.12[0.00](0) -3.67[0.01](0) -9.84[0.00](0) -9.91[0.00](0) Stationary
Electricity -3.73[0.03](0) -2.80[0.06](0) -10.15[0.00](0) -10.15[0.00](0) Stationary
Mining -3.07[0.12](0) -2.27[0.19](0) -10.42[0.00](0) -10.50[0.00](0) Non-stationary
Source: Author’s computation.
Table A.3: ADF unit-roots test for the aggregated data
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Levels(Trend) Drift only Conclusion
Capital 213.78[0.00] (8) 126.70[0.00](5) stationary
Liquidity 80.09[0.00] (2) 190.69[0.00](1) stationary
Return on Asset 139.19[0.00] (3) 140.99[0.00](1) stationary
Asset 291.95[0.00](8) 121.57[0.00](3) stationary
GDP 167.01 [0.00] (0) 146.66 [0.00](5) stationary
Policy rate 256.63 [0.00](3) 113.45[0.00] (3) stationary
Agriculture 100.58[0.00](1) 171.57[0.00] (1) stationary
Manufacturing 158.10[0.00](1) 145.78[0.00] (3) stationary
Trade 69.78[0.00](1) 160.85[0.00] (1) stationary
Transport 124.47[0.00](2) 110.26[0.00] (5) stationary
Real Estate 103.63[0.00] (4) 166.60[0.00] (1) stationary
Community 148.36[0.00] (1) 72.50[0.02] (1) stationary
Household 121.67[0.00] (3) 116.05[0.00](1) stationary
Business 127.75[0.00](3) 134.97[0.00](2) stationary
Source: Author’s computation.
Table A.4: Fisher test for the panel data
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t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001







Variable chi2 df Prob > chi2
Policy rate 0.9 2 0.63775
Agriculture 5.458 2 0.06529
Mining 4.563 2 0.10214
Manufacturing 1.305 2 0.52077
Transport 0.619 2 0.73373
Trade 0.156 2 0.92493
Electricity 1.445 2 0.4856
Business 2.405 2 0.30045
Community 2.557 2 0.27839
Real Estate 0.199 2 0.90547
Household 1.126 2 0.56955
All 20.732 22 0.53734
Table A.6: Tarque Bera test for Normality
lag chi2 df Prob > chi2
1 115.8358 121 0.61554
2 132.9505 121 0.2157
3 122.165 121 0.45324
4 123.619 121 0.41685
Table A.7: Test for auto-correlation
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0.0211 -0.0224 0.00350* -
0.00689
-0.0239
























(-1.19) (0.78) (-2.03) (-2.03) (1.90) (0.10)
L.liquid 0.000627 0.0000973 0.00171 0.000958* -
0.00224
0.000310
(1.24) (0.39) (1.03) (2.00) (-1.68) (0.67)
L2.liquid 0.000125 0.0000167 0.000998 -
0.00106
0.00155* 0.000544







(-1.72) (-2.00) (1.70) (1.61) (-0.47)
Continues on the next page
174




















































(-3.11) (0.01) (2.11) (0.27) (1.26) (-0.31) (-0.19) (3.21) (0.96)
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ln asset 0.0311* -
0.00865
0.0359* 0.0195 0.0382
(2.16) (-0.45) (2.40) (0.65) (1.79)
L.ln asset 0.00192 -0.0178 0.0389 -0.0256 -0.0369
(0.16) (-1.02) (1.50) (-1.09) (-1.08)
L2.ln asset 0.0346* -0.0273 -
0.0642*
0.0250 0.00736
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N 331 324 297 351 331 358 322 351 341
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Appendix B
Does a sector borrowing channel exist
in Uganda?
Regional banks Domestic banks(Local) International banks
Ecobank DFCU Bank of Baroda
Bank of Africa Centenary bank Standard Chartered






United Bank for Africa
Source: Bank of Uganda.
a Excludes new banks licensed after 2018;Opportunity Bank, Finance Trust,
NCBA(following merger of NC Bank and CBA in 2020).
b Domestic(local) banks are banks with headquarters and majority shareholding,
Ugandan resident.
c Regional banks are institutions controlled and owned from other regional countries
on the African continent.
c International banks, these are multinational banks that have headquarters and ma-
jority share holding based overseas.
d Crane Bank limited excluded from the analysis.
Table B.1: Bank classification by the origin of bank.
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Appendix C
Credit supply shocks and aggregate
volatility: A network approach
C.1 Theoretical results
C.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Using (5.1), (5.2) and (5.9), sectoral output can be written as qi = qi(xi, qij). The problem
faced by intermediate good firms thus becomes
max
xi,qij
πi = piqi(xi, qij)− rixi −
n∑
j=1
pjqij + λ [ξpiqi(xi, qij)− rixi] ,
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where λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on financial constraint (5.10). The optimality
























where the inequalities follow because ξ ∈ (0, 1). Let χ ≡ (1+λξ)
(1+λ)
η and ζ ≡ (1 + λξ)η. As
ξ ∈ (0, 1), we have ξη < χ ≤ η. Moreover, (1 + λξ)η = (1 + λ)χ and hence λ = η−χ
χ−ξη ≥ 0 and

















Finally, when ξ < ηα, the financial constraint (5.10) is strictly binding and χ = ξ
α
< η. This
implies λ = η−χ
χ−ξη =
ηα−ξ
ξ(1−ηα) > 0, and ζ = (1 + λξ)η =
1−ξ
1−ηαη > η. The demand for bank loans


































































where the last equality makes use of the demand condition for the loan aggregate. Total




pjqij = [αχ+ (1− α)ζ] piqi.
When the financial constraint (5.10) is strictly binding, χ = ξ
α
and total expenditures are










The expression in brackets is continuous in ξ and converges to one as ξ → ηα. Its derivative




















+ (1− α) 1−ξ
1−ηα
]
< 1 when ξ < ηα. It follows that, under a binding financial






C.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2
As seen in the proof of Lemma 1, total expenditures under a binding financial constraint
(5.10) are given by
















+ (1− α) 1− ξ
1− ηα
]
= −(1− ξ)(1− η)
(1− ηα)2
< 0.
C.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1










ζ(1− α)ωijpiqi = pjqj.















ζ(1− α)ωijγi = γj. (C.1.1)
In vector notation, stacked over sectors, this becomes
β + ζ(1− α)W′γ = γ.
Solving for γ,
γ = [I− ζ(1− α)W′]−1 β. (C.1.2)













where we used (5.14), the normalization for the aggregate price level, P = 1, and the fact that
final output coincides with aggregate consumption, Y = C. That is, the elements of γ are









which converges to 1
α
as the expenditure coefficient for intermediate inputs approaches its
value under constant returns to scale (η = 1) and no financial frictions (ξ > ηα), ζ → 1.1
Multiplication of the sales vector in (C.1.2) with α yields the influence vector,
v = αγ = α [I− ζ(1− α)W′]−1 β, (C.1.3)
with transpose
v′ = αβ′ [I− ζ(1− α)W]−1 . (C.1.4)










indicating that, when ζ = 1, the elements of the influence vector sum to one and correspond
to the sectoral shares of total intermediate good sales – the Domar weights. However, when
ζ 6= 1, this equivalence is lost.Financial frictions and the influence vector. Notice that
the input-output matrix W is positive and that all the eigenvalues of W are inside the unit






1Given the technology in (5.2), when η = 1 and ξ > ηα, final output amounts to a share α (the labor share,
corresponding to the remuneration of the only primary input) of total intermediate good sales; the remaining
share (1− α) is netted out for expenditure on intermediate inputs.
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which is different from one, unless ζ = 1. Notice that α
1−ζ(1−α) > 1 holds if ζ > 1, which is true
provided the extent of financial frictions as captured by the shortfall of ξ below ηα is
sufficiently strong relative to the extent of decreasing returns to scale η < 1. Formally,
ζ = 1−ξ





. By contrast, under moderate financial frictions, we have ζ < 1 and
hence α
1−ζ(1−α) < 1. Recall from the proof of Lemma 1 that, under a binding financial





1−ηα < 0. Since the ratio in (C.1.5) is increasing in
ζ, it follows that tighter financial frictions (that is, a reduction in ξ in the range where


















From (1), we have




Substituting for pipj from the previous equation, and using the relationship vi = αγi, we get








































































































































i=1 w`i = w by clearing on the market for working capital loans. Finally, notice that the























where the result follows from
∑m
b=1 φib = 1 and from (C.1.5).
C.1.5 Proof of Proposition 2
First, substitute from the factor demand functions (C.1.6) and (C.1.11) into the production function (5.1) of






































1−ζ(1−α) . Taking logs,
ln qi = η
{
− αw + α
m∑
b=1










i=1 w`i = w by clearing on the market for working capital loans. Reorganizing,










φib (lnφib + ln zb)
]
+ (1− α)









b=1 φib = 1 and
∑n
j=1 ωij = 1, and stacking over n sectors,
q = η
{
α [v − 1 lnα+ 1 ln(1− ζ(1− α)) + Θ]
+ (1− α)
[
v + 1 ln(ζ(1− α)) + Wq−Wv + (W ◦W)1
] }
,




b=1 φ1b ln (φ1bzb)
...∑m
b=1 φnb ln (φnbzb)
 .
Solving for q,
[I− η(1− α)W] q = η
{
α [v − 1 lnα+ 1 ln(1− ζ(1− α)) + Θ]
+ (1− α)
[




q = [I− η(1− α)W]−1 η
{
α [v − 1 lnα+ 1 ln(1− ζ(1− α)) + Θ]
+ (1− α)
[
v + 1 ln(ζ(1− α))−Wv + (W ◦W)1
] }
.
Pre-multiplying the right-hand-side by I = [I− ζ(1− α)W]−1 [I− ζ(1− α)W],
q = [I− ζ(1− α)W]−1 Mη
{
α [v − 1 lnα+ 1 ln(1− ζ(1− α)) + Θ]
+ (1− α)
[





M = [I− ζ(1− α)W] [I− η(1− α)W]−1 . (C.1.12)




α [v − 1 lnα+ 1 ln(1− ζ(1− α)) + Θ]
+ (1− α)
[




β′q = ηv′MΘ + ηv′M
{











[v − 1 lnα+ 1 ln(1− ζ(1− α))] + (1− α)
α
[
v + 1 ln(ζ(1− α))−Wv + (W ◦W)1
] }
,
the previous equation becomes
β′q = ηv′MΘ + Γ0. (C.1.13)
Next, recall that vi = αγi = αβi
qi
ci
. Taking logs, and expressing in vectorial form, we get
c = q− v + 1 lnα+ lnβ.
Pre-multiplying by β′,
β′c = β′q− β′v + lnα− β′ lnβ.
Finally, from (5.4), market clearing for final consumption goods implies
lnY = β′c.
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Putting the previous results together,
lnY = β′q− β′v + lnα− β′ lnβ
= ηv′MΘ + Γ0 − β′v + lnα− β′ lnβ,
where the last equality uses (C.1.13). Collecting in Γ the terms that are invariant to the balance sheet shocks
zb, we get
lnY = ηv′MΘ + Γ, (C.1.14)
where
Γ ≡ Γ0 − β′v + lnα− β′ lnβ.
Defining d′ ≡ v′M and using (C.1.4) and (C.1.12), we have
d′ = v′M
= αβ′ [I− ζ(1− α)W]−1 [I− ζ(1− α)W] [I− η(1− α)W]−1
= αβ′ [I− η(1− α)W]−1 . (C.1.15)
Hence,
d = α [I− η(1− α)W′]−1 β. (C.1.16)
Using (C.1.15), equation (C.1.14) can be written as
lnY = ηd′Θ + Γ, (C.1.17)
which is equivalent to










Characterization of the distortion influence vector. The following Lemma helps to further characterize
the vector d′ defined in (C.1.15).
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Lemma 3 Consider scalars α, β and quadratic matrix A. Then,
(I− αA) (I− βA)−1 = (I− αA)
(








I + βA + (βA)2 + . . .
)
= I + βA + (βA)2 + · · · − αA− αβA2 − αβ2A3 + . . .
= I + (β − α) A + (β2 − αβ)A2 + (β3 − αβ2)A3 + . . .
= I + (β − α) A + (β − α)βA2 + (β − α)β2A3 + . . .





I + βA + β2A2 + β3A3 + . . .
]
− (β − α)
β























I + βA + β2A2 + β3A3 + . . .
]
.
Using this Lemma, we have
M = [I− ζ(1− α)W] [I− η(1− α)W]−1 = (η(1− α)− ζ(1− α))
η(1− α)

































η(1− α)W + (η(1− α))2W2 + (η(1− α))3W3 + . . .
]
+ v′I,
where the third line simply expands [I− η(1− α)W]−1. Next, define vector δ as the deviation of vector d
from the influence vector v,
δ ≡ d− v, (C.1.19)
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so that























η(1− α)W + (η(1− α))2W2 + (η(1− α))3W3 + . . .
]
. (C.1.20)
By Lemma 1, η < ζ. Since α < 1 and the input-output matrix W is non-negative, it follows that vector δ










where the expression for
∑n
i=1 vi comes from (C.1.5).
C.1.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Recall (C.1.18),























Since Γ is composed of constants and η is a parameter, we have





























where the last equality follows from the fact that the shocks zb are independent across banks b. However,
given the input-output network structure embodied in W (and relevant here via the vector d), the
propagation of shocks implies that there is no independence across intermediate good sectors. The variance
expression therefore needs to take into account the covariances across sectors i. Therefore,













cov [diφib ln(φibzb), djφjb ln(φjbzb)]
 .
According to the properties of the variance and covariance operators and recalling that di and φib are
constant, we can express the previous equation as







































































Thus, defining σ2b ≡ var [ln(zb)], we have








If all banks have the same distribution of shocks, σb = σ, and these are independent, we have

































and from (C.1.19) the definition of vector δ = d− v. The variance expression in (C.1.23) can then be
rewritten as







































































































































η(1− α)W + (η(1− α))2W2 + (η(1− α))3W3 + . . .
]
.
To the first-order, we thus have
δ′ ≈ (η − ζ)(1− α)v′W,
implying




where the inequality follows since η < ζ, α < 1 and all entries of the input-output matrix W are non-negative.
Generically (that is, when sector i is relevant at all as a supplier of intermediate inputs), the inequality is
strict, δi < 0, since at least one ωji > 0 when sector i supplies intermediate inputs to other sectors.
195











Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas
Other Mining & Quarrying
Manufacturing(manufacturing)
Food, Beverages and Tobacco
Textiles, Apparel and Leather
Wood, Wood Products & Furniture
Paper, Paper Products, Printing & Publishing
Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Plastic and Rubber Products
Basic and Fabricated Non-Metal and Metal Products










Land (Road & Rail) Transport
Water Transport
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Postal & Courier Services
Telecommunications
Electricity and Water(Electric)
Electricty, Lighting & Power
Water, Water Works & Supply





Road Construction and Mantainance
General Construction Contractors e.g. Building/Construction Companies
Specialised Contractors e.g. Plumbers, Roof Repair, Electrical Contractors etc




Community, Social & Other Services(Social)
Education Services
Health Services
Membership Organisations, Community Development




C.1.7 Analytical results for Section 5.3.1
From Proposition 3, aggregate volatility is given by










Considering the case with n = 2 sectors and m = 2 banks, we have



















d1φ1b [d1φ1b + d2φ2b] + d2φ2b [d1φ1b + d2φ2b]
= σ2η2d1φ11 [d1φ11 + d2φ21] + σ
2η2d2φ21 [d1φ11 + d2φ21]
+ σ2η2d1φ12 [d1φ12 + d2φ22] + σ
2η2d2φ22 [d1φ12 + d2φ22] .
Since for sector 1 φ12 = 1− φ11 and for sector φ21 = 1− φ22,
1
σ2η2
var[lnY ] = d1φ11 [d1φ11 + d2(1− φ22)] + d2(1− φ22) [d1φ11 + d2(1− φ22)]







2 − 4φ11φ22d1d2 − 2φ1(d21 − d1d2)− 2φ22(d22 − d1d2) + d21 + d22.
As φ11 and φ22 are independent (but 0 ≤ φ11, φ22 ≤ 1), the first-order conditions for an interior extremum are
4d21φ11 − 4φ22d1d2 − 2(d21 − d1d2) = 0












As the determinant is zero, the equations are either dependent or incompatible. In fact, the solution is given














subject to the restriction 0 ≤ φ11, φ22 ≤ 1.






d = α [I− η(1− α)W′]−1 β ≈ [0.5378, 0.4034]′.
Notice that φ11 = φ22 = 0.5 is a solution. That is, although the input-output network is asymmetric, the set of
volatility minimizing configurations for financial intermediation includes the symmetric one where both sectors
have equal funding shares from both banks. Going away from the symmetric configuration, as the
high-distortion influence sector 1 starts to concentrate its funding on bank 1 (higher φ11), the low-distortion
influence sector 2 needs to accommodate this by increasing its funding from bank 2 more than proportionately
(higher φ2); mathematically, this is the consequence of the fact that d1 > d2. Notice also that the constraint
0 ≤ φ22 ≤ 1 requires d1−d22d1 ≤ φ11 ≤
d1+d2
2d1
. That is, the high-distortion influence sector 1 cannot fully
concentrate its borrowing on one bank. Figure A.1 below plots the minimum volatility configuration between
φ11 and φ22 implied by equation (C.1.25) and the volatility surface for all feasible combinations of φ11 and φ22.
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(a) Minimum volatility configuration (b) Volatility surface
Figure C.1.1: Configuration of financial intermediation in the example economy
C.2 Empirical illustration and quantitative results
C.2.1 Financial intermediation in Uganda
Although Uganda’s recent economic history has seen significant financial development, most indicators of
financial development are still low by international standards. Similar to most low income countries, financial
market depth in general, and the size of the banking system in particular, are smaller – in terms of domestic
credit relative to GDP – and less open – in terms of de iure and de facto measures of financial integration – in
Uganda than their counterparts in developed countries (Abuka et al., 2019).
The informal economy in Uganda is large, with estimates in the range of 30 to 40% of GDP (La Porta and
Shleifer, 2014). Informality is thus important both in the financial and non-financial sectors. Importantly,
however, this informal activity remains largely disconnected from the formal economy: There are only very
few transitions of firms between the informal and the formal sectors. Moreover, the interaction between
trading partners and on credit markets is characterized by substantial self-enforcement mechanisms (e.g.
through the operation of the tax system; de Paula and Scheinkman, 2010), which induce a tendency of
separation between formal and informal activity.2 LaPorta and Shleifer (2008, 2014) thus advocate a dual
2LaPorta and Shleifer (2008, 2014) report that, in firm-level survey data across a number of developing
countries, only two percent of informal firms sell their output to large (formal) firms.
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view of informality. Accordingly, informal activity on both financial and non-financial markets is separate
from the formal economy. In particular, access to formal finance is limited to firms which themselves operate
as formal, registered businesses.
With this in mind, Table B.1 provides some statistics relating to formal finance in Uganda from the Global
Financial Development Database.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
(1) Private credit by financial sector to GDP (%) 11.23 12.29 12.31 12.34 12.67 13.44 13.28 12.37
(2) Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%) 10.86 11.86 11.84 11.84 12.18 12.89 12.67 11.81
(3) Bank dependence [(2)/(1)] 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95
(4) Total loans to total deposits (%) 46.41 52.26 50.70 48.53 47.47 49.37 48.28 44.20
(5) Total loans to total assets (%) 65.34 73.84 74.96 73.42 70.48 73.14 70.67 64.41
(6) Deposit dependence [(5)/(4)] 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.69
(7) Bank concentration (largest 3 banks, %) 43.47 41.00 39.10 37.63 37.98 42.68
(8) Bank concentration (largest 5 banks, %) 59.02 56.84 55.45 54.27 54.84 61.20
Source: Bank of Uganda, Uganda Bureau of Statistics and authors’ computations.
Financial sector defined as deposit money banks and other financial institutions.
Table C.2.1: Financial development and banking in Uganda (2010-2017)
Formal financial sector credit to the private sector has increased from 11.2% of GDP in 2010 to 12.4% of GDP
in 2017. The overwhelming share of this is actually originated in the banking system, whose credit volume to
the private sector expanded from 10.9% to 11.8% of GDP over the same period. The Ugandan economy is
thus characterized by significant bank dependence, with an average of 96% of private sector credit coming from
banks. The banking system itself is strongly dependent on deposit funding. Deposits as a share of GDP range
between 14.6% and 16.9% (Global Financial Development Database, 2018), and they are by far the most
important source of funding for bank assets. Indeed, deposit dependence, calculated as the fraction of bank
deposits relative to assets, was at 71% in 2010 and at 69% in 2017. By contrast, the availability of wholesale
funding is very limited; with a ratio of interbank borrowing to total deposits in the banking system at only 2%
in 2017 (Bank of Uganda Financial Stability Report, 2017), the interbank market is weak.
While Uganda still has a substantial informal financial sector, the formal banking sector is well-established
and adequately capitalized,3 though with a relatively small number of banks. It currently comprises 25
(private) banks and is characterized by a high degree of concentration. The market share (in terms of total
assets) controlled by the three largest banks accounted for more about 40% in 2017, and the combined balance
sheet of the five largest banks made up more than 60% of the overall assets held in the banking system.
3In 2017, the average tier one capital adequacy ratio and total capital adequacy ratio were 21.4% and 23.6%,
respectively (Bank of Uganda Financial Stability Report, 2017).
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C.2.2 Bank-level volatility
Figure C.2.1 plots the standard deviation of the bank-level supply shocks ςb estimated in (5.21) against the
banks’ market share. There is no evident pattern indicating a systematic effect of bank size on volatility. A
linear regression results in a slope estimate of -0.01 estimated without significance (p = 0.28). We thus assume
a uniform volatility at the level of the cross-sectional average, σb = σ = 0.3313.
Figure C.2.1: Bank market shares and volatility
C.2.3 Bank-level decomposition under intermediation
counterfactuals
202
(a) Empirical data (b) Low concentration
(c) High concentration (d) Diversification
(e) Specialization m = 25 (f) Specialization m = 10
Figure C.2.2: Contribution to aggregate volatility: bank-level decomposition.
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